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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal of the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff/Appellant Frantz's (Frantz) 
attorney malpractice suit against Defendant/Respondent Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
(HTEH) under the provisions ofI.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). The District Court recognized that the claims 
of malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty were properly assets of Frantz's Bankruptcy Estate 
and that the Bankruptcy proceeding constituted another action pending between the same parties 
for the san1e cause. Accordingly, the action was appropriately dismissed pursuant to judicial 
estoppel and the defense of abatement. 
This Appeal also encompasses the District's Court's denial to Attorney Jeffrey Katz of 
admission pro hac vice, and the Court's ultimate award of attorney's fees to HTEH under LC. 
§ 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121. 
Plaintiff Frantz' case is based in its entirety on his belated and opp01iunistic contention, 
first asserted in an October 2014 Bankruptcy proceeding, that an attorney-client relationship had 
existed between himself and Merlyn Clark, a partner with Respondent HTEH. Frantz sought 
disqualification of HTEH as a former client of the firm, contending that its representation ofldaho 
Independent Bank (IIB) as a creditor against him in his Bankruptcy proceedings and HTEH's use 
of confidential infonnation violated Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct (I.R.P.C. 1.9) and 
breached fiduciary duties. 
The record on this appeal demonstrates that Frantz' s claims of malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty (hereinafter "Attorney Claims") against HTEH arose prior to his filing of 
bankruptcy in 2011 and are rooted in Frantz's pre-bankruptcy past. Further, Frantz's Complaint 
alleges damages occurring prior to the Bankruptcy and prior to the conversion of the Bankruptcy 
case to a Chapter 7. Thus, those claims are property of the Bankruptcy Estate and Frantz is 
BRlEF OF RESPONDENT HAWLEY 
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estopped from pursuing them in this action. Further, as a fundamental element of 
Frantz's claim against HTEH in this action was determined against Frantz after a full evidentiary 
hearing in the Bankruptcy proceeding, dismissal or abatement pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) is 
appropriate. 
The District's Court's denial of Respondent's request that Attorney Katz be admitted pro 
hac vice falls solidly within the appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion, and likewise should 
be upheld. The District Court considered a number of actions by Mr. Katz which clearly raised 
questions regarding Mr. Katz's understanding ofldaho's Rules of Professional Conduct, or as to 
his willingness to comply with them. Without an adequate explanation by Mr. Katz for the 
questioned conduct, and in light of Mr. Katz's likely appearance as a witness if the case were to 
proceed, the District Court appropriately declined to admit Mr. Katz pro hac vice. 
Finally, the District's Court's award of attorney's fees under either LC. § 12-120(3) or 
I. C. § 12-121 was proper and should be upheld. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Plaintiffs description of the course of proceedings is accurate as to the dates but the 
following additions and corrections are required: 
a) This matter was filed, but not served on Feb 20, 2015. Counsel for HTEH 
orally appeared on March 3, and requested that he be advised when service was 
accomplished. (Aff. ofRiseborough, R. Vol. I, pp. 27-28) 
b) The Complaint alleged that HTEH used confidential inforn1ation to support 
a claim that the IIB debt was not dischargeable for fraud, and that, but for the use of that 
information, Frantz would have been able to discharge his debt to IIB. (Complaint, R. 
Vol. I, p. 18, i;i[ 29d, 33; p. 19, 138c; p. 20, ,144 and 45) 
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c) The Complaint alleges that HTEH' s actions occurred within his Bankruptcy 
proceeding. (R. Vol. I, pp. 27-28) 
d) The Complaint does not limit the allegations of wrongdoing and harm to 
HTEH's representation of IIB in the Adversary Proceeding, but makes broad based 
contentions that HTEH breached its duties to Frantz in the Bankruptcy Proceedings in 
general. (Complaint, ,r,r 30, 32, 38(c), 43, R. Vol. I, pp. 18, 19 and 20) 
e) Frantz's counsel moved for the Admission of Katz on April 7, 2015 but did 
not advise defense counsel of the motion - it was received from the client on April 13, 
2015. Defendant's counsel filed an objection on April 22, 2015. 
f) Defense counsel for HTEH filed a Notice of Appearance on May 4, 2015. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 108-110) 
g) On June 1, 2015, Attorney Frantz filed a "Response to Objection to Motion 
for Pro Hae Vice Admission." (R. Vol. II, pp. 306-308) 
h) On June 26, 2015, counsel for HTEH filed its "Reply re Objection to 
Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission," (R. Vol. II, pp. 336-340) as additional questionable 
conduct had been learned. 
i) On July 13, 2015, Frantz filed his "Brief in Support of Motion for Pro Hae 
Vice Admission" (R. Vol. I, pp. 341-344) as well as lengthy declarations by Mr. Katz 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 345-348), and by Attorney Frantz (R. Vol. I, pp. 349-351). Neither denied 
the complained of actions. Neither recognized the violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct those actions represented. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HAWLEY 
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Statement of Facts. 
Facts Relevant to the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) Motion. 
Beginning in 2008, Bruce Owens and Regina McCrea, partners in the law firm of Owens 
& Crandall, began representing Martin Frantz in a legal malpractice action Frantz was pursuing 
against the Witherspoon Kelly law firm ("WKDT"). In preparing their case for Frantz, Owens and 
McCrea retained Merlyn Clark, a partner with HTEH, to serve as an expert witness on the standard 
of care. (Aff. of Regina McCrea, R. Vol. I, pp. 116-118; Aff. of Merlyn Clark, R Vol. I, pp. 139-
144) By letter, Mr. Clark was advised of McCrea's theory of actionable conduct by WKDT and 
asked to evaluate and to provide his "independent assessment" as to whether WKDT had violated 
the standard of care applicable to attorneys. (R. Vol 1, pp. 129-133) Mr. Clark reviewed materials 
provided him by McCrea and, on May 4 2009, produced a 21-page written report for Owens & 
Crandall reflecting his opinions and detailing the materials he had received and reviewed. (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 154-174) Mr. Clark did not receive any confidential information in connection with his work 
for Owens & Crandall. He had cautioned them that any material they did send would be subject to 
disclosure to their opponents. (Aff. of Clark, R. Vol. I, p. 141; Oral Decision of Judge Myers 
R. Vol. I, p. 245) Frantz never spoke with Mr. Clark, and never provided him any infonnation 
(Aff. of Clark, R. Vol. I, pp. 141-142). HTEH billed Owens & Crandall for Mr. Clark's services. 
One of those invoices, in the amount of $10,664.00, was paid directly to HTEH by Frantz in May 
of 2009. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-180; Declaration of Frantz R. Vol. I, p. 124) Frantz's suit against 
WKDT was resolved through mediation in July 2009. (Declaration of McCrea, R. Vol. I, p. 117) 
Less than a year later, on June 28, 20 I 0, attorney Sheila Schwager of HTEH wrote a letter 
on behalf of her client, IIB, demanding payment on a commercial indebtedness Frantz had 
guaranteed and advising of the prospect of legal action to collect if payment was not received. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 135-137) Payment was not received and an action was brought by HTEH on July 14, 
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10, on behalf of IIB, under Cause No. CV-10-6088, District Court, First Judicial District of State 
Idaho, County of Kootenai. Subsequently, Frantz filed for protection from creditors, 
(reorganization) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court, 
District of Idaho. It was assigned Case No 11-21337-TLM, and the Honorable Chief Judge 
Terry L. Myers began presiding. This halted the state action against Frantz. 
On April 23, 2013, the Bankruptcy proceedings were converted to a Chapter 7. (Add., BR 
193) In Re Frantz, 2015 W.L. 1778068 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2015). On August 23, 2013, HTEH filed 
an Adversary Proceeding (No 13-07024-TLM) in the Frantz Bankruptcy proceeding against Frantz 
on behalf of IIB, seeking a determination that Frantz's debt to IIB was not dischargeable due to 
fraud. A pre-trial hearing was held in December of 2013, and a trial date of December 1, 2014 was 
set. (R. Vol. I, p. 75, ll. 4-5) 
Thereupon, on October 31, 2014, Frantz brought his Second Motion to Disqualify HTEH, 
claiming that Merlyn Clark had been his attorney in 2008-2009, that Clark had been given 
confidential infonnation during that representation, and that HTEH must be using that infonnation 
to support its claim of fraud. (Exh. B to Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol 1, p. 39)1 Affidavits were submitted 
in support of and against the motion, but Chief Judge Myers determined that he needed to hear live 
testimony, subject to cross-examination, to resolve the questions of fact the affidavits raised. (Oral 
Decision of Judge Myers, R. Vol. I, pp. 241-242) 
In connection with his Motion to Disqualify, Frantz identified as an expert witness, attorney 
Jeffrey Katz. (Exh. C, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 62-64) Neither Frantz nor Katz disclosed to the 
Bankruptcy Court (the finder of fact) that Mr. Katz had a personal interest in seeing HTEH 
1 Frantz's first Motion to Disqualify HTEH resulted in a Stipulated Order of January 17, 2012, 
reflecting that HTEH "does not and has not" represented Frantz in any matters and no conflict 
existed. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 189-90) 
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disqualified as he was representing Frantz in a legal malpractice suit to be pursued against HTEH. 
That suit involved the same matter, i.e., the substantial indebtedness of Frantz to IIB and his efforts 
to avoid it. 
The Court held a full evidentiary hearing on December 1 and 2, 2014, with testimony by 
Regina McCrea, Plaintiff Frantz, and Merlyn Clark. After hearing direct and cross examination 
and considering numerous exhibits, the Court found that (a) Merlyn Clark never formed an 
attorney-client relationship with Frantz, and (b) Merlyn Clark never had or utilized any 
confidential materials. (Exh. D, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 77-83) The Court thus denied the 
Motion to Disqualify, entering its Order on December 9, 2014. (Add., AP 85, Aff. ofRiseborough, 
R. Vol. I, p. 272) 
Despite his failure to prove that Mr. Clark had been his attorney, or that Mr. Clark had 
received confidential materials, on February 20, 2015, Frantz filed but did not serve the instant 
action, contending again that, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's express holding, Mr. Clark had 
been his lawyer in 2009. 
On February 27, 2015 Frantz brought a Motion to Dismiss the Bankruptcy or Reconvert it 
to a Chapter 11 as well as a Motion for Relief from Stay. The basis for these motions was an 
alleged desire to litigate the claims by and against IIB in the original State Court action which had 
been stayed since 2011. ln re Frantz, supra at *3; (Add. BR421, BR 425) The Court held a hearing 
and on April 16, 2015 in a lengthy Memorandum Opinion, the Court denied both motions. (Add., 
BR 484, pp. 28, 33; 2015 WL 1778068)2 The Court observed that the Bankruptcy Court (through 
the pending Adversary Proceeding) could resolve the amount of the debt, its dischargeability, and 
the Debtor's (Frantz's) defenses. (Add., BR 484, pp. 28-31; In re Frantz, supra at** 13-16) 
2 The opinion contains a comprehensive history of the Frantz Bankruptcy. In re Franz, No. 11-
21337-TLM, 2015 WL 1778068 at** 1-7 (D.Idaho April 16, 2015). 
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On May 1, 2015, Frantz sought approval of a Waiver of Discharge as to all debts and 
creditors, including the IIB indebtedness. (Add., BR 508, BR 509) The Court granted that motion 
on May 20 2015 (Add., BR 516) 
On June 2, 2015, HTEH, on behalf ofIIB, brought a Motion for Sanctions and for an award 
of attorney's fees in the Adversary Proceeding. (Add., AP 117) One basis for the Motion for 
Sanctions was Frantz's unfounded Motion to Disqualify HTEH. (Id., pp. 5-7; pp. 15-17) 
The Court held a hearing on June 15, 2015, and issued its oral ruling on September 14, 
2015. (The Court granted the part of the Motion for Sanctions that was based on the failed Motion 
to Disqualify in the amount of $49,477.46 (Court's Oral Ruling, Add., AP pp. 142, 142-1) In 
granting the sanctions motion, the Bankruptcy Court stated: 
Given their very nature and timing, the disqualification motions 
before this Court were guaranteed to cause IIB and its counsel to spend 
significant resources. This Court found the motions lacked any merit. It also 
now appears that another strategy was at play, the use of the motion to 
disqualify counsel was a test of the law firm in order to evaluate an 
anticipated collateral malpractice suit and nematic of the behavior and this 
Court on the disqualification motion, when the malpractice suit was actually 
brought, the debtors and their counsel disclosed to the state court the 
existence of the bankruptcy disqualification motion but not its unsuccessful 
outcome ... This Court, therefore, on the entirety of the record and with 
emphasis of the facts set forth today, as well as in the prior decisions, finds 
that the motions to disqualify IIB 's counsel and witnesses were made in bad 
faith, for an improper purpose, and manifest willfulness conduct. Id. at p. 
34, ll. 4-15; p. 35, ll. 8-12. 
An Order was entered that same day. (Add., AP 135) The Court also entered an Order dismissing 
the Adversary Proceeding as moot. (Add., AP 136) 
Frantz did not appeal the dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding as moot. Frantz DID 
appeal the award of sanctions, but did not appeal the underlying order on which sanctions were 
based, i.e., the meritless disqualification motion. (Add., AP 143, AP 150) 
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2. Facts Relevant to the Pro Hae Vice Issue. 
Frantz retained attorney Jeffrey Katz on October 2014, to represent him in an attorney 
malpractice case against HTEH, based on the alleged conflict of interest posed by Mr. Clark's 
alleged attorney-client relationship with Frantz. (Aff. of Katz, R. Vol. II, p. 346) Katz advises that 
he had been contacted as early as mid-2014. (Id.) Katz accepted the case on a contingency fee 
basis. (Exh. B, Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 334) The damages alleged included Frantz's inability 
to discharge his indebtedness to IIB, the same indebtedness HTEH was seeking to collect from 
Frantz for TIB. (Complaint, R. Vol. I, p. 13, et seq.) "At the outset" Katz advised Frantz to attempt 
to enlist the participation of IIB in the suit as a plaintiff to share in a future "insurance settlement" 
this as a means to reduce or eliminate the debt that IIB was pursuing against Frantz. (Exh. B, 
Aff of Gustave!, Vol. II, pp. 333-334) On Mr. Katz's advice, Frantz brought the motion to 
disqualify HTEH as a tactical "probe" to allow Mr. Katz to evaluate HTEH's response to the claim 
of conflict of interest, and thus, theoretically, assist in preparation of the state malpractice case. 
(Exh. B, Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 334) Mr. Katz was thus aware of HTEH's representation 
of IIB and its scope. Mr. Katz agreed to act as an expert witness in this probe and he authored an 
expert disclosure (Exh. C, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 60-66), despite his financial interest in 
obtaining a favorable ruling that would significantly enhance the malpractice case. Neither Katz 
nor Frantz disclosed Katz's interest in the outcome of the motion. Neither Katz nor Frantz advised 
the Bankruptcy Court that the Disqualification Motion, which interrupted the Court's schedule and 
caused it to strike a trial date that had been set for a year, was a tactical "probe" for another lawsuit. 
(Oral Decision R. Vol. I, p. 75, l. 4 p. 77, l. 22) 
On April 7, 2015, Frantz filed a motion for pro hac vice admission, seeking the admission 
of Mr. Katz in the instant action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 22-23) The motion was signed by Mr. Katz on 
February 25, 2015, and by attorney Frantz on March 3, 2015. (Id.) 
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On March 9, 2015, with the bankruptcy still pending, and after this had been filed 
not served, Mr. Katz sent an email to Mr. Jack Gustavcl, the CEO of IIB. This contact was made 
without notice to HTEH (Aff. of Kurtz, ,I9, R. Vol. I, p. 32) The email suggested the business 
proposal Frantz and Katz had discussed, i.e., the proposal that IIB join Frantz in the lawsuit against 
IIB' s lawyers, HTEH as a means of satisfying Frantz' s debt. (Id., R. Vol. I, p. 107) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff's claim on the basis of 
judicial estoppel/lack of standing where damages are alleged to have occurred pre-petition 
and pre-conversion, where the operative facts underlying Plaintiffs claim of conflict of 
interest-based attorney malpractice preexisted the Bankruptcy filing and where such claims 
are substantially rooted in Frantz's pre-bankruptcy past? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing Frantz's Complaint under 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) where a ruling disposing of an essential element of Frantz's claim in the 
instant action was previously made in his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and that dispositive ruling 
remains the law of the pending Bankruptcy proceedings? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in declining to admit a non-resident attorney 
where the attorney may be a trial witness and where evidence of attorney misconduct in 
connection with the case was brought to the attorney's attention, but not satisfactorily 
explained? 
4. Defendant accepts Plaintiff's characterization of the two issues regarding the award of 
attorney's fees. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
Plaintiff has appealed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case under principles of 
judicial estoppel, dismiss the case under principles of abatement, decline to admit counsel pro hac 
vice, and to award attorney's fees. The standard review for each of these decisions is abuse of 
discretion. As this Court is aware, in evaluating a decision under this standard, this Court considers 
"(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
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court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by 
an exercise ofreason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 ldaho 87, 94, 803 
P .2d 993, 1000 (1991 ). Absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, the Appellate Court will 
uphold the decision of the trial court. Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760; 215 P.3d 476, 
480 (2009). A district court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the 
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Young v. Williams, 122 Idaho 649, 
652, 837 P.2d 324, 327 (App. 1992). A district court's decision is based on "an erroneous view of 
the law" if the court "does not apply the correct legal test or consider the factors laid out in an 
applicable rule or statute." Sammis v. Magnetek. Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 352, 941 P.2d 314, 324 
(1997). The record herein amply demonstrates the Court appropriately exercised its discretion in 
each of its determinations. 
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that Frantz was Judiciallv Estopped/Lacked 
Standing as Frantz's Attornev Claims are Based on Facts and Occurrences 
Sufficiently Rooted in His Pre-Bankruptcy Past. 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs action on the basis of judicial estoppel and standing. 
Those are separate but related concepts. In the bankruptcy setting, judicial estoppel is applied to 
prevent a debtor, who fails to disclose a cause of action on his schedule of property, subsequently 
seeks to pursue that cause of action for his own benefit. Standing relates to the fact that, if a cause 
of action is considered property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Trustee is the only party with 
standing to pursue that cause of action. McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,898,303 P.3d 578, 
585 (2013) (citing Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008). 
1. Judicial Estoppel in the Bankruptcy Setting. 
The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial system, by 
protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial 
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proceedings." A&J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,685, 116 P.3d 12, 15 (2005). Broadly, it 
is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. Id. 
Judicial estoppel applies to inconsistent positions taken in bankruptcy proceedings and may 
act to bar a subsequent action. McCallister, 154 Idaho at 894, 303 P.3d at 581. Under Federal 
Bankruptcy law, a cause of action is property which can be properly included within the 
Bankruptcy Estate. The bankruptcy code requires a debtor to make full disclosure of all known 
and potential assets, including contingent causes of action. 11 U.S.C. § 521 et seq. Under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a), debtors are required to disclose "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case" and "the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be 
overstated." A&J Constr. Co., 141 Idaho at 685, 116 P.3d at 15. This duty continues through the 
pendency of the bankruptcy. Bums v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). 
Accordingly, judicial estoppel can prevent a debtor from pursing a cause of action for his own 
benefit that should have been included in his Bankruptcy Estate. 
In determining whether the debtor should have disclosed the cause of action, the courts 
take into account what the estopped party knew or should have known at the time the original 
position was adopted, not his intent. McKav v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222, 1229 
(1997). That knowledge or chargeable knowledge is determinative as to whether that person is 
"playing fast and loose with the court." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 236, 178 P.3d 597, 601 
(2008). 
In deciding whether a cause of action is includable in the Bankruptcy Estate, courts are 
called upon to determine the nature and extent of the debtor's interest in property, as well as 
whether title to that property has vested in the Bankruptcy Estate. In perfom1ing that analysis, state 
law informs the nature and extent of the debtor's interest in property, while federal law determines 
whether the property is properly considered an asset of the Bankruptcy. Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 
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(9th Cir. 2001). Causes of action that arise after the filing of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
but before its conversion to a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, become the property of the Chapter 7 estate 
and possession of the Trustee. See Cantu v. Schmidt (In Re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253, 257-58 (5th Cir. 
2015). The same analysis, however, applies. 
Finally, questions of whether a cause of action should be included in the Bankruptcy Estate 
arise in three scenarios: (a) where all facts creating the cause of action occurred before the 
bankruptcy petition was filed; (b) where all facts creating the cause of occurred after the 
bankruptcy petition was filed; and ( c) where the operative facts of the legal wrong occurred pre-
petition, but the injury or legal harm occurred post-petition. Scenarios (a) and (b) are 
straightforward: if all elements of a cause of action arose pre-petition, that cause of action is 
property of the Estate; if all elements of the cause of action arose after the petition was filed, the 
cause of action is the property of the debtor. Scenario ( c ), however, requires a different analysis. 
Includability under scenario ( c) turns on whether the operative facts, i.e., those facts which created 
the potential benefit, entitlement or recovery, are sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy 
past to justify including the cause in the Estate. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,380, 86 S.Ct. 511, 
515 (1966). That analysis is not the same as one done in detennining the commencement of the 
running of a statute oflimitations, which requires a strict "accrual" assessment. Rather, the analysis 
focuses on whether, under the facts, the post-petition damages are due to causes put in motion by 
occunences pre-petition, which are "sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy past." See 
In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 14-15 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1997); In Re Ellwanger, 140 B.R. 891,898 
(Bankr.W.D.Wash. 1992). 
2. Facts Relevant to Includability of Frantz's Claims. 
In an attempt to avoid the judicial estoppel doctrine, the Appellant now argues that the 
Attorney Claims \Vere limited to the Adversary Proceeding which was filed after the Chapter 7 
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Yet his Complaint in this action is not so limited and establish that the Attorney Claims 
are claims held by the Bankruptcy Estate, which were never scheduled or disclosed in his 
Bankruptcy proceedings. 
The pre-petition facts creating Frantz's interest in the Attorney Claims are well reflected 
m the record. Beginning with the Complaint, Frantz alleges an action "sounding in legal 
malpractice" arising from Defendant's adverse representation against Plaintiff AND/OR for the 
use of Plaintiff's confidential :financial information (Complaint, ,II, R. Vol. I, p. 13), Frantz alleges 
that he retained Merlyn Clark to provide consultation in 2009 and that in that connection Clark 
reviewed a large number of confidential documents. (Id. 4J2, R. Vol. I, p. 14) Frantz alleges as a 
result of this professional negligence, he lost an amount in excess of $10,000 in attorney's fees 
paid to HTEH for Clark's services in 2009. (Id. ,I4, R. Vol. I, p. 14) The Complaint alleges that 
Defendant began representing IIB to pursue a claim against him in June of 2010. (Id. ,Il 8, R. Vol. I, 
p. 16); and that Defendant HTEH continued to pursue Mr. Frantz, filing a claim on behalf of IIB 
for $6.4 million. (Id., ,ii[l 9-20) 
That IIB claim was filed in January 2012, before the subsequent conversion of the 
Bankruptcy proceeding to a Chapter 7 in April 2013. In Re Frantz, supra, 215 W.L. 1778068 at *2 
*fn. 45. 
Further, Frantz alleges that HTEH breached the standard of care by representing a party 
with materially adverse interests to Frantz in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings (Id., ,I29, R., 
Vol. I, p. 17), by: ( a) failing to properly screen out Merlyn Clark, (b) failing to give proper notice 
to Frantz of the conflicting representation, ( c) thus depriving Frantz of the opportunity to ascertain 
Defendant's compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, ( d) using infom1ation 
related to Hawley Troxell's representation to Frantz's disadvantage; and (e) otherwise acting in a 
negligent and careless manner. (Id. ,I29, R. Vol. I, p. 18, (b), (c), (d) and (e), ,I30) Frantz alleged 
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negligence prevented him from timely seeking removal of Defendant to prevent 
Defendant from asserting claims contrary to Frantz' s interests based on improperly gained 
information. (Id. ,I32, R. Vol. I, p. 19). Frantz contended he was damaged, inter alia, in the form 
of legal fees previously paid to Hawley Troxell. (Id. 134, R. Vol. I, p. 19) 
Frantz's Complaint also makes a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the same 
actions as the malpractice claim and seeking the same damages. (Id. 135-46, R. Vol. I, p. 19-20) 
The record reflects that Frantz personally paid an invoice Hawley Troxell had sent Owens 
& Crandall for Mr. Clark's services. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-180; Exh. A, Aff. of Gustavel, R. Vol. II, 
p. 334,) Further, Frantz has represented that in 2009, Mr. Clark was his "key attorney." (Exh. A, 
Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 333) Finally, Frantz moved to disqualify HTEH alleging a different 
conflict of interest early in the bankruptcy proceedings and before conversion to Chapter 7. Upon 
stipulation, HTEH continued representing JIB. (Stipulated Order, Exh. 6, Aff. ofRiseborough, R., 
Vol. 1, pp. 189-190) The record reveals that on April 23, 2013, Frantz converted his Chapter 11 to 
a Chapter 7. The adverse representation by HTEH continued beyond that conversion, through and 
to the present. (Add.; BR 193) Based on the foregoing, the basis for Frantz's claims in this action 
are firmly rooted in Frantz' s pre-petition and pre-conversion past. 
3. Frantz's Interest in the Claims Pre-Petition and Pre-Conversion. 
(a) Frantz 's Property Interest in the attorney claims under Idaho Law. 
State law determines the nature and extent of a debtor's interest in property. In Re Alvarez, 
224 F.3d 1273, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2000). An act that creates a specific and concrete risk of harm 
comprises a legally cognizable injury sufficient for inclusion in the Bankruptcy Estate. In Re 
Cantu, 784 F.3d at 260-61 (5th Cir. 2015). 
The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice in Idaho include (a) the existence 
of the attorney-client relationship; (b) a duty on behalf of the attorney towards the client; (c) breach 
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that by the attorney and damages proximately caused by the breach of duty. Bishop v. 
Owens, 1 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012). As to the damages element, evidence of 
"some damage" is sufficient to meet this element. For example, the loss of a right to act for one's 
benefit represents "some damage." See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 662-63, 201 
P.3d 629, 635-36 (2009) (loss of chance to enter a settlement agreement and release of right to sue 
additional tortfeasor recognized as "some damage" for accrual of attorney malpractice claims). 
Frantz resists dismissal by claiming that his Attorney Claims did not accrue prior to filing 
his bankruptcy petition. He contends that the causes of action were incomplete because he wasn't 
damaged until HTEH utilized "confidential information" that he had provided Mr. Clark during 
his prior "representation." He dates the occurrence of this damage, and thus the accrual of his 
action, to the filing of the Adversary Proceeding in August 2013. This is contrary to the allegations 
of his Complaint and to Idaho law.3 
Assuming Frantz' s allegations to be true, Frantz had sustained "some damage" for purposes 
of accrual of his causes of action prior to filing of his Bankruptcy petition. Frantz was aware as 
early as June 2010 that HTEH was representing a party adverse to him in litigation arising out of 
a loan he had secured and guaranteed with IIB. (HTEH Demand Letter, R. Vol. I, pp. 135-37) He 
alleges that he had provided confidential information to Merlyn Clark sometime between 
December of 2008 and June 2009. He was aware that Merlyn Clark was a partner with HTEH at 
the time he paid the $10,664 bill it had invoiced Owens & Crandall for Merlyn Clark's services. 
Per his Complaint, HTEH's negligence in failing to screen Merlyn Clark from the IIB case, failing 
to advise Frantz of the conflict and failing to obtain his permission to proceed damaged him by 
preventing him from seeking to prevent HTEH from participating in the adverse representation. 
This loss of his legal rights constitutes "some damage" under Idaho law. City of McCall, 146 Idaho 
3 Frantz is in error when he asserts that defense agrees his damages did not occur until post-petition. 
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at 662-63. Frantz further alleges that these actions damaged him by rendering the legal services he 
had paid, $10,664, worthless, entitling him to seek disgorgement of those fees. These rights to seek 
legal redress arose in Frantz at least by the time HTEH brought IIB' s lawsuit against him, prior to 
his 2011 Bankruptcy filing in 2010, if not at the time of his receipt of the June 281h demand letter. 
By his Complaint, Frantz could have acted to prevent the continued representation by withholding 
his consent. If refused, Frantz could have sought relief from the Court seeking an injunction to 
prevent HTEH's further participation, seeking his attorney's fees in connection with that 
injunction, and seeking disgorgement of fees for HTEH's adverse representation. These rights of 
Frantz continued after the Bankruptcy was filed, and after his Chapter 11 Bankruptcy was 
converted to a Chapter 7 on April 23, 2013, and continues today. 
The facts Frantz has alleged as occurring prior to his Bankruptcy filing are actionable in 
Idaho, and thus constitute a property interest. Given that, federal bankruptcy law determines 
whether that interest is sufficient to be included in his Bankruptcy Estate. In Re Ellwanger, 140 
B.R. at 898; In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. at 14-15; In Re Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1276-78. 
(b) Frantz 's Causes of Action were lncludable in his Bankruptcy Estate under 
Federal Bankruptcy Law. 
"Property" of the Bankruptcy Estate is construed broadly. This is because the goal is to 
provide as much relief for creditors as the debtor's assets can afford. In Re Feiler, 218 F.3d 948, 
955 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal courts approach the issue of includability with those principles in 
mind. 
As indicated above, cases concerning causes of action which are fully developed pre-
petition and cases concerning causes of action that arise only post-petition are not informative 
when evaluating a case like this one, where the facts demonstrate actionable conduct pre-petition 
and damages alleged both pre- and post-petition. Those cases, termed by some courts as "straddle" 
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cases, a different analysis, one that looks to the nature and extent of the pre-petition activity 
and relationships giving rise to the causes of action to assess whether they are sufficiently rooted 
in the pre-petition history to justify including the post-petition receipt of benefits, payments, or 
damages as an asset of the Bankruptcy Estate. 4 
This principle had its genesis in the United States Supreme Court case of Segal v. Rochelle, 
382 U.S. 375, 380, 86 S.Ct. 511, 515 (1966). That case involved loss carryback refunds, the 
entitlement to which occurred pre-petition, but which were received post-petition. The Court 
observed that Congress intended the term "property" to be broadly interpreted, and that the purpose 
of bankruptcy was to afford creditors everything of value that a debtor held at the time of the 
bankruptcy. While Segal pre-dated the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the principle continues to be 
applied in a variety of situations where facts creating a contingent entitlement pre-petition result 
in occurrence of the contingency and receipt of entitlement post-petition. See In Re Schmitz, 270 
F.3d 1254, 1256-58 (9th Cir. 2001) (post-filing fishing quota rights, based on fisherman's pre-
filing catch history, not "sufficiently rooted" where the regulations creating such rights did not 
exist pre-petition). 
Substantial federal authority supports inclusion of Frantz' s claims in his Bankruptcy Estate. 
Federal Courts favor an assessment of how the pre-petition facts relate to the debtor's 
circumstances and the definition of his estate over a technical assessment of when a cause of action 
accrues for statute of limitations purposes. In Re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 
2000) (pre-petition exposure leading to post-petition diagnosis-damage properly includable); In 
Re Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1276-78 (accrual for statute oflimitations purposes irrelevant; a cause of 
4 As indicated above, Frantz's claims likely fully accrued pre-petition. However, even if his 
damages accrued post-petition, his causes of action are properly considered property of the 
Bankruptcy Estate. 
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action can accrue for ownership purposes in a bankruptcy proceeding before the statute of 
limitations begins to run); In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. at 14-15 (accrual for bankruptcy ownership 
purposes is not confined to those elements sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations as such questions have unique considerations). 
In Re Strada Design Assoc., Inc., 326 B.R. 229,236 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2005) is informative. 
There the court held that although the accrual date for state law purposes is important, it is not 
critical in deciding whether a cause of action will be "property of the estate." The Court observed 
that § 541 ( a) is not restricted by state law concepts such as when the cause of action ripens or when 
a statute of limitations begins to run. Property of the estate may include claims that were inchoate 
on the petition date. Accordingly, a cause of action will be "property of the estate" if it has 
sufficient roots in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy activities regardless of when the claim accrues under 
State law or the statute of limitations begins to run. Id. at 236. 
The case of In Re Ellwanger, supra, is likewise informative. There, the Court considered 
whether separate legal malpractice claims arising out of representation both pre and post-petition, 
but which accrued under state law post-petition were property of the estate. The debtor argued that, 
although the acts of malpractice occurred pre-petition, his cause of action for malpractice did not 
accrue until he was damaged which, under California law, did not occur until the attorney's errors 
became "irredeemable," i.e., incapable ofremedy. The Court rejected that analysis, observing that 
the debtor's position "collapses into one analysis several distinct concepts oflaw." While state law 
defines the nature of the debtor's interest in property, whether this interest is property of the estate 
is a matter of federal bankruptcy law. The Court observed that if the pre-petition representation 
was negligent, the debtor had a contingent claim against his attorneys for those services at that 
time. The fact that this contingent interest may never come to fruition if the harm is remedied 
before finality does not alter the fact that the debtor's interest arose when the representation 
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As a debtor is required to schedule contingent assets, the malpractice actions were 
properly included as property of the Bankruptcy Estate. 
4. The District Court Properly Applied the Applicable Law. 
Although the foregoing federal case law was not referred to by the District Court in its 
opinion, the Court recognized that contingent assets must be disclosed either at the time the petition 
is filed, or during the bankruptcy by amendment. The cases the Court cited recognize the obligation 
of the debtor to schedule all property, including pre-petition contingencies. They also recognize 
the debtor's obligation to amend his schedules to reflect contingent assets which ripen during the 
bankruptcy. These cases, discussed below, are fully compatible with the Federal Authority cited 
above. 
The trial court relied on the case of Mc Callister v. Dixon, supra, in support of its conclusion 
that Frantz was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim when he was aware of that claim's 
potential at the time of filing his Bankruptcy but failed to disclose it. The Court was correct in its 
reliance. McCallister cited with approval the following language from this Court's prior decision 
in A&J Constr. Co. v. Wood: 
Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough 
facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of 
the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to 
identify the cause of action as a contingent asset. 
Mccallister, 154 Idaho at 895 (quoting A&J Constr. Co., 141 Idaho at 686). A&J Constr. Co. 
involved a bankruptcy debtor who failed to list his interests in a joint venture or in real property 
owned by that joint venture at the time he filed for bankruptcy in 1991. Some time after bankruptcy 
was filed, the property of the joint venture was sold and A&J sued its joint venturer, Wood, for an 
accounting of the proceeds and distribution of profits. Despite the occurrence of the losses post-
petition, A&J Construction was estopped from pursuing the suit against his joint venturer Wood 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HAWLEY 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP - 26 
because 
list it. 
potential for such claim was known to A&J prior to the bankruptcy, and he failed to 
Further, A&J Constr. Co., cited with approval Hav v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 
N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992). In Hav, the debtor was judicially estopped from suing a 
bank for actions which had occurred pre-petition, but which the debtor did not discover until during 
the bankruptcy proceeding. Despite this discovery, the debtor did not amend his schedules to assert 
the potential cause of action. After his Bankruptcy closed, the debtor sued the bank, but his suit 
was dismissed on the basis of judicial estoppel. Again, the potential claim, once discovered, should 
have been included in an amended schedule. The Court stated: "We recognize that all facts were 
not known to Desert Mountain (Hay) at the time the bankruptcy was filed. However, enough was 
knovm to require notification of the existence of the potential asset to the Bankruptcy Court." Hay 
at 557. 
Finally, the Court in McCallister cited with approval Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001 ). Although cited for a different principle, of interest is the fact 
that the cause of action that Hamilton was estopped from pursuing against State Fam1 did not 
technically accrue until several days after he had filed bankruptcy, although the acts and omissions 
of the parties prior to the bankruptcy filing suggested the potential for such a claim. 
Thus, under state and federal law, Frantz had an obligation to include his Attorney Claims 
in his schedules at the time of filing bankruptcy, or, if not then, to amend his schedules to reflect 
those claims once his damages should have become apparent to him. Especially considering that 
Frantz was aware of HTEH' s adverse representation of IIB both before and after his Bankruptcy 
filing, that he was litigating his obligations under the IIB debt to and through the time of filing this 
action, that a principal reason for filing this lawsuit against HTEH was to attempt to satisfy that 
debt, and considering that Frantz's alleged damages arose from HTEH's activities on behalf ofIIB 
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collection of that debt, Frantz's causes of action were sufficiently rooted in his pre-petition 
history to justify their inclusion as assets in the Estate. 
5. Plaintiffs Authorities Do Not Address the Issue. 
Plaintiff cites three cases in support of his contention that a cause of action is onlv 
includable in the bankruptcy's estate of a debtor if that cause of action has fully accrued under 
state law pre-petition. The cases do not so hold. The first case, Wade v. Bailev, 287 B.R. 874 (S.D. 
Miss. 2001), excluded a cause of action as property of the Bankruptcy Estate because the action 
accrued after the petition was filed. The Court held that, as there was no showing that the debtor's 
claims where traceable directly to pre-petition conduct, they were property of the debtor and not 
the Estate. Id. at 881. The case does not hold that cases which are fully accrued pre-petition are 
the onlv causes includable in the Bankruptcy Estate. 
The second case, In Re Forbes, 58 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1986), considered a cause of 
action which fully accrued before the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, it was 
property of the Estate. It did not hold that only causes of action which have fully accrued pre-
petition are includable in the Bankruptcy Estate. 
Plaintiff also cites Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001). 
As indicated supra at page 27, Hamilton is actually a "straddle" case with the cause of action finnly 
rooted in the debtor's pre-petition history and therefore properly included in the Bankruptcy Estate. 
C. Res Judicata Bars Frantz from Relitigating an Element Essential to His Malpractice 
Claim Decided Adversely to Him in a Prior Proceeding. 
In this action, Frantz is attempting to litigate claims of attorney malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty, despite the fact that an essential element of those claims, i.e., the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship between him and Merlyn Clark/HTEH has been decided against him 
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pending bankruptcy. 5 As established above, those claims should have been identified at the 
time ofFrantz's Bankruptcy filing or during its pendency. Plaintiff did not do so, but rather elected 
to litigate the existence of an attorney-client relationship through a Motion to Disqualify HTEH 
from further representation of its client, IIB, in the Frantz Bankruptcy. After a full opportunity to 
prove these contentions, Frantz lost. After Frantz filed a Waiver of Discharge as to all of his 
creditors, including IIB, the Bankruptcy Court found the dischargeability issue of the Adversary 
Proceeding was moot and accordingly dismissed that proceeding. That dismissal was a final, 
appealable order, as discussed infi·a. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata apply, this case 
falls squarely within the defense of abatement, and dismissal is appropriate. Meanwhile, the Frantz 
Bankruptcy continues and HTEH continues to represent IIB in its pursuit of Frantz as the 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling on disqualification continues as the law of that case. Thus, it is 
appropriate for the District Court to refrain from deciding an issue which might affect or interfere 
with the pending action. 
1. Nature of the Defense. 
Although asserted as a defense under I.R.C.P. 12(b )(8), the elements of the defense of 
abatement are determined by Idaho case law. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 
907,684 P.2d 307 (App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms, 
Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 73 3 P .2d 721 (1987). Abatement is the power of a court to dismiss or stay an 
action where a similar action is already proceeding in another forum. It is a decision committed to 
5 Plaintiff agrees that he must prove, as an essential element of his Attorney Claims, an attorney-
client relationship between himself and Clark/HTEH. Further, Plaintiff also must concede that he 
was provided a full evidentiary oppmiunity to prove that an attorney-client relationship existed 
between himself and Clark/HTEH. 
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sound discretion of the trial court. · see also Klaue v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437,988 P.2d 211 
(1999). 
In Idaho, there are two tests that are applied to determine if abatement or dismissal are 
proper. The first test is whether the other case has proceeded to a final determination. In that event, 
the Court will consider the principles of res judicata in determining whether to proceed with the 
case before it. Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440; Wing, 106 Idaho at 908. In Idaho, res judicata includes 
both claim preclusion as well as issue preclusion. Claim preclusion requires that the current action 
have the same parties or their privies as the prior action, that those parties be litigating the same 
claim as in the prior action, and that there was a final judgment on the merits in that prior action. 
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirev, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). Issue preclusion, on 
the other hand, requires that the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier case; that the issue decided in the earlier case is 
identical to the issue now presented; that the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in 
the prior litigation; that there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and that the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. 
It is important to note that for issue preclusion, the "final judgment" requirement pertains to the 
case in which the issue was raised, not that there needs to be a separate final order on the 
determination of that issue. Ticor Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). 
The second test is whether the Court, although not barred by res judicata, should 
nevertheless refrain from deciding it. Wing, 106 Idaho at 908; Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440. 
The policy behind the second test is to prevent concurrent litigation of the same issue in 
different courts that could result in conflicting decisions. Further, proper application of the defense 
advances the goals of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to the litigants, promoting the 
prompt and orderly disposition of claims, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments. A Court 
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reach its determination by evaluating the identity of the real party-in-interest, the degree in 
which the claims or issues are similar, and whether the court in which the matter is already pending 
is in a position to determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties. Diet 
Center. Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-44 (App. 1993). Abatement is 
appropriate under this second test as well. 
2. Issue Preclusion Bars the Frantz's Claim.6 
Frantz elected to attempt to establish an existence of an attorney-client relationship 
between himself and Clark/HTEH, the precise issue he is required to prove in this action. The 
Bankruptcy Court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in which it heard the testimony of not only 
Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark, but also Regina McCrae, Frantz's former attorney who had hired 
Mr. Clark as an expert witness. As reflected in his oral Opinion (R. Vol. I, p. 77, l. 15 p. 78, l. 
21 ), Chief Bankruptcy Judge Myers listened to the testimony, argument of counsel and considered 
numerous exhibits. He then unequivocally found that there was no attorney-client relationship 
between Mr. Frantz and Merlyn Clark, and further, that no confidential materials had been 
provided to Mr. Clark. Subsequently, Chief Judge Myers found that the disqualification motion 
was wholly without merit, entering sanctions against Frantz and his attorney for pursuing that 
motion. (Add., AP 142, p. 34, ll. 4-15; p. 35, ll. 8-20) 
Under these facts, the elements of issue preclusion have been met, with the possible 
exception of a "final judgment," depending on whether the Adversary Proceeding or the parent 
Bankruptcy proceeding is considered the prior action. Mr. Frantz had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue ( existence of attorney-client relationship), the attorney-client relationship issue in 
the disqualification hearing is identical to the issue presented in this action, Judge Myers actually 
6 Claim preclusion likely also bars Frantz' s claim under the "Marshall" application of res judicata. 
See Farmer's Nat'l Bank v. Shirey. 126 Idaho at 70, 878 P.2d at 769, and the cases cited therein. 
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'-'""'"'-'·"'"' that specific issue, and the party against whom the issue is asserted this action was the 
party in the earlier litigation. As to the "Final Judgment" element, if the Adversary Proceeding is 
the prior action as contended by Frantz, it has been dismissed as moot and Frantz failed to appeal 
that decision. There has thus been a final order and issue preclusion bars Frantz's claims. If, 
however, the Adversary Proceeding is viewed as a component of the overall Bankruptcy, final 
judgment awaits closure of those Bankruptcy proceedings. Whether it is considered that the 
Adversary Proceeding has concluded in a final judgment due to Frantz's failure to appeal, or 
whether it is considered that the Bankruptcy proceeding will ultimately conclude with the precise 
issue in question having been determined, dismissal was appropriate. Under either scenario, the 
issue has been determined and Frantz's Attorney Claims in this action defeated. Accordingly, the 
District Court properly applied legal principles in exercising his discretion and the dismissal should 
be upheld. 
3. Abatement is Appropriate Under the Second Test. 
Application of the policy considerations undermining the second test, i.e., should the Court 
nevertheless abate, results in the same conclusion. Frantz does not dispute that the Bankruptcy 
proceeding continues and that HTEH continues to represent IIB in those proceedings, adverse to 
Mr. Frantz. Allowing Frantz to proceed to litigate the same issue in District Court raises a danger 
of potentially inconsistent decisions, does not promote the prompt and orderly disposition of 
claims, nor does it advance the goal of judicial economy. The Plaintiff does not dispute that HTEH 
is the real party-in-interest on the issue of disqualification that the issue, attorney-client 
relationship, is identical in both proceedings, and the Bankruptcy Court is in the position to 
determine the whole controversy, settling all the rights of the parties. Accordingly, abatement was 
appropriate and the District Court's decision should be upheld. 
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4. Plaintiff's Arguments are Unpersuasive. 
Plaintiff presents several arguments: 
(a) The two actions do not involve the "same matter" as malpractice actions are 
not disqualification motions; therefore abatement cannot apply; 
(b) Several arguments related to the "same matter" argument, without citation 
to authority; 
( c) There is no "other action" as the Adversary Proceeding has been dismissed; 
therefore Judicial Estoppel does not apply; 
( d) There will never be a final judgment of the Adversary Proceeding and 
therefore res judicata cannot apply. 
None of these arguments have merit and will be addressed seriatim. 
(a) Plaintiff's argument that a disqualification motion and cause of action for 
malpractice are different assumes that the claims must be identical for abatement to apply. Issue 
preclusion, however, does not require that the claims be the same, it only requires that the issue 
determined in the first proceeding be identical to that being litigated in the second. Ticor, 144 
Idaho at 124. The relevant issue here, i.e., the existence of an attorney-client relationship between 
Frantz and Merlyn Clark/HTEH, is identical. Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of that 
relationship or the possession by HTEH of confidential information. A determination of that issue 
defeats his Attorney Claims in this action. 
Further, Plaintiff's citation to case law from Indiana, South Carolina, and Illinois, are 
inapposite. The Indiana case, Davidson v. Perron, 716 N .E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), applied 
Indiana's Court Rule, l 2(b )(8), which allows abatement of one of two Indiana court actions, and 
turns on whether the outcome of one action will affect the adjudication of the other. Its requirement 
that a party's subject matter and remedies be precisely or even substantially the same is much 
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Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 323, 701 S.E.2d. 39, 45 (S.C.App. 2010), relied on the fact that the same 
parties were not litigating in two actions. Its "same claim" analysis was based on that Court's 
observation that South Carolina's 12(b)(8) Rule is based on an old statute which required that the 
rule be construed narrowly hence the requirement that the matters be identical. Eckert v. Freeborn 
& Peters, LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexus 23477 (N.D. Ill., February 26, 2015), applied claim 
preclusion, not issue preclusion. Thus, an assertion of claim preclusion failed as the two "claims" 
were not identical. 
Finally, Plaintiff's reliance on the Idaho case of Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32-33, 175 
P.3d 186, 194-95 (2007) is wholly inapposite. The disqualification being considered in that action 
was under Idaho RPC l .12(a). A former appellate court clerk who had worked on an earlier appeal 
of the case subsequently joined the law firm of one of the parties. The objection was not being 
made by a forn1er client and there was no issue as to whether an attorney-client relationship had 
ever been established. Thus the elements of disqualification cited by Frantz in his briefing have no 
application to the instant circumstance. 
(b) Plaintiff asserts several "policy" arguments related to the differences between 
motions to disqualify and actions for malpractice. Whatever their merits, they again miss the point 
as the basis for abatement in this matter is the disposition in the Bankruptcy proceeding of an issue 
essential to Frantz's successful prosecution of his claims in this action, i.e., the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship between Frantz and Merlyn Clark/HTEH. 
( c) Plaintiff next contends that there is no "other proceeding", apparently based on an 
argument that an adversary proceeding is a stand-alone lawsuit, independent of the bankruptcy 
proceeding. No authority is cited for this proposition, which is contrary to bankruptcy law. A 
bankruptcy "case" is comprised of all components of the bankruptcy that is commenced by the 
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of a petition, including all litigation. It is, in short, "the whole ball of wax." In Re The Caldor 
303 F.3d 161, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2000). An adversary proceeding in bankruptcy is not a distinct 
piece oflitigation, but is a component of a single bankruptcy case. Cohen v. Bucci, 905 F.2d 1111, 
1112 (7th Cir. 1990). Frantz's Adversary Proceeding is authorized by Rule 7001(6), "A proceeding 
to determine the dischargeability of a debt." This is a determination unique to bankruptcy. 
Rulings in an adversary proceeding apply throughout the Bankruptcy case under the "law 
of the case" doctrine. "In the bankruptcy context, the law of the case doctrine should be applied to 
disputes arising in the main bankruptcy case as well as all of its related adversary proceedings." 
This is to insure certainty of bankruptcy proceedings and unifonn results throughout. In Re 
Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 442 B.R. 522, 530-31 (Bankr.N.D. Tex. 2010). Law of the case is a rule of 
practice that once an issue is decided," ... that should be the end of the matter." United States v. 
United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198-99, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544-45 
(1950). The law of the case doctrine is applied to disputes arising in the main bankruptcy as well 
as all of its adversary proceedings. In Re Bordeau Brothers, Inc. v. Montagne. Bankr. No. 08-
10916, 2010 WL 271347 at **5-6 (Bankr.D.Vt. January 22, 2010). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff errs in contending that, with his Adversary Proceeding dismissed, 
there is no "other case". Frantz's Bankruptcy proceeding continues. Chief Judge Myers' Order 
based on the finding of no attorney client relationship remains the law of that case, and HTEH 
continues its adverse representation of IIB, something Frantz claims is actionable in this lawsuit. 
( d) Finally, Plaintiff argues that res judicata cannot apply because there will never be 
a final judgment in the Adversary Proceeding. Again, no authority is cited for this proposition. It 
is likewise contrary to the Federal Rules of Procedure and Federal Bankruptcy law. 
In Bankruptcy, an Order is final and thus appealable if it 1) resolves and seriously affects 
substantive rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to which it is addressed. ~-~~ 
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Holdings. Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2008); In Re Brov.n, 484 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 
2007). Appeals of bankruptcy are governed by 28 U.S.C § 158. In Re Frontier Properties. Inc., 979 
F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). Finality for purposes of appealability in Adversary Proceedings 
is considered under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Lower Elwha Band of S'Klallams v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 
235 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000). An order dismissing an Adversary Proceeding is a final Order. 
In Re King City Transit Mix. Inc., 738 F.2d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 1984). See also FRCP 41(b) 
"Involuntary Dismissal, Effect: any dismissal other than one under this rule operates as an 
adjudication on the merits." 7 
At the time of the dismissal in this action, the Adversary Proceeding remained pending 
within the Bankruptcy. Subsequently the Bankruptcy Court heard and granted a Motion by HTEH 
for sanctions, (Add. AP 135) one basis of which was Frantz's prosecution of the disqualification 
motion. (Add. AP 142 - Oral Ruling re Sanctions, p. 33, l. 15 - p. 13, l. 20) The same day, 
September 14, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order dismissing the Adversary Proceeding 
as moot. (Add. AP 136) Frantz had 14 days from the entry of those Orders to appeal. F.R. BKR. 
P. 8002(a), 8003(a). 
On September 25, 2015, Frantz filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's granting of 
sanctions. He did not appeal the Order dismissing the Adversary Proceeding. Nor did he appeal 
the denial of his Motion to Disqualify. (Statement of Issues on Appeal Add. AP 150). Thus, if 
Frantz's argument that the Adversary Proceeding is the only "other action" is accepted, his time 
to appeal has expired, the orders are final, and the final judgment element of issue preclusion is 
met. On the other hand, if the "other action" is the Bankruptcy proceeding, then the orders entered 
in the Bankruptcy proceeding will become final and appealable upon the closure of that 
7 An Order refusing to disqualify counsel, although not immediately appealable, is appealable after 
the final judgment. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,377 (1981). 
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Bankruptcy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contention that there will never be 
purposes of application of issue preclusion is meritless. 
order for 
D. The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion in Denving Admission, Pro Hae 
Vice, to Attorney Katz. 
1. Conduct Warranting Disqualification Includes, But is Not Limited To. Violations 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Although the primary concern of the District Court in evaluating Katz's Pro Hae Vice 
motion was the potential he would be required as a witness, Katz's actions as well as violation of 
LR.P.C. 4.2 were clearly on the Court's mind. Considering the totality of circumstances, the 
Court's decision was correct. Several Courts have found that an attorney is not entitled to appear 
Pro Hae Vice where the attorney's conduct is in question, even if that conduct does not technically 
violate a specific ethical cannon. See Meschi v. Iverson, 805 NE.2d. 72, 74-75, 60 Mass.App.Ct 
678 (2004); Kampitch v. Lach, 405 F.Supp.2d. 210, 215-16 (D.RI 2005). The Meschi case is 
particularly informative. There, pro hac vice admission was denied because counsel's ex-parte 
contact with an adverse client "Skated perilously close to the line of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct". As will be demonstrated, attorney Katz's conduct actually violated LR.C.P. 
4.2 and, combined with his other actions, support the District Courts' denial. 
2. Facts Relevant to the Pro Hae Vice Motion. 
Sometime in "mid to late" 2014 (Aff. of Katz, Deel., ,I6, R. Vol. II, p.346), Frantz contacted 
attorney Jeffrey Ogden Katz in connection with a potential malpractice claim against HTEH. At 
that time, HTEH was actively pursuing collection of the $6.4 million claim filed in Frantz' s 
Bankruptcy proceedings and further was pursuing an Adversary Proceeding on behalf of IIB for 
non-dischargability. IIB 's goal in that proceeding was to prevent Frantz from discharging his $6.5 
Million indebtedness. 
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the outset", Katz advised Frantz of a plan to obtain IIB's agreement to participate in a 
proposed malpractice action against HTEH as a way to satisfy Frantz's indebtedness to IIB, being 
litigated in the Adversary Proceeding. (Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p.333) The plan apparently 
was to be "beneficial" to HTEH as IIB would consider its "good relationship with HTEH" in 
approving any settlement offers. Frantz envisioned that there would be an "insurance settlement" 
and all would be accomplished within six months. (Id. at 334) 
On October 7, Frantz signed an attorney retainer agreement providing for a contingency 
fee to Katz. (Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, pp. 333-334; Katz Deel., R. Vol. II, ~7, 9, p. 346.) On 
October 16, attorney Katz wrote a letter to the managing partner of HTEH advising of Frantz's 
intent to bring a suit for legal malpractice. No mention is made in that letter of the Katz/Frantz 
plan to invite HTEH's client, IIB, to join the lawsuit as a party plaintiff. (R. Vol I, p. 36) 
Then on October 31, Frantz brought a Motion to Disqualify HTEH in the Bankruptcy 
Proceeding on the basis of conflict of interest. In connection with that motion, Frantz served a 
FRCP 26(a)(2) expert disclosure, authored by attorney Katz, setting forth Katz's opinions as to 
why HTEH should be disqualified. (R. Vol. I, p. 62) Although aware that the trial judge would be 
deciding the motion as the trier of fact, Katz did not disclose his attorney-client relationship with 
Frantz, nor how that representation would be advanced if the Court granted the motion. (Id.) 
On February 20, 2015, Frantz filed but did not serve the instant litigation. On March 9, 
2015, Katz, without notice to HTEH, directly contacted Jack Gustave!, CEO of IIB. The email 
invited a response to discuss a "business proposal which might be of benefit to you." (R. Vol. I, 
p. 107) The Bankruptcy continued at that time and HTEH continued to represent IIB. On April 7, 
Katz moved for admission pro hac vice in this action. Defendants objected, raising a question of 
whether attorney Katz was aware of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and suggesting that 
the Court make inquiry. (R. Vol I, p. 24-26) 
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Katz's response was telling. Rather than recognizing the error and committing not to 
repeat it, Mr. Katz doubled down, seeking to excuse the conduct with the contention that 
I.R.P.C. 4.2 only applies to attorneys representing opposing parties in a specific lawsuit. 
Subsequent to this response, the defendants learned of the Frantz communication to Mr. Gustav el, 
revealing that the Motion to Disqualify had been a "probe" and laying out in detail the Katz/Frantz 
plan for eliminating Frantz's debt through litigation against HTEH. R. Vol II, p. 333. Accordingly, 
on June 26, defendants filed a Reply to the Frantz Response disputing Katz's interpretation of 
I.R.P.C. 4.2 and raising additional issues related to I.R.P.C. 3.3 - Candor Toward the Tribunal and 
Rule 11. The latter was based on Mr. Katz's failure to advise of his representation of Frantz at the 
time he presented himself as an expert witness and the fact that the Motion to Disqualify HTEH 
had been a subterfuge. 
On July 13, Frantz filed his Brief in Support of Motion (R. Vol. II, pp. 341-42) contending 
that Katz would not be a witness and that Katz had not violated any Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct. At that time, Frantz attempted to excuse Katz's conduct by arguing that Katz's failure to 
advise the Court of his bias was "immaterial" as the Court did not allow his affidavit, that the 
allegations of a probe were "outlandish and unfounded" (even though based on Plaintiff Frantz's 
email to Gustave!) and contending that Mr. Katz did not care how the disqualification motion 
turned out. In connection therewith, a Katz Declaration was submitted. (R. Vol. II, p. 345) Katz 
again attempted to excuse his ex parte contact on the basis that he was representing Mr. Frantz in 
a different lawsuit than the Adversary Proceeding, and asserting that the disqualification motion 
was brought to prevent an argument of mitigation of damages. 8 Of significance, is the fact that 
Katz did not deny that he had proposed the questionable plan laid out in Mr. Frantz' s email to IIB. 
8 This assertion by both Katz and Jonathan Frantz is curious given the fact the Frantz's duty to 
mitigate arose as early as his receipt of the demand letter in June 2010! 
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the face of this inadequate explanation for Katz's conduct, and the real potential that 
Katz would become a witness in this action, the District Court properly declined to grant him 
admission. 
The Protection Afforded by I.R.P.C. 4.2 is Not Limited to Lawsuits. 
Plaintiffs argument is that the "in the matter" language of the Rule refers to lawsuits and 
only applies to attorneys representing clients on either side of that suit. However, the purpose of 
the Rule and its scope, as reflected in the Commentary, demonstrate that such an interpretation is 
too restrictive. That interpretation reflects either ignorance of the Rule, or an inclination to read 
our ethical rules so as to obviate the protection afforded. 
Next to the attorney-client privilege, there is probably no ethical rule more sacred to 
attorneys than the one protecting their clients from ex parte contact by attorneys adverse to their 
client in the matter being discussed. As the commentary makes clear, the Rule is designed to 
protect lay persons from possible overreaching by other lav.ryers who are participating in the 
matter, interference by those lawyers with the attorney-client relationship, and the uncounseled 
disclosure of information relating to the representation. I.R.P.C. 4.2: Communication with Person 
Represented by Counsel, Comment [ 1] .9 In this instance, the Rule protects IIB, who had chosen to 
be represented by HTEH in the matter of recovery of Frantz' s indebtedness to it. Pursuant to the 
Katz/Frantz plan, the reason Katz was contacting Mr. Gustave! was to suggest a way that IIB could 
obtain satisfaction of the same Frantz debt, with the idea that IIB would stop litigating in the 
Bankruptcy where it is represented by HTEH and instead join a different lawsuit as a plaintiff 
against its lawyer! This would benefit both Katz and Frantz as it would eliminate the still pending 
Adversary Proceeding, remove IIB's claims from Bankruptcy and advance the malpractice action 
by IIB agreeing that there had been an undisclosed conflict. It is clear that contact by Katz posed 
9 A limitation to a specific piece of litigation is found nowhere in the rule or commentary. 
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risk of everything the Rule seeks to prevent, including overreaching by Katz, causing IIB to lose 
confidence in its attorney, and a substantial risk of uncounseled disclosure of infonnation relating 
to HTEH's representation. Contending that Katz's discussion with IIB would be on an unrelated 
matter is flatly negated by Frantz's full description of the proposal Katz wanted to make. 
Mr. Katz had violated I.R.P.C. 4.2. Rather than recognizing the error, he attempted to 
excuse it. This alone was sufficient basis for a District Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to 
deny pro hac vice admission. 
4. Katz's Additional Actions are Factors a District Court Should Evaluate m 
Determining Pro Hae Vice Admission. 
While it is correct that I.R.P.C. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal) or I.R.P.C. 3.7 (lawyer as 
witness) do not specifically address Katz's actions, when taken in connection with Mr. Katz's 
refusal to acknowledge his violation of I.R.P.C. 4.2, such conduct provides additional reasons to 
give a District Court pause in granting pro hac vice admission. Attorney Katz presented himself 
as an expert witness to the Bankruptcy Judge who he knew would be the finder of fact. He did not 
disclose at that time that Mr. Frantz had retained him to pursue a legal malpractice claim against 
HTEH, an essential element of which was the very subject of the motion on which he was 
testifying. The fact that the trial judge ultimately did not consider Katz's Affidavit is no excuse. It 
is the belief that such conduct is acceptable that raises eyebrows. 
Further, before the District Court was Mr. Katz's participation in the "probe" 
disqualification motion. That conduct raises a serious question as to a violation of I.R.C.P. 11 ( a)(l) 
or its federal equivalent. The record presented to Judge Mitchell revealed that this motion was 
brought in Bankruptcy at the eleventh hour and required the Bankruptcy Cami to alter its trial 
schedule to hold an evidentiary hearing. The hearing ultimately demonstrated that Mr. Frantz had 
nothing more than his supposition of what had happened to support his claim of attorney-client 
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relationship and possession of confidential materials. (R. Vol. I, p. 82, l. 23 - p. 83, l. 5) The 
District Court would be well within its discretion to consider these acts and omissions of Mr. Katz, 
in connection with his violation ofl.R.P.C. 4.2, in declining to grant admission pro hac vice. 
5. Plaintiff's Legal Authorities Do Not Infom1 the Court. 
On appeal, as he did below, Frantz submits only two cases to support attorney Katz's pro 
hac vice admission. Neither of the cases inform the Court. The first case, Sanders v. Russell, 401 
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), is entirely inapplicable. (The Sanders case is found at R. Vol. II, pp. 370-
376.) That case presented the issue of" ... whether the petitioners had a federal right to retain 
counsel of their choice in non-fee generating school segregation and civil rights cases in federal 
court." Sanders, 401 F.2d at 244. At issue was a Mississippi rule which, as applied, operated to 
unduly restrict litigant's choice of counsel in civil rights litigation. Further, the case specifically 
provides, "this case does not involve the right to practice in state courts." The second case cited 
by Frantz is Schlumberger Technologies v. Wvlie, 113 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1997). Although that 
case addresses pro hac vice admissions, it reflects the standard for a federal district court operating 
in the Eleventh Circuit, i.e., that a trial court lacks discretion in arriving at such a determination. 
As such, it is contrary to Idaho practice and the majority rule. See, DiSabatino, Attorneys Right To 
Appear Pro Hae Vice in State Court, 20 ALR 4th 855 (1983). 
6. Katz as a Witness. 
The District Court believed that attorney Katz would, of necessity, become a trial witness. 
Although perhaps not a "stand alone" basis for declining admission, when combined with the 
history presented to the District Court of Katz's activities, it certainly would give a District Court 
pause. 
It is not difficult to envision circumstances developing where Mr. Frantz's case would be 
prejudiced if he was unable to call Mr. Katz as a witness at trial. For example, Frantz's and Katz's 
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plan to turn IIB against HTEH as a means of obtaining relief from Frantz's indebtedness is fair 
game in attacking Frantz's credibility. Frantz could need some corroborative testimony to help 
explain this credibility impacting testimony. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances brought to the attention of the District Court, 
the potential that this counsel may become a witness is an additional consideration in arriving at a 
proper decision to deny admission pro hac vice. 
E. An Award of Attorney's Fees Under Either J.C. § 12-120(3) or I.C. § 12-121 Was 
Appropriate. 
The statute, I.C. § 12-120(3), Attorney's Fees in Civil Actions, provides that: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on ... a contract relating to the purchase 
or sale of ... services, and any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. The 
tenn "party" is defined to mean any person ... corporation .... 
Plaintiff recognizes that negligence in providing legal representation can qualify as a 
"commercial transaction" and that the inquiry is whether the commercial transaction constituted 
the gravamen of the lawsuit and was the basis on which a party was attempting to recover. See, 
e.g., City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009) (fees allowed where attorney 
advice caused losses arising out of construction contract). The sole basis for this appeal is Frantz's 
contention that the gravamen of the dispute was not a commercial transaction. Plaintiff does not 
contest the amount of fees awarded, nor does he contend the Defendant failed to appropriately 
allege a commercial transaction in its Amended Answer or that it failed to affirn1atively seek an 
award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Plaintiff also apparently agrees that fees are awardable even 
where a commercial transaction is not established by trial. See Garner v. Povev, 151 Idaho 462, 
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469-70, 259 P.3d 608, 615-16 (2011). There is no dispute that the indebtedness being pursued by 
HTEH on behalf of IIB was a commercial obligation and under commercial guaranties of the 
indebtedness owed by IIB to which Frantz held a majority interest. See In re Frantz, 2015 W.L. 
1778068, at *1, fn. 41, 44. 
Plaintiff cites Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,890 P.2d 714 (1995), as well as Kelly v. 
Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,631,903 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1995), in support of his "gravamen" 
position. However, neither of those cases are attorney malpractice cases, nor are either of them 
based on a commercial transaction. Spence v. Howell is a fraud case. Although the fraud occurred 
in a commercial setting, the gravamen of the case was misrepresentation and fraud. Spence, 126 
Idaho at 775-76. The Kellv case involved a straightforward winding up of partnership affairs 
pursuant to statute. Although the partnership was involved in commercial transactions, the purpose 
of the suit, i.e. winding up the partnership affairs, was the basis for the Court's decision. Kelly, 
127 Idaho at 631. 
Spence has likely been overruled, sub silentio. In Blimka v. My Web Wholesalers. LLC, 
143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007), the court held: 
From time to time the court has denied fees under I.C. §12-120(3) on the 
commercial transaction ground either because the claims sounded in tort or 
because no contract was involved. The commercial transaction ground in 
I.C. §12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction 
that involves tortious conduct ( cites omitted) or does it require that there be 
a contract. Any previous holdings to the contrary are overruled. 
As Blimka sustained damages as a result of a commercial transaction, he was entitled to fees, 
despite the fact that his claim was asserted as fraud. 
Fmiher, Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to Kelly by contending that his suit is an 
effort to enforce a statutory scheme. It is nothing of the sort. First, the Idaho Rules of Professional 
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Conduct do not constitute a "statutory scheme. Further, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
do not form the basis for causes of action. The cases cited are not dispositive. 
Instead, the gravamen of the instant action is Frantz's claim that HTEH's use of 
confidential information has prevented him from escaping his commercial indebtedness to IIB, 
and the goal of the suit is to obtain a means to exhaust that indebtedness. Further, the gravamen of 
the suit is the alleged failure of Clark to meet his duties as an attorney under his contract of services 
and HTEH's failure of a continuing duty thereunder. Viewed as a whole then, the gravamen of 
Frantz's suit is a commercial transaction and fees were appropriately awardable under l.C. § 12-
120(3). 
Turning to I.C. § 12-121, that statute, when read in connection with I.R.C.P. 54(a)(l), 
allows fees where the case has been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Frantz brought his suit after a two-day evidentiary hearing had demonstrated that he lacked the 
evidence to prove an attorney-client relationship with Merlyn Clark, or to prove that Merlyn Clark 
was provided with any confidential information. The Court denied his disqualification motion and 
HTEH was continuing to represent IIB pursuant to that ruling at the time this action was brought. 
Thus there is no basis for Frantz contending that he had a good faith claim, well founded in law 
and fact, at the time he commenced this action against HTEH. 
Frantz supports his objection by contending that the District Cami's basis for dismissing 
the action is inconsistent with an award of fees. He contends that the District Court found that 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion "do not apply because there was not and will not be a final 
judgment on the merits." Brief of Appellant p. 24-25, but then found the suit frivolous because of 
the earlier suit. However, that is not what the Court held. 
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On the contrary, what the Court found was that because the adversary proceeding remained 
pending, claim preclusion and issue preclusion did not apply, m. (R. Vol. II, pp. 445-449) Indeed, 
in discussing claim preclusion, the Court specifically stated: 
In the near future there may be a final judgment in the bankruptcy action. 
At that time this state court action will be barred based on the additional 
ground of claim preclusion. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 446) 
Frantz cannot contend that his suit was pursued in good faith. The award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to LC. § 12-121 was appropriate. 
F. Defendant Seeks Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 3 5( 5) and I.A.R. 41 defendant requests attorney's fees on appeal. An 
award of attorney's fees on Appeal may be granted under those rules to the prevailing party. Excel 
Leasing Co v. Christiansen 115 Idaho 708, 712, 769 P.2d 585,589 (App. 1989). Fees are awardable 
pursuant to LC.§ 12-121. Such an award is appropriate when the Supreme Court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Id. An appeal may be deemed frivolous, and attorney's fees awarded, for failure to properly comply 
with I.A.R. 35(5)(6) (regarding the extent of legal argument and citation to authorities and the 
record). Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 61, 244 P.3d 197, 205 (2010). In particular an award 
will be made if an appeal does no more than simply invite the Appellate Court to second guess a 
trial court on conflicting evidence, or, on review of discretionary decisions, no challenge is 
presented with regard to the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 
449, 797 P.2d 153, 157 (App. 1990). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case on the basis of judicial 
estoppel or, alternatively on the basis of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). The Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to admit attorney Katz pro hac vice in light of the unexplained evidence of 
misconduct. Finally, the award of attorney's fees was proper under either I.C. § 12-120(3) or LC. 
§ 12-121 as set for above. Defendant requests that the District Court decision be affirmed in all 
respects. 
DATED this Jlr1 day of February, 2016. 
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By:_~4"--""1.-::_C. __ ;1_.__--- __ _ 
J9fui C. Riseborough 
Kttorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
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I Chapter 7 
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Motion for Relief from Stay 
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Motion to Allow Waiver of Discharge 
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DATE DESCRIPTION 
06/02/2015 HTEH Motion for Sanctions 
09/14/2015 Order Granting Motion for Sanctions in Part 
09/14/2015 Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding as Moot 
09/14/2015 Transcript of Oral Ruling re: Sanctions 
09/25/2015 Notice of Appeal of Sanctions Motion 
10/09/2015 Statement of Issues on Appeal 
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STATES COl;"RT 
(Boise) 
Lri Re: ) 
) CaseNo.11-21337-TU..1 Iv1A.c~ TIN D. FRANTZ and C{NTHL-\ lvL 
FRA .... NTZ, 
) 
) Chapter 11 
) 
Debtor. ) 
ORDER A.PPROVING STIPULATED MOTION TO COI'{VERT CASE 
Upon consideration of the A.mended Notice of Stipulated 1vfotion to Conve1i Case filed 
matter between Martin D. Frar1tz and Cynthia lvi. Frantz, the Debtors herein, Idaho 
I11dependent Bank on March 29, 13, ("Stipulation") [Docket No. 187]; and no objection filed 
as set in the Statement of No Objection to Stipulated :Motion to Conve1i Case filed on April 
23, 2013 [Docket No. 192), and after considering the record herein, and for good cause shmvn, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Tl:-LA.T, the Stipulated Motion to Conve1i Case is approved 
iI1 accordance ·with the terms and attachments set forth therein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDER, this Order is effective innnediately upon entry. 
//end of text// 
DATED: April 23, 13 
S. BA.NKJU}PTCY 
BR421 
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STEPHEN B. McCREA 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1501 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
(208) 666-2594 I FAX (208) 664-4370 
email: sbmccrea@cda.twcbc.com 
---rdano StateS-arNo.16S4- ---- ---~ - - ----- --- ~ 
Attorney for Debtors 
U1'HTEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT 
DISTRJCT OF IDAHO 
IN THE lv1ATTER OF: 







CASE NO. 11-21337-TLM 
Chapter 7 
MOTION TO DIS1\TISS OR RECOi{VERT TO CHAPTER 11 
STEPHEN B. McCREA, one of the attorneys for the above named debtors, moves this court 
an order dismissing proceedings in the above entitled matter or, in the alternative, reconverting 
the case to a Chapter 11 of the Code instead of Chapter 7. 
This motion is made pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §706(a) and (b). 
The grounds for this motion are that the debtors want to pay all their creditors. They desire 
to continue to litigate their claim against Idaho Independent Bank. Dismissal, or conversion ofthis 
case to Chapter 11, is the bes\,1 1a to accomplish this goal. 
Dated thiC)-=?aay o 
-- I 
Attorney for Debtors 
MOTION TO DlSMISS OR RECONVERT TO CHAPTER l I: P,I\GE ! 
BR425 
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E::-nail: jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for :1\fartin and Cynthia Frantz. 
In re: 
:1\1AR TIN D. FR.A.... l'\JTZ 
FRANTZ, 
uNlTED STATES BA,\1<:RUPTCY C01)RT 
DISTRICT OFIDARO 
(Coeur d'Alene) 
Case "N"o. 11-21337-TLM 
CYNTHL.\ :1\1. 
Chapter 7 
:VIOTION FOR RELIEF FR0:'.\1 STAY 
Desc Main 
Ma1iin and Debtors, by and through their attorney of record, Jonathon 
Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, hereby mo-ve the Comi for relief from the automatic stay pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(l), for the purpose of dete1mining the amount, if any, the Frantzes mve 
putative creditor Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB"). The Frantzes do not seek stay relief on 
counterclaim litigation or third paiiy litigation, but merely their defenses and affinmtive 
defenses to IIB' s complaint i11 Kootenai County Case No. CVI 0-6088. This motion is made 
based upon the follmving: 
Background 
Prior to the Frantzes filing on July 19, 2010, filed litigation against tte 
for a m District Comi, czse ;10. CVl0-6088. 
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From that time, until October 17, 2011, when the debtors filed for ban..la:uptcy protection, the 
extensive cost the Frantzes more than Sl00,000 in 
ill 
Frantzes continued 'Nith negotiatio:1s and mediation with IIB. Hmvever, on August 23, 2013, IIB 
filed an adversarv action mrainst the Frantzes seeking: the nondischarg:eabilitv of their nut2.tive .; ._, ._, ._., .; .l. 
court has yet adjudicated IIB' s claim. However, at triis point, the debtors have 
deter111i11ed that settlen,ent ·with IIB "no 10112:er 2.nnears tenable." 1 A ._. ..l r any continui..11g 
ofresolution, the Frantzes now vvish to challenge IIB's assertion that the Frantzes are liable for 
breach contract. Since IIB and the Frantz es have a!Jeady 1) spent hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in litigation over th2.t issue in the state com1, 2) litigated that issue for more than a year in 
state 3) 2.re close to a final tiial resolution in. the state com1 litigation (t1ial date), the 
reEef to resolve this question of pure, state la1v L."1 st2.te cou11 
ARGU:\1ENT 
11 USCS §362(d)(l) allows stay relief for cause. While "cause" is not defined, "as 
Congress has observed, the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical 
determination oflitigation the pai1ies is a fundamental bas:s for granting stay relief. .. " 
Arundotech, LLC, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1705, 13, 2009 VlL 7809008 (9th Cir. BAP :'.\fay 4, 
2009). "[I]t will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue in their place 
ongm, 710 to the estate would result, order to leave the 
it 
re 
p2.11ies to their chosen forum to relief the bankruptcy from many duties that may be handled 
}vfa11in Frantz in of Discharge 401),p.3,ln.12-13. 
\10TI0N RELIEF FROM STAY- 2 
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elsewbere." Id.; see re Ordinance & Equip. Bankr. LEXIS 3038, 5, 
4705285 (Banl::r. D. 17, 2005). 
are t'ivelve non-exclusive CoUit :ised to 
for r·elief of stay: 
1. \\!nether :he reliehvill result ii1 a pa1tial or complete resolut:on of the issues; 
2. The lack of any connection with or interference v,ith the bankruptcy 
3. \\!nether the foreign proceedfr1g involves the debtor as a fid1:ciary; 
4. Whether a specialized tribunal has been established to hear the pa1ticular cause 
of action and \Vhether that t1ibun2.l has the expe1tise to hear such cases; 
5. \Vbether the debtor's ii1surance carrier has assumed full financial 
for defending the litigation; 
6. Vlhether the action essentially invoi-ves third panies, and the debtor functions 
only as a bailee or conduit for the goods or proceeds question; 
7. Vlhether the litigation in another fornm would prejudice the interests 
creditors, the creditors' committee and other interested parties; 
8. Whether the judgment claim arising from the foreign action is subject to 
equitable subordination under Section 510(c). 
9. \Vhether movant's success foreign proceeding ·would result ii'1 a 
avoidable by the debtor under Section 522(f) 
10. interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and vvc,.,vui.ivu, 
determination litigation for the parties; 
11. "\Vhether the foreign proceedings have progress[ ed] to the point where the 
paities are prepared for trial, and 
12. The impact of the stay on the parties and the "balance of hurt. 11 
In re Tactical Ordinance & Equip. Co1p., supra. 6-7. "Not all factors will be relevant and some 
factors may 1veigh heavier in a comt's determination than others." 
The only factors relevant to the present inquiry are nw.ubers 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, and 12. 
·will be briefly addressed in tum. Factor No. 1: stay relief to allow the Frantzes to defend 
against IIB 's allegations breach of contract ·will reso]ye the issue of liability completely as 
1s sole theory of liability aileged. Factor No. 2: allowing the stay will not intern1pt or 
bankruptcy comt as there is not yet any 
on the matter liability. is a to a11y 
MOTION 3 
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the Frantzes may mYe is dischargeable, that litigation ,vill proceed unaffected unless until 
state court adjudges Frantzes as no thereunder to IIB.2 Factor No. 7: no 
to to to 
against IIB's state comi lav;suit. Factor No. 10: judicial economy and the concern for 
econoElical detenr.tination of litigation weights fcsor of granting 
the Frantz es and IIB have already spent hundreds of thousands dollars in the course of the 
state comi litigation. To require the paiiies to duplicate those costs again would be a 
burden to both paiiies. Factor No. 11: at the ti.me the Frantzes filed for ban..lz:ruptcy, the parties 
v.-ere fifteen months into their state comi litigation. They were also only five months a'Nay 
trial. As a result, this factor ,veighs L.'1 the Frantzes favor. Factor No. 12: the pa1iies \Yill not be 
hmi by the relief of stay. Neither pa;iy has yet spent resources on litigating the issue ofliability 
breach contract in bankruptcy comi. Therefore, lifting the the lin1ited 
def ending against IIB' s claim should be granted. 
Jurisdiction 
'iVhile Bankruptcy Rule 3007 sets forth a process of objecting to the allowance of a claim, 
the clain1s litigation process is separated into two different areas for the purposes of detennining 
a Comi's jurisdiction: 1) detenniriing the allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate3, 
2 Frantzes it curious that IIB not already sought to adjudicate the 
amount it claims is O\\'ed by the Frantzes. The Frantzes have consistently deJ1jed any liability to 
IIB under the guarantees. It ·would seem to make sense to adjudicate potential liability 
to seeking a determination that its claim is not subject to discharge. 
3 28 USCS §157(b)(2)(B): "Core proceedings include ... allowance or 
ciaims the estate." 
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and detem1i.Tu1g the arD.ount of the claiJ.114. See In re 912 F. 1162, 
11 . 1990) 1334 supports of to 
st2.te COUli ' rne stat:s 
claim to the b2.nkruptcy court. 
of claims· answering the question of or not a 
putative claimant complied the ban..1<.ruptcy rules in filing a claim properly under the 
bad(niDtcv code and rnles. Detemun.imr the amount of the claim . - ~ a look at 
state 1a·N to determine if the putafrve creditor is really mved ·what is claimed. Tlus 1S 
exemplified by the jurisdictional statutes. 
28 USCS § 1334(a) directs that " ... the district courts shall have original and exclusiYe 
all cases under ti tie 11" ( emphasis added). § l 334(b) then states, "the district 
courts have original but not exclusiYe jurisdiction of civil proceedings 2.rising 
title 11, or arising or related to cases under title 1 ( emphasis added). "Arising under" 
refers to the filing of cases under 11, Bankruptcy Code. re 0 
B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). "Arising in" has been defined as "proceedings that ·would 
not exist outside of bankruptcy ... " Id. ( citing In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1193 Cir. 
2005). '·Related to" is detennined by at whether the outcome of the proceeding 
conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." Id. at 638 
(referencing the "Pacor Test"). Thus, the district courts (and by reference the bankruptcy comis) 
4 See In re 119 B.R. 763, 769 n.12 (Bankr. E.D. 1990): "Claims litigation is, 
jurisdictionally, a hybrid. The state-law rigl1t underlyi...11g a clain1 can, if the auto~11atic stay is 
lifted, be dete1mined in state comi ... The actual claim, once a proof of claim is filed, i...nYokes 
special bankruptcy rnles and procedures that are created by the Bank.rnptcy Code and are a 
matter of exclusive federal 
5 Citing 's, 81 B.?,__. 422,427 S 1 7). 
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only possess original, not exclusiYe, jurisdiction to hear matters "arising in" and "related to" 
cases title 11. 
a Code is a 
matter that "arises under" title 11. Therefore district comis (and by reference the bankruptcy 
-· 
comis) have exclusive jmisdiction to decide whether a claim ,Yas properly filed. However, 
dete1111ination of the arnot:.nt of a claim falls within the ambit "related to" because the amount 
exist outside a ban..1.c.ruptcy. As a result, dis"'.:rict court is not wsted ·with 
exclusivejruisdiction to decide such matters. 6 Therefore, either a dist1ict comi (ban..1.crnptcy 
comi) QI a state comi has the jurisdiction to hear and detemune the amount of the claim. 
Abstention 
"Wbere a bankruptcy comi may abstain deciding issues in fa,,or of an imminent 
state comt involving same cause exists for listing the as to the state 
COUli re , 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cu:. 1990). 
Despite both the dist1ict comi and the state court having authority, 28 uSCS § 1334( c) 
provides for mandatory and permissive abstention by the federal comts. Such motions are 
typically brought by putatiYe creditors when seeking to finish state comi litigation establishing 
their claim. Still, there is no motion abstention before the Cami, if the stay relief is 
denied, the Frantzes ·will initiate an adversary proceeding challenging the liability IIB alleges is 
mved by the Frantz es. Then, will file a motion for abstention. In order to save the paiiies 
and the Cami time and eff01t, if :he Cami were to abstain from the Frantzes' adYersary 
6 In re 119 B.R. 763,769 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990): "The sole for federal 
111 oYer claims, is not exclusiYe 
FOR 6 
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proceedii1g, the grnnt the stay relief spaiing the parties from having to 
of fili..11g an adversary proceeding for a 
§ 1334( c )(2) states that "in a proceeding based upon a State lmv claiiu or State la\v cause 
action, related to a case under title 11 but not 2.risii-ig under title 11 or aiising in a case 
title 11, respect to ·which an action could not have been cormnenced in a court of the United 
States absent under tr.J.s section. the district coun rand therefore the bank::nmtcy • C ' 
court] shall from bearing such proceeding if an action is comnlenced, and can be 
adjudicated, in a State forum appropriate jurisdiction." The requirements for mandatory 
abstention are: 
l) a timely motion by the party seeking abstention; 2) the action involves purely 
state questions; 3) the action is 'related to a case under title 11;' 4) there is no 
'-"·'"'·"--""' federal jurisdiction over the 2.ction absent the petition under title 11; 
. r1 . 6) ' . 1s con1Inence._.. Ln state com1; tn.e state cou11 action may timely 
and a state fornm of appropriate jmisdiction exists. 
(citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(c)(2)). \Vhile all seven elements are necessary, the "two major 
elements" for mandatory abstention are: "l) the action has been commenced in state court and 2) 
action can be timely adjudicated in state court." In re Bliss Vailey Inc., 1990 B 
LEXIS 1912 (Banl:r. D. Idaho 1990). 
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The Current Dischargeability Litigation 
IIB likely bring up ,he that the parties are cunemly litigation in 
COUli. have :r.o bearing on the OYer or not 
IIB 's underlying claim for breach of contract/guarantees has merit The cunent adversary 
pi·oceeding bem'een paiiies is to reso]Ye \vhetber or not IIB' s putative claim is discbargeable 
or not. 7 That is to say, the cunent litigation has nothing to do 1vith ·whether or not Frantzes 
has had nearly five years to seek such resolution. IIB chose not to move for relief of stay 
fi:rish the state comi proceeding despite how close the parties \'i'ere to trial. Instead, IIB chose to 
litigate the issue of dischargeability before finalizi.c1g its claim in the state court action or even 
incorporating it into its adversary proceeding8. IIB cannot now complain that the Frantzes seek 
to finalize dispute. 
AJl this ti.cue, the Frantzes have hoped to be able to resolve their dispute 1vith IIB. 
as stated above, that no longer appears tenable. It is trne the claims asserted 
IIB in case no. 13-07024 do request certain amounts, but that is only because, under §523, 
nondischargeability is only to the extent of the damages alleged. IIB 's complaint is not for a 
7 The title of the complaint is: "Complaint Determination ofNondischargeable Debt 
to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2), (a)(6)." The first count is: "Detennination that Debt is 
Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) (Ma1iin Frantz)" see 13-07024 Dkt. 1 
22. The second count is: "Detennination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 US.C. 
§523(a)(2)(A) (Mmiin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at p. 23. The third count is 
"Deten11ination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) 
Frantz) see Id. at p. 24. The fourth count "Determination that Debt is 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B) (Mmiin and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at 26. The fifth and 
final count is: "Detennination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § (a)(6) 
(Maiiin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at 27. 
8 Had IIB done so, Frantzes 'l',·ould ha\·e to haYe matter in st2te 
COUli. 
8 
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blan..~et denial of discharge under 7 (which not require a finding of da:.·mges for the 
it is an ' ·ht •· ) unner L1 a, seCLlOn . 
CO~CLuSION 
Therefore, the Debtors rnotion for stay relief, allo"wing them to adjudicate their state 
and affir:112.frs:e defenses against IIB' s claim should be granted because the parties 
already spent excessive amounts money on discovery and mediation i..11 the state court case, 
parties v;ere neari..1g trial dates and dates dispositive motions, a:J.d of 
claims/defenses/affim1afr,-e defenses in Kootenai County Case No. CVl 0-6088 are entirely state 
causes of action \Yould best be adjudged by state comi judges. 
RULE 4001.2 l\'OTICE 
to .2 of Local Bankruptcy Rules, to Fed. R. Bankr. ?. 
9006, any paiiy in interest opposing the motion must file and sen-e an objection thereto not later 
seventeen days after the date of serYice of the motion. The obj shall specifically 
identify those matters contaii1ed in the motion that are at issue and any other basis for opposition 
to the motion. Absent the filing: of a timelv objection, the court mav 2.rant the relief sou2.ht 
vdthout a hearing:, As set fo1ih in Rule 4001.2(d)(3), if an objection is filed to this relief 
motion, the objection must be served upon the movant and upon all paiiies receiving service of 
the motion. In accordance with Rule 4001.2(e)(l), a paiiy opposing a n1otion shall contact 
comt's calendar clerk to schedule a preliminary hearing. At the time of filing the objection to a 
motion, the objecting paiiy shall file and sen'e notice of such hearing. 
:'.\10TI0N - 9 
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In addition, pursuant to Rule 4001.2 of the Local Ba11 .. 'kn.1ptcy Rules and 11 S.C. 
a ( "\ Ci) 
from the stay of any act agai.ri.st property of the estate under subsection (a) of this 
section, such stay is tern1inated ·with respect to the party in interest making such 
request, unJess the court, after notice a::1d hearing, orders such stay continued in 
effect pendii1g the conclusion of, or as a result of, a fmal heari21g and 
dete1111i11ation under subsection ( d) of ti\is section. 
DATED this 27'J:i Day February, 2015. 
FRA . .1'\TTZ LAW, PLLC 
J 
Attorney for Debtors 
Certificate of Electronic Filing 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27ili day of February, 2015, I electronically filed the 
foregoing Motion for Relief from Stay with the Clerk of the Court using ClA/ECF system 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the follmving persons: 
David Eash deash@e1vin2:anderson.com 
David P. Gardner trnsteeui}\vinstoncashatt. com 
Nevmrnn 
\V. Dyer ,rnrv.w.dver@usdoi 2.0v 
J 
10 
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Kelly Greene 1\1cCow1ell li ti Q:ation@ ci Yenspursl ev corn 
E, Olsen ecfid@rcflesi:al.com 
l\1ichael J. Paukert mpaukert02nt-1aw.com 
Stephen B. :'.\1cCrea mccreaecfla)cda.twcbc.con1 
US. Trustee 
Sheila R. Schv,·ager ssdr;vaQ:er(a)hawle,iroxe11 com 
Jonathon Frantz 




PO Box 598 
folluwing non-Cl\1/ECF Registered Participants 
Hayden, Idaho 83835 
Recovery Management Systems Corporation 
For Capital Recovery 
25 SE 2nd Ave., Suite 1120 
~v1iami, FL 33131 
Joe Dobson 
Cold·well Banker Schneidmiller Realty 
1924 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Thomas Development Company 
413 W. Idaho St. 
Suite 200 
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INRE ) 
_Case. No.Jl-21337-TLl\1 
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l\1EMORA.1~DTJI\1 OF DECISION ON 
DEBTORS' :MOTION TO DISMISS OR RECONVERT, 
A.i'\D DEBTORS' 1\IOTION FOR RELIEF FROl\1 STAY 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 1 
The relevant to the pending matters are taken from the record 
the 111 chapter 72 case and from the hearing on March 30-31, 2015 .3 
Thi-ee and a half years ago, in October 2011, lvfa1iin and Cynthia Frantz 
1 This Decision constitutes ,he Court's findings and conclusions. Rules 7052, 9014. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, citations to statutory provisions are to the Ban.la-uptcy 
11 U.S. Code,§§ 101-1532, and citations to the "Rules" are to the Federal Rdes of 
Bankruptcy Procedure. 
3 As expressly stated at that hearing, the Court takes judicial notice of its files and 
under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Wni1e generally notice of-what was filed, and does 
not mean the contents of those filings necessarily ha Ye evidentiary ,,,eight, see Credit Alliance 
Cmp. v. Inc. (In re Blume1), 95 B.R. 143, 146-47 (9th Cir. BAP 1 
debtor's verified schedules and statements, ·when offered agaiLst the debtor, haYe 
effect under Fed. R. Evid. 801 In re Vee Vinlmee, 336 B.R. 437,449 (9th Cir. 
:>1,o,-a0 ,, (In re Jordan), 392 B.R. 444 n.32 D. Idaho 
OF - 1 
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("Debtors"4) filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 commencing this case. 
/I Their statement of financial affairs ("SOFA") 
~ D~~ 
a l O state court 
B 
It is clear that IIB is Debtors' single largest creditor. IIB 's claim arises from 
Debtors' unseci..:red guarar:ties of an IIB loan an entity in 'Nhich Debtors held a 
majority interest. At the time bankruptcy filing the lav;suit had been 
pending over a year. W11ile discovery had commenced and mediation 
been attempted, no motions for sun1111a11 judgment had been heard in that suit, 
no depositions had been taken. Testimony indicated Debtors filed barL'k.ruptcy 
tbe day before Maiiin Frantz' deposition \Vas scheduled to occur. 
March 2012, on Debtors' and IIB 's joint motion, the Comi appointed 
Ford Elsaesser, an experienced bankruptcy practitioner and a chapter 7 trustee, as 
a "mediator" in the chapter 11. Comi subsequently approved the employment 
of Maggie Lyons and her business, Resolve Financial Group ("Resolve"), to 
analyze Debtors' financial activities and transactions. Doc. Nos. 82, 100.5 
application to employ ResolYe asse1ied that Elsaesser believed no medi2:tion 
4 
Debtors filed a under § 302, and their schedules indicate their assets are 
and The 
of reference, v,:ill at times refer to in describing and events 
Frantz did not testify at the 1v1arch 2015 hearing and several of the documents refer solely to 
Frantz. 
to as "Doc. No." and those filed 
the related Adv. No. 1 are 
referred to as "Adv. Doc. No." 
OF - 2 
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successfully conclude until a financial professional thoroughly evaluated, analyzed 
and reported on "Debtors' transfers, fina.1ces, assets, liabilities, and 
Doc. No. 82 at 2. 
"report" had been provided to him, Debtors, IIB and the United States Trustee 
("UST") on January 10, 2013,6 and that Debtors and IIB had agreed to a 1Y1ediation 
session to occur in I\1arch 2013. On March 29, 2013, however, Debtors and IIB 
filed aJ · for conversion of the case to chapter 7. Doc. Nos. 185, 187. 
The case \Vas convened to a liquidation case under chapter 7 on Ap1il 23, 2013. 
Doc. No. 193. 
IIB an adversary complaint on August 23, 2013, alleging causes of 
action under§§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(6). Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM.7 IIB sought both 
a judgment damages (in an amount not exceeding the full obligations due 
under the "Eagle Ridge Loan," the "Tv-1in Lakes Construction Loan" and the "Line 
of Credit" as described therein) and a ruling that such damages, plus interest, 
6 A copy of the report ,vas marked at the :\farch 30 hearing as Ex. 212 but never offered. 
However, its contents were referred to by Mi1iin Frantz in responding to questions from his own 
counsel, and in cross examination, and later referred to by the chapter 7 trustee, David Gardiler 
("Trustee"), in The Comi therefore allowed questioning of witnesses that related 
to the existence of the report and their actions taken in response, com1ection or regard to it, but it 
is not considered as evidence establishi11g the conclusions 2.sserted therein. 
Rule 
") - .) 
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attorneys' fees and costs, were nondischargeable. Adv. Doc. No. 1.8 
In late September 2013, Debtors moved for an order requiring 
"counterclaim" thev allegedly ., ~ against IIB related to matters 





Debtors 1vithdre\v their abandonment request shortly before a scheduled 
evidentiary hearing on that matter. 
As noted, administration of 7 case commenced in .April 2013. 
After selling a number of personal property assets, Trustee sought turnover of 
Debtors' real property in Scottsdale, A.Iizona. Ultimately, after months of 
litigation, Trustee v,1as granted authmity to sell this prope1iy. The disputes 
request, and Debtors' several alternative litigation strategies in 
objecting to Trustee's request and attempting to gain control of the Arizona 
property, \Vere described in detail in the Court's oral rnling approving sale and in a 
February 2015 decision denying Debtors' request for a stay pending appeal. Doc. 
8 Debtors have argued that the adversary proceeding only seeks a declaration of 
nondischargeability, and does not seek adjudication or liquidation of the debt to IIB. That 
assertion is belied by the contents and prayer of the complaint, which seek a detennination of the 
amount of nondischargeable debt. The total amount of IIB 's alleged debt is over $6.4 million. 
See Claim No. 6-1. The Court also notes that IIB' s claim, filed on January 30, 2012, has never 
bee1:1 objected to and is thus alfowed, see§§ 501,502, and facie evidentiary z,s to 
validity and see Rule 3001 (f). 
9 This motion, Doc. No. 255, asserted that such a counterclaim against IIB had been 
asserted in state court litigation, and that Debtors had disclosed it on February and September 
2013 amendrr:ents of schedule B. This is an reference to Ex. 204 at 5 and Ex. 206 4, 
both of which list an claii:1 in an "unk.nown" amount. Debtors' on 
this motion a 1 million counterclaim. Doc. No. 265. 
- 4 
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' 
No. 414. 10 In addition, it \Vas established at the March 30 hearing that Debtors 
caused several to be filed record on 
Com1 The first such filing Yvas ren:oved Trustee's protests. The 
second was removed after the Court entered an order its removal. 
'Nas subsequently followed, hmve'i·er, with the filing a third, post-sale closing, 
lis pend ens. 
On February 27, 2015, just tbJee days after Court denied their 
for a stay pending appeal, and ,vith rescheduled trial in the IIB adversaiy looming 
in May, 11 Debtors filed a Motion to Dismiss or Reconve1t to Chapter 11, Doc. No. 
421 (the "Dismissal;Reconversion Motion"). Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion 
?\fotion is terse, simply states: "The grounds for this motion are that the 
debtors ,vant to pay all their creditors. Ibey desire to continue to litigate their 
claim against Idaho Indeper:dent Banlr. Dismissal, or conversion of this case to 
Chapter 11, is the best way to accomplish this goal." The Dismssal/Reconversion 
Motion was served on all creditors. Id. at 2-5. 12 
10 The specific findings and conclusions in such rulings are incorporated by this 
reference and ·without repetition. 
11 Trial had been set to commence on December 1, 2014. Debtors attempted in several 
ways to delay commencement of the trial, including to continue and motions to 
disquali:f; IIB 's counsel and seYeral of IIB 's disclosed witnesses. The Court denied all 
such :::eq-uests, the hearings on the latter did delay the trial date, which is now set for 
26, 2015. See Adv. Doc. Nos. 51 (minute entry denying motion to continue), 71 (minute 
105 of 12/10/14 oralniling). 
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A.n bo'lr and a half after filing their Dismissal/Reconversion Motion, 
Debtors filed a Motion for Relief Stay, Doc. No. 425 "Stay Relief 
Stay Relief Motion seeks purpose of detem1ining 
Independent Ban ___ k[.]" Debtors specifically disclaim any desire to pursue their 
counterclaim, and only seek relief to assert "their defenses and affimrntive 
defenses" to IIB 's claim. 13 
At a bearing on March 3, the Court identified a lvfarch 30 hearing date 
Debtors' t\vo motions and set pre-hearing evidentiai7 disclosure deadlines. Under 
Rule 2002(a)( 4), a hea1ing on dismissal or conversion of a chapter 7 case (\vith 
not relevant here) requires 21 days' notice to all creditors 2.nd parties 
interest. The date selected by the Court for hearing allowed Debtors to issue a 
of heaiing on proper notice. Debtors never provided a notice of hearing to 
creditors. Neve1iheless, the Dismissal/Reconversion Motion and the Stay Relief 
Motion came on for hearing on lvfarch 30, 2015. The Comi has considered all the 
12 
( ... contirmed) 
it on creditors and in interest. See Doc. No. 422 at 5, 9~11. 
13 For additional context, just prior to these two motions, on February 12, 2015, 
filed a "waiver of discharge" and a motion to approve th2t waiver. Doc. Nos. 397, 398. The 
expressly excluded the debt to IIB and w2s thus a waiwr. The Co1.:.1i, 2t 
on :!\farch 3, found that§ 0) for a complete, not a selective or 
and it denied Debtors' motion. See Kart:-.man v. Kleinn:ann (171 re 
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I testimony presented
14 and the documentary evidence admitted. 
In many ,,:vays, 111otions could be resolved on basis tl1e 
over the course of the two day hearing, the parties specifically raised 
and established a number of facts. some of v,;hich the Couii highlights belO\v. . - -
I. 
Debtors made se1ial amendments to their schedules and statements 
throughout the case. The clear weight of the evidence \Vas that all such 
amendments ,vere t1iggered by Debtors' undisclosed or inadequately explained 
assets and transactions, as identified in the Resolve repo1i, or \Vere in response to 
questions and objections raised by creditors, the UST and Trnstee. In sbo1i, 
Debtors' amendments 1vere not independently initiated or proactive. 
W11en such issues came to light, Frantz said he \vould advise his attomeys15 
needed to be changed. added or deleted. He \Vould later receive signature ~ . -
pages to sign regarding the amendments, but he did not necessarily review the 
amendments or verify their accuracy \vhen executing the ve1ifications. 
IL 
In October 2010, approximately a year before the baIL1<:ruptcy filing 
several months after the stmi the IIB state court suit, Maiiin Frantz settled a 
14 The Court }:as also considered the credibility of all wi'.nesses and the ,veight to be 
their whether in this Decisio:1 or not. 
15 Debtors have had fou in the case. 
DECISION - 7 
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promiss01y note in the face amount of Sl,050,000 01ved to Debtors by their son, 
Frantz, his ·Ni:e, :'.\'1elissa. 222. 6 On the 01iginal SOFA, this was 
disclosed as a "sale" a note Tyson equivalent interest in Frantz 
ordinarv course of business." Ex. 202 at 21. Testimony indicated it ,vas a ~ . 
settlement of the obligation mved to Debtors, not a sale of the note. 17 Debtors later 
"explained" to Resolve they accepted a l interest in FIG and cash in 
satisfaction of the note. See Ex. 223. 
As part of this settlement agree111ent, the paiiies amended the FIG operating 
agreement to entitle Debtors to a "priority distribution of $50,000 annually p1ior 
dist1ibutions." Ex. 224. The distributions ,vere to sta1i 5 years later 
(i.e., in 2015) with any pmiion of the payments not made being added to future 
payments "until paid in " 
Martin Frantz testified he could not recall the amount due on the note. The 
am01iization schedule attached to the note, hmvever, shows total payments of 
$52,420 and a balance due of $1,066,316.34 as of 1\farch 2007. Given this 
16 
The May 2006 note ·was secured by the LLC interests in Snov;,r Pe2.k l Real 
Estate Holding Co., LLC, interests \,ere acquired by the proceeds of the loan. The note 
was payable monthly starting in June 2006. For the first year interest accn1ed at 8% and 
at \Vells Fargo Pri:ne plus 1 %. The was subject to a bailoon payment in 
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balance, and since fr.ere is no absolute amount noted in the settlement agreement, 
it appears the SS0,000 payments \Vill exist an extended 
Frantz admitted that the right to this income stream \Vas an asset 
payments has never been disclosed in any schedule B. Though the separate FIG 
mvnership interest \Vas scheduled, the details varied significantly.i8 
III. 
In the January 201211:0R, Debtors disclosed receipt of $89,619.89 as 
management or partner fees, \Vith a notation of "GP FEE INCO:tvffi A.\1J\10N 
ASSOC." 228. A settlement staternent on this transaction regarding Ammon 
Associates, Ex. 121, indicates Martin Frantz was paid an "exit fee" of $65,250.00 
and a $24,369.89 repayment of a "loan" he had made to the entity. 
Debtors' l % partnership interest in .A ... mmon Associates \Vas disclosed 
else\vhere in this MOR as \V01ih $80,000. Subsequent MORs failed to reference 
an mvnership interest in A.mmon Associates. See Ex. 229. Hand-.w1itten notes on 
the settlement statement, Ex. 121, suggest the "exit fee" \Vas paid for services 
rendered, and that nothing \vas paid "for" Frantz' general partner interest because 
18 Debtors' mvnership interest in FIG was disclosed on schedule B but it 'ivas aggregated 
with all other · interests. See Ex. 202. Reference to FIG was deleted in a 
amendment, Ex. 204. A reference to a 5 .3 8% interest (r..ot 19%) in FIG with a value of "SO" was 
disclosed in a amendment, Ex. 206. Hm1'ever, in certain of the 11 
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all proceeds underthe agreement (net of taxes, secured creditors and closing) had 
to be first paid to limited pa1iners. The "sale" ai1d satisfaction or 
termination of the general paiiner interest \Vere not disclosed to or approved by 
Comi. 19 
1\fa1iin Frantz testified that he made loans to at least nvo partnerships 
during the chapter 11 p01tion of the ban..'Kl-uptcy, including ium11on Associates, 
saying this occmTed when "I had to feed the partnership." The loans and the fact 
that these paitnerships ov,red money to Debtors (in addition to Debtors' ownership 
general paiiner interests) were not disclosed. Nor did Debtors disclose the fact 
that the amounts paid in Januaiy 2012 included repayment to Debtors of an 
Associates loan.20 
IV. 
In October 2012, Debtors attempted to sell rights flmving from their 
paiinership interests in entities controlling 21 affordable housing projects. Doc. 
No. 127. The sale contemplated that 50% of the general partner's interest in fees, 
and 50% of its interest in profits, vwuld be sold to Tailored Management Services, 
19 Frantz appeared to argue, though unpersuasiveiy, that if creditors wo'.lld have 
no right under a partnership agreement to object to a sale, then they would have no right to 
if it were sold in thus that no disclosure of such a sale during bankruptcy would 
be ~on,,,~;o,i 
2° Frantz arg,Jed that wherever there were 01nitted of this creditors cou1d 
the rest of the infomrntion from tbe Resol\·e "audit." Not only \,,as the Resolve rep01i not filed 
with the Court ur,til Debtors filed it in the proceeding in Noven-;ber 2014, see Adv. 
Doc.No. 64-1, but Debtors cannot reiy on whate\'er Resolw from its 
to Debtors' violation of their c2.ndid snd disclosure. 
OF - l 0 
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LLC for $40,000, netting $30,000 to the estate after taxes. The motion did not 
and candidly disclose that buyer entity 1vas one of Debtors' 
sons. There v-1ere also issues concerning the reasonableness of the sales price 
finances and cash flmv. The motion thus 
drew objections from IIB and the UST. and it 1vas denied in December 2012 after - . 
hearing. 
V. 
Debtors' interest in Admiralty Associates \Vas sold during the chapter 11.21 
Franz testified that the sale was directed by and through his brother, Jim Frantz, 
,vho had replaced him ( or over" for him) as general partner. Debtors \\'ere 
entitled to approximately $92,000 that transaction, 1vhich was paid at or 
about the time of the conversion to chapter 7 on April 23, 2013.22 Those funds 
\Vere not paid to Debtors but, instead, \rere paid directly to the IRS on Debtors' 
behalf, referencing Maiiin Frantz' Social Security number. Jim Frantz later 
explained to Trustee that the direct payment ivas to protect the pa1inership from 
IRS inqui1ies. 
The sale or satisfaction Debtors' interest in this paiinership \Vas not 
disclosed dming the chapter 11, nor approved by the Comi. Nor was the 
interest in what \V2.s otherwise disclosed in Debtors' 
of 
22 Tbe motion to convert h2d 2.bo1.2t a n1ornh e2.r1Jer. 
- 11 
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of Debtors' IRS obligation disclosed.23 
VI. 
The and account following Doc. No. 225, 
"management employment fees." Yet only slightly over $20,000 remained 
\Vas provided to Trustee at conversion. 
The expe:1dit1res during the chapter 11 are not itemized in the final report 
but Debtors refer generally to the MO Rs they filed during the chapter 11 for 
infomrntion. Id. The detail in the :tvIORs, Exs. 225-239, 2re summarized in the 
final April 2013 MOR included as paii of Ex. 239. That MOR reflects that, over 
. ('S" mcome or . 5 761.05 \Vas realized 
and expenditures totaled $369,939.24. Those expenditures included $160,669.40 
in personal living expenses? Debtors have a t\vo-person household and claimed 
no dependents in their filings. Hmvever, they have argued they at times supp01ied 
many of their 14 adult children and spouses and 24 grandchildren. See 246. 
These living expenses constitute 43% of all expenditures and average slightly over 
23 
Frantz testified that he may also have been entitled to repayment of a loan made to this 
bi.::t could not re.call if it had been 
:
4 
The Court's review specific entries in this category on each of the 
:v10Rs suggests the amount shov:n on the summary in the last MOR may not be accurate, but the 
Court's calculations v,:ould the acte2] 2mount is eYen 
DECISION - 2 
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S8,900 per month, not including a mmigage expense that is separately i~emized.25 
These same MO Rs reflect that tlu·ough the course of 11, 
Debtors made Sl9,000 in "capital Eagle Ridge on 
deYeloprnent. See Exs. 225,227 at 5. And they made another Sl0,000 capital 
contribution to ERTL in March 2012. See Ex. 230. Debtors also made to 
ERTL of at least $41,500. See Ex. 231 10,000), 236 ($8,000), Ex. 239 
($7,000 in Januaiy 2013, $5,000 in February 2013, $5,000 in March 2013, and 
$6,500 in April 2013). No request to use estate funds to make such contributions 
or loans, see§ 363(b)(l), was ever made or approved.26 
During chapter 11 funds \Vere being infused into ERTL, Debtors' 
filings suggested their interest in the corporation had value.27 ERTL ovl'ns l 04 
acres of real estate in n01ih Idaho, adjacent to 50 acres O\vned by Debtors. 
Debtors' initial Rule 2015.3 report, Doc. No. 24, \Vas filed in November 2011 
25 
The MO Rs shmv several months where the non-mo1igage living expenses exceeded 
Sl0,000. See Ex. 229 (Sl 1,088); Ex. 230 (£11,265); Ex. 232 ($14,239); Ex. 233 ($22,528); Ex. 
235 ($10,308); Ex. 237 ($13,790); Ex. 238 (S Ex. 239 ($16,074 in 2013). 
16 In a letter to IIB 's counsel, Debtors argued that ERTL' s :nonthly expenses of 
S3,935.36 (which included payment of Debtors' health insurance) were as "ordinary course 
of bisiness" expenses. Tbs argument was never raised to the whether i.11 reg2rd to those 
monthly expenses or the loans or capital contributions to ERTL. 
27 
e.g., Ex. 225 (MOR Oct. 2011, an 87.99% interest worth $870,000). 
The l\fORs continued this assertion until Ac1 6cst 2012 when the sa:11e was 
shown to be wonh $720,000. Ex. 234. This latter 
- 13 
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ascribed, consistent with the earlier lvfORs, a $870,000 value to Debtors' interest 
in ERTL. A supplement (addenda) to the Rule 201 report, Doc. o. 47, 
addresses ER TL provides Debtors' opinion of then-present 
104 encumbered acres as $5.52 million. Debtors subtracted an IIB secured claim 
of $4.6 m.illion (an amou:1t that excluded default interest and penalties) and thus 
calculated a $920,000 value for their interest in ERTL.28 
HO\vever, IIB 's proof claim (on Debtors' guarantee of the ERTL secured 
obligation to IIB) is filed in excess of S6 million.29 This indicates Debtors and 
have negative equity in ERTL. Their infusion of cash into ERTL in the fom1 of 
loans and capital contributions, in addition to funding operating expenses, during 
the chapter 11, \Vas not shown to be appropriate or justified. 
'W11i1e there \Vere a number of other matters explored at length at the 
hea1irnz, the Court deems it mmecessarv to make findin:2:s as to all such matters. ......... .., ....., 
The foregoing, and the Cami's record, suffice for purposes of this Decision. 
Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion Motion was objected to by the UST, 
Trnstee, IIB and creditors Duk and i\nn Roell er. The Stay Relief l\fotion ,vas 
opposed by IIB. All issues \Vere taken under advisement on March 31 following 
28 
The :-eason the difference betweert this S920,000 value and the S870,000 assertiort 
is not clear. 
29 
That claim indicates principal and non-default interest on loan no. 1309 is 
S4,672,000. Default and other expertses increase the 
of that loan to The cli,iu also lorn (no. 1 of abocJt 
- 14 
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argument. The Comi has evaluated the dockets and record, the evidence, the 
arguments the and the applicable authmities. It concludes 
must denied. 
DISCCSSION At"\"TI DISPOSITION 
A. DismissaJJReconYersion :\lotion 
Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion Motion seeks inconsistent and, thus, 
alternative fonns of relief, \Vhich be sep2.rately addressed. 
1. Dismissal 
A chapter 7 debtor's motion to dismiss the case is considered under 
§ 7Q7(a), Vlhich States: 
(a) The may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice 
and a hearing and only cause, including-
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees or cbarges required under chapter 
123 of title 28; and 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen 
days or such additional time as the comi may allow after the 
filing of the petition conm1encing such case, the information 
required by paragraph (1) of section 52l(a), but only on a 
motion by the United States trustee. [3oJ 
As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Gall01vay v. Ford (In re 
Galloway), 2014 WL 4212621, at *5 (9th Cir. B.A_P Aug. 27, 2014): 
Dismissal of a chapter 7 case is governed by § 707(a): "The 
and not exclusive. 
§ 102(3)). 
- 15 
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comi may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a 
hearing and only for cause[.]" In re Bartee, 317 B.R. [362,J 365 
Cir. B.A.P 2004)], Debtors do have an absolute right to disrniss their 
voluntary chapter 7 case. Id. Like any interested paity, § 
a a prepondera11ce 
exists to justify dismissal of a chapter 7 case. In re Leach, 130 B .R. 
855, 856 (9th Cir. BAP 1991 ). Further, dismissal should only be 
--granted-if there w-ill 13e no han1:1.·to ·creditors:·~Jn re-Bartee; 31-7· B-.R~ at· 
365; Gill v. Hall (In re Hall), 15 B.R. 913, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 1981) 
(citing Schroeder v. 'l Airport Inn P'ship, 517 F.2d 510, 512 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). 
Bartee furtber notes that debtors have the burden of proving that dismissal ·wiil 
cause no legal prejudice to interested pa1iies. 317 B.R. at 366 ( citing Leach, 130 
B.R. at 857). Bartee was an asset case, and the BAP found that dismissal \Vould 
have prejudiced creditors because there \Vas no guarantee the debtors v,'ould pay 
their debts outside of bankruptcy. The BAP agreed with bankruptcy comi that 
debtors' proposals \Vere too speculative to establish the required lack of prejudice. 
Id. Galloway this proposition: "A debtor's speculative ability to repay 
creditors outside bankruptcy is not cause for dismissal." 2014 \VL 4212621 at *6 
(citing Twpen v. Eide (In re Turpen), 244 B.R. 431, 434-35 (8th Cir. BAP 2000)). 
a. Debtors' asserted cause and lack of prejudice are 
unpersuasiYe 
Debtors argue creditors 1vill not be prejudiced by dismissal of the case, 
and they can provide more to their creditors outside bankruptcy by returning to 
their preban .. 1-cruptcy business as compared to \Vhat a chapter 7 trustee could 
nrovide thrornrh liouidation . .t:' ~ l 
- 16 
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numerous affordable housing projects. The projects \Vere generally mvned by 
single-purpose limited partnerships, in Debtors held a general 
interest. Debtors not such mterests 
from compensation for the development of the projects and their management. 
Such ects benefit from v2.rious types of governmental incentives 
including subsidized loans and tax credits. The nature of such projects and credi~s 
provides opp01tunities for value to be obtained through "resyndic2.tion" and 
refinancing of projects and the restructuring of underlying pa1inerships. These 
processes also · sales of tax credits, which are dependent on the project, 
the discounted value of such credits. Some project transactions 
"rehabbing" 1vhich requires remodeling of the physical projects for 
Purnoses of such sale or resvndication. ~ ~ 
The existence of Debtors' bankrnptcy imposes a significant impediment to 
this business. Maiiin Frantz' baILlzruptcy apparently violates the covenants of the 
project paiinerships and syndication agreements, and perhaps regulatory 
requirements. He testified that, practically speaking, the presence of his 
bankruptcy prohibits sales and resyndications so long as personally is · 
He indicated that even a completed baILhuptcy \Vith a discharge \Vould 
him from paiiicipating in government-assisted affordable housing contracts 
related syndications. 
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problem or obstac1e.31 Debtors claim dismissal vl'ould allmv them to extract value 
the ects over a 3 to 5 trame, that to 
generate more 
the bankruptcv liauidation of their 12:eneral partner interests in the numeroi.:s ., " ~ 
limited paiinerships.32 
Debtors ai·gue that future payments to creditors outside barr._kruptcy will 
assured by a mmigage on 50 acres mvned by Debtors. 33 A draft proposed 
mmigage \Vas admitted as Ex. 165. It contains nurnerm:s blanks and is clecr ly just 
a \vorking document. The exhibit also contains "primary points" providing some 
very general tem1s of Debtors' plan to pay creditors after dismissal. Neither the 
draft rn01igage document, nor the "points" explaining the post-dismissal plan 
te1111s, ·were provided to creditors, though there \vas a general reference to Debtors 
"grant[ing] equal primity liens on his 50 acres to all creditors except [IIB]" in the 
b1ief accompanying their Dismissal/Reconversion Motion, Doc.No. 422.34 
31 However, Frantz seemed to suggest that even if the banki.uptcy were to be 
unresolved litigation ·with IIB V/Ould him from qualifying for goverrunent-2.ssisted 
financing, tho12gh perhaps other partners in the projects could qualify. 
32 The asserted value of the general pa1inership interests per se was to wide 
by Debtors. See Ex. Nos. 202,204,206. \Vhen asked by Trustee's counsel \vhat 
justified those changes in value, Martin Frantz could not provide an answer. As noted, Debtors' 
attempted sale of interests in one such limited partnership to their son's company, Tailored 
was less than the various values Debtors h2d asse1ied in the 
Frantz also admitted he h2d valued such interests at substantially higher amounts in 
prior financial statements, but justified the later, lovier values as a result 01 "regulatory vuu,H-•-u 
33 Debtors assert this property is \VOrth S2.6 n1il11on. 
Trustee the 50 2.cres liti 
- 18 
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Debtors' arguments regarding lack of prejudice are also based to a degree 
on allegation the acres, and the adjacent ERTL property, can 
prebank-... ruptcy possibility of such an easement was reflected in a July 2006 letter, 
Ex. 150. Hmvever, this proposal required payment by Debtors or their corporate 
entity of S40,000 (the first portion of ·which ·was due by December 2006) and 
recordation of the easement. These conditions ,vere never folfilled. Issues 1vith 
establishing or settling lot lines on the property prohibited closing that transaction. 
Nothing other than Frantz' assurances \Vas provided to est2.blish th2.t similar 
easements could be obtained to the benefit the prope1iy at this date. 
Thus, Debtors argue that creditors will not be prejudiced by dismissal 
because they be paid their claims outside ban.."k:ruptcy and because they \Vili 
have security of the m01ig2ge on the 50 acres. But Debtors did 11ot establish 
either the ability to generate funds for pay:ment, or that their conceptual mortgage 
1vould effectively secure creditors. 
Moreover, Debtors specifically exclude IIB from the secmity of 
m01igage. They argue that even though IIB is their largest creditor, it has a 
;
4
( t· o') · · ... con mue 
various Frantz' family members and related entities and Debtors' interests in the rural 
development/affordable housing projects and partnerships) as one of the most valuable assets of 
the estate. Hmvever, Trustee ,vou]d presumptiYe]y liquid2te the property and pay creditors the 
proceeds. From the creditors' perspective, this differs significantly from the 
as for foture 2.ddress the 
inherent in a 
creditors in 
OF DECISION - 19 
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"disputed" debt and, therefore, 1vill not receive the same treatment as other 
creditors upon dismissal and it secured the mmigage. See ~..., 
see 1 exa1111nat1on, 
admitted that other creditors (the Roellers, and 1:v1ichael Reagan) \Vere or might be 
"disputed" as \vell. This "exclusion" of other non-IIB creditors from the proposed 
treatment and mmigage \Vas not disclosed in the motion or brief. 
A.no th er aspect of Debtors' request to dismiss suggests that creditors are 
"guaranteed" eventual payment given Debtors' '\vaiver of discharge." To the 
extent this is a reference to Debtors' prior motion to \Vaive discharge, Doc. No. 
398, the Comi previously denied that motion, as it improperly contemplated only a 
",va1Ver. 
At the J\farch 30 heaiing, Debtors again argued they \Vould couple the 
dismissal a "discharge \vaiver." But whether it \vou1d apply to all creditors, 
and hmv, was decidedly unclear. More significantly, though, Debtors could not 
explain how a '\vaiver of discharge" vrnuld apply should dismissal be granted. 
dismissal rnling at this time would moot the question of a bankruptcy discharge. 35 
After extended discussion at heaiing, it appeared that Debtors might be suggesting 
a dismissal with "prejudice" in the sense of a bar of discharge in any later 
bankruptcy case of debts dischargeable in the dismissed case. See § 349(a). 
h2.s yet been entered in this case. 
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Debtors never made their precise proposal clear at hearing and, impmiantly, 
make it clear to credi~ors in their pleadings.35 
no dismissal 
of the case for the administrative expenses that ha-ve accrned in both the chapter 11 
and the chapter 7 components of this 3 V2 year proceeding. 
In surn.mary, \Vhile testimony indicated that Maiiin Frantz had historically 
high income generating capability tbrnugh the development of subsidized 
affordable housing projects, the proposition that he could effectively re-engage in 
that field to the s2.rn.e extent \Vas not proven. The security to be provided creditors 
in return for dismissal was sketchy undeveloped. Creditors ,vere not provided 
adequate detail concerning the proposals, including identifying all the creditors 
"exciuded" from such protection. The suggestion of a "waiver" ( or "bar") of 
discharge ,vas not adequately explained, and Debtors' themy of "paiiial" waiver 
had already been rejected. And the notice to creditors of the details of the 
proposal, and notice of hea1ing, ,vas patently inadequate. 
Debtors have also argued in suppmi of dismissal that they now feel it ,vas a 
36 In closing arguments, Debtors appeared to indicate if the Couii the 
conditions or tenns they suggested at hearing (at times called Debtors' "plan") were or could be 
creditors could later recei;-e notice of those tenns. It ,vas not clear v,-hether 
argument related to dismissal as well as reconversion but, in any e-vent, it ignores the 
of notice to creditors. 
- 21 
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I mistake to file the voluntary chapter 11 petition (in 2011 ), and to conve1i to 
7 (in 201 and reason for the mistCk"k:e \vas the ir1adequate 
as \Vere 
discussed in Bartee, see 317 B.R. at 364, and Leach, see 130 B.R. at 856 and 
857-58, and \Vere unavailing.37 iu1d, bere, the evidence before the Couii does not 
support the contention. The strategy of filing b2.n ___ 1cruptcy to deal \vith 
creditors-primarily IIB-\vas intentional, as v,,as the decision to conve1i. See 
Doc. No. 401 (declaration of :!\1artin Frantz in supp01i ofv;raiver of discharge). 
That it is now regretted is not cause for dismissal. 
And these arguments come long after the decision to file bankrnptcy, and 
after the decision to convert. Debtors filed a chapter 11 case in 2011, 
assuming the duties and burdens debtors in possession, and remained in that 
case and control of the property of estate \vithout proposing a for 
just shy of 11h years. They then stipulated to conversion to chapter 7 \vhere they 
have remained for 2 years. Creditors have been stayed throughout this process, 
37 Simil2rly, in In re Guth, 2002 WL 31 (B2nkr. D. Idaho Nov. 8, 2002), the 
debtors contended that meetings with attorneys left them with the understandwg they could file a 
"single-creditor, single-asset" case to halt a foreclosure. Debtors later sought to dismiss the case 
on several grounds, including alleged bad leg2l advice, or their in understanding or 
relying on such advice. The Court, id. at *7, addressed the m1thorities, and the argu:nents 
including debtors' alleged "e1Tor" in filing, and denied the request to dismiss under§ 
inter alia and apropos to the case, that debtors (i) intentionally sought 
relief, intending to use the filing to deal ,vith a difficult creditor; (ii) availed themselws of 
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and none have been paid on their claims. See, e.g., Turpen, 244 B.R. at 435 
(creditors can incur prejudice if the 
considerable re , '1 l .J 
to disn1iss is brought after passage 
1 at *7 
Mar. 27, 2013) (finding debtor failed to establish cause to dismiss in a case that 
had been pending nearly four years); In re Klein, 39 B.R. 530, 533 (Ban__la. 
E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing prejudice from delay, ,;vhether caused by inadvertence 
or design). The delay in raising the argument is significant and prejudicial. 
The burden, in all regards, 'Nas on Debtors, and they established neither 
good cause for dismissal nor the absence of prejudice. Debtors' request for 
dismissal ,vill be denied. 
2. Reconversion to chapter 11 
Conversions of chapter 7 cases fall under§ 706 of the Code. Under 
§ 706(a), a may convert the case to one under chapter 11, 12 or 13 "at 
time, if the case has not been co11ve1ied under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this 
title." Here, Debtors stipulated-with IIB-to conve1i from chapter 11 to chapter 
7. That conversion \Vas necessarily based on§ 1112, thus Debtors have no 
or right to convert the case back to chapter 11 under§ 706(a), and the 
Dismissal/Reconversion Motion must fall under § 706(b ).38 See, e.g., In re Home 
38 Since the Court Vias not asked to, and did not, mc:ke findings under § 1112 (b ), and 
DECISION - 2.3 
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Builders, Inc., 2006 'IVL 3419791, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2006) ("V>/here 
a converted Chapter 11, ... ::econ-version 
11 is § subsection provides: 
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
~~ hearing;-the-comimay c01rve1tc:caseuffdenb:is chaptertcracase under ~ 
chapter 11 of this title at any time. 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit held that: 
"[t ]he decision ,vhether to convert [ under § 706(b)] is left in the sound 
discretion of the comi, based on what ,vill most inure to the benefit of 
all paiiies in interest." Willis, 345 B.R. 647 at 654[39J (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 2.t 94 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Section 706(b) does not provide guidance regarding the 
factors a comi should consider. In re Quinn, 490 B.R. 607, 621-22, 
2012 \VL 6737484, at *10 (Bankr. D.N.M. Dec. 28, 2012). "Since there 
. ,..... ;l £' 0 ' , , .. • 1 are no specmc !9 ounus 1or conversion, a court snou1d consrner 
any1hing relevant that vwuld fm1her the goals of the Bankruptcy 
Code."' Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon (In re Gordon), 465 B.R. 
, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012) (quotinginreLobera,454 B.R. 824, 
854 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011). 
to 
Schlehuber v. Fremont ]{at'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Schlehube1), 489 B.R. 570, 
573 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 
Home Netivork Builders also observed that: 
38 
( ... continued) 
given the nature of the 
under§ 111 
2dvanced by 2nd IIB, the conversion necess2rily occu,Ted 
39 Willis v. Rice (In re Willis), 345 B.R. 647 (8th Cir. BAP 2006). 
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In detennining -Yvhether conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 
11 under§ 706(b) 1vill most inure to the benefit of all parties in interest, 
including both creditors and debtors, coruis consider the factors in 
§ 1112(b) .... Tbe § 1112(b) factors are considered because 
cause r,, · ' 1 ' ~ 1 ' ' 2 '1". . Lnapter 1 1::.naer ~ 11 Cu)~ corrvers1on 
from Chapter 7 under§ 706(b) vwu1d be a futile and \Vasted act." In re 
Ryan, 267 B.R. [635,] 637 [(Ban._1a. N.D. Imva 2001)]. 
2006 VlL 3419791, at *3. As the movants, Debtors bear the burden of shmving 
good cause for, and benefit to creditors from, reconversion. 
a. Debtors' shmYing in support of conversion ,ms 
inadequate. 
The conversion to chapter 11 is premised on the idea that Debtors, 'Nhen 
they are once again in control of their assets, \Vill be able to generate substantial 
sums of money as they allegedly did prior to the initial 2011 filing. But this focus 
into a chapter 11. During their chapter 11, from 2011 to 2013, Debtors \Vere not 
able to generate the same or similar income as they had before 2011 and, given the 
consumption of income for personal a.rid other expenses, minimal amounts \Vere 
left for creditors. 
Moreover, Frantz testified that even being in a ban .. "kruptcy case \Vas a 
disqualif;ing condition or event for his paiiicipation in syndicating, resyndicating, 
and rehabbing the housing ects. Vlhether · was through 
covenants in partnership agreements or by reason of governmental regulations ( or 
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significant problems that bankruptcy posed. fadeed, be testified that even a p1ior 
discharge entered a ba:J.k:ruptcy case be a in his line of Vi'ork. 
to a 
Debtor-directed chapter 11 reorganization to succeed.40 That Debtors could 
effectively reorganize ( or even liquidate) in a chapter 11 \Vas a proposition not 
established by their proof.41 
In addition, Debtors did not adhere to the :fiduciary requirements and duties 
imposed on them as debtors in possession while previously in chapter 11. 
40 Debtors' brief in support of the indicates that: "[T]he va1ue of his projects are 
not in the physical value of the assets, ... rather the value comes from the opportunity to obtab 
affordable housing tax credit sales. Resyndication and refinancing of the projects, REIT sales 
with leasebacks, conservation easements and restm.cturir,g of partnersb.ips are various methods to 
for creditors. It is a combination of the general partr1ersbip rights and privileges and 
that 1\1r. Frantz has from thirty years building these affordable housing projects 
give value. Hmvever, "Without control as the general partner and access to capital markets, 
assets are ·worth very little to 1\1r. Frantz or the tms:ee." This aspect of the brief appeared to 
be dismissal of the case. But the altematiYe relief sought, of recorrversion to chapter 
11, is also advocated. Debtors' brief even suggests they can propose a confmnable plan, and 
acceptance thereof by impaired creditors. But the evidence at the March hearing raises 
serious issues of feasibility, given the testirnony of the debilitating, indeed fatal, ramifications for 
the partnership projects from Frmtz' pending bankruptcy. 
41 Martin Frantz' declaration is illuminating. In attempti..rig to suppo1i the ultimately 
unsuccessful "partial" \Vaiver of discharge, Frantz asserted that the initial barr..lcruptcy Vias 
intended to provide a means to force a settlement with IIB that had not been achieved in state 
court. He stated: "As soon as a settlement could be reacbed, I planned to iVithdraw from 
banki-uptcy without any discharges; since that is the only \Vay I can re-establish access to national 
credit and investor syndication/REIT markets, go back to work, and regain my past e2.mings 
ability[.] ... It's important to understand that in the finance world in ivhich I work, ifI have any 
discharges on my record I ·wiil never be eligible to develop another project for the rest of 
my life." Doc. No. 401 at 2. He also stated that he "agreed to convert the case to a chapter 7 
desiring to extend my opporti:;nity to settle [with IIB] and again avoid the high cost of civil court 
litigation believing that a settlemer:t was still imminent. Again, ·when a settlement is as 
in the prior I would \vithdra-w from bankn.1ptcy without any discharges since again it's the 
way I could re-establish access to financial markets Id. a: 2-3. "\Vhile the state court 
froze my access to credit 211.d national capital the 
T 'T ' "\-
1 a. at.). 
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I Accurate and complete disclosures of assets and liabilities were lacking. 
A.mendrnents \x'ere not proactive, but merely responsive to omissions enors 
1vent undisclosed and unrepo1ied. Several appear to violate the Code because 
lacked notice and Court approval. A.nd even those that arguably could 'Within 
the ordinary course of business were inadequately disclosed and documented. 
l\foreover, in \veighing the evidence, the Comi sees the impetus for 
reconversion, like dismissal, as less of a desire to pay all debts than it is an attempt 
to control or impact the litigation with IIB. It is unclear whether Debtors believe 
reconversion to chapter 11 will require a vacation of the pending trial in the 
§ 523(a) adversary proceeding, something they have already attempted to 
in several 'Nays. If they do, they are \vTong. Under § 1141 ( d)(2), a discharge of an 
individual in a chanter 11 case is not effective as to debts excepted from dischanre 
~ - ~ 
under§ 523. This, therefore, requires resolution of the IIB adversary proceeding 
even \Vere the case to be reconverted. 
In addition to the prior authorities, in In re Young, 269 B.R. 816, 825 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001), synthesized several factors from case law to detemune if 
conversion from chapter 7 to chapter 11 is appropriate: 
(1) \Vhether conversion is sought in good faith; 
(2) \Vhether the debtor can propose a confirn1able plan; 
(3) The impact on the debtor of denying conversion \veighed against the 
prejudice to creditors caused by allmving conversion; 
( 4) The of conversion of tbe efficient 
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ban_"kiuptcy estate, including the likelihood of reconversion to Chapter 
7; 
conversion \vould further abuses of the bankruptcy process 
serve pen:ert, rather · congressional 
The Comt finds that ,vh.ile not binding, these factors are instrucfrve and "provide a 
good, basic, guideline" to evaluate a reouest 
- <..; J. conversion. Id. l\foreover, the 
Court finds, given the evidence presented, that the factors identified in Young 
\Veigh against the Dismissal/Reconversion :tvfotion. 
Having considered the ,vho1e of the record, the Comt, in the exercise of its 
infonned discretion, concludes that reconversion of the case to chapter 11 is not in 
the best interests of creditors of the estate, and 'Nould not fu1ther the goals of the 
Code. The request for reconversion to chapter 11 be denied. 
B. Stay Relief r,:t:otion 
Debtors seek stay relief in order to defend against IIB' s assertion of liability 
and present affirmative defenses to those claims. But a state comt action is not 
necessarily required to detem1ine liability.42 
It is \vell accepted that this Comt can establish the amount of a debtor's 
liability in the process and context of detem1ining whether such debt is 
nondischargeable. Cowan v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 
(9th Cir. 1997). See also Sasson v. Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864, 
of those defenses. 
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(9th Cir. 2005); Stanbrough v. Valle (In re Valle), 469 B.R. 35, 40-43 (Ban .. lcr. D. 
Idaho 2012). fu1d the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dete1mined that not can 
a on a disputed state rn 
the course of determining a debt's dischargeability, but such adjudication remains 
\Vithin both the jurisdiction and constitutional auth01ity of fae bar:_1.crnptcy court 
even after Stem v .. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 
469 B.R. 11 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) (adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its entirety at 
760 F.3d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014)). 43 
Given this jurisdictional and substantive la\V undeTpinning, the alleged 
"cause" advanced by Debtors for stay relief is unpersu2.sive. Lifting the stay to 
state court litigation on IIB' s claim, and Debtors' defenses to such claim, 1s 
not necessaiy. 1foreover, that it is urged at this late date, and ,vhen trial will 
commence now in five \\'eeks on the same issue in this Comi, speaks to strategic 
desires rather than principled ones.L4 
43 These authorities belie the argument in the Stay Relief Motion that stay relief is 
wammted "to resolve this state law in the state court where it all " Doc. No. 425 at 2 ( emphasis added). The "state law" iss"\.ce of liability on the claim is subsumed in the process of adjudicating the claim's dischargeability. That bankruptcy issue of dischargeability, of course, was triggered by Debtors' filing a petition for relief under Title 11 over 31/i 
years ago. 
44 As noted earlier, this is not the first arternpt to avoid the commencement of the m the At a pretrial conference in 2013 v,ith Debtors' and IIB's 
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! 
The authorities cited by Debtors, including In re Arundotech, LLC, 2009 
\VL 7809008 (9th Cir. BAP lvfay 4, 2009), and this Comi's re 
4 """ .u. 
2005), are inapposite. W1lile there are times, paiiicularly early in the bankruptcy, 
when allowing a ready-to-try matter to be adjudicated in another fornm is in the 
best interests of the parties and the Comi, this is not such a situation. The severai 
factors that this Court can in its discretion evaluate include t\\'O that ,veigh heavily 
here. 
First, Debtors argue that state comi litigation will result a complete 
adjudication of issue of whether IIB has a claim against them, and that this 
not interfere matters before this Court because "there is not as yet any 
adversary proceeding on the matter of liability." Doc. No. 425 at 3. The 
complaint's and prayer, and foregoing analysis this Comi' s 
jurisdiction and authority in detennining a debt's nondischargeability, overcome 
that assertion.45 
Second, interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and 
44 
after a nvo-day evidentiary hearing, to lack any 1nerit. The trial was reset and ·will start 26, 
2015. 
"5 In addition, as discussed in an earlier footnote, IIB filed a timely proof of m 
January 2012 approximately S6.4 million. filed claims are ailowed unless an objection is 
raised and see § § 50 l, 502, and a filed of claim is prima facie evidence of 
and 2:mount, see Rule 3001 (f). there has been no objection to IIB 's claim. If c:ny 
of the claim is not addressed in the (':ere are a·venues 
available to resolve 
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economical detem1ination of litigation for the paities strongly supp01ts completing 
trial pends in this Comt. Debtors asse1t the state cou1t trial \Vas some five 
tl1ey IIB . 
characterization of the status of the state comt litigation, even assuming it was 
once set for trial, Debtors failed to establish how quickly a state comt t1ial ·would 
be reset if stay relief \Vere granted. It is patently implausible that a state comt trial 
could be rescheduled to occur before t1ial in the adversary proceeding at the 
end of:May 2015. 
\V11ile there are other factors that could be discussed, they sim.ply add 
additional support to the Comt' s conclusion that stay relief to allow state comt 
litigation to recommence is umvarranted. There is inadequate "cause" to graEt 
such d l S R 1, f"' IC ' '11' 1 ' d Af. an t 1e tay e~1e Motion w11 oe aerne .-" 
Debtors also urge "abstention" under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) which the 
Comt would abstain from hearing Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM in deference to the 
state comt litigation (presun1ably the stayed 2010 litigation). 
:tvfandatmy abstention under§ 1334(c)(2) seven elements: (1) a 
timely motion; (2) a purely state law question; (3) a non-core proceeding, 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(l); (4) a lack of independent federal jurisdiction absent the 
under Title 11; (5) that an action is corn.rnenced in state comt; (6) the state 
to see Doc. "\'o. 
are and need net be further discussed. 
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court action may be timely adjudicated; and (7) a state court forurn of appropriate 
jmisdiction exists. Krasnoff v. _Marsha ck (In re General Carriers 258 B.R. 
181, 1 ). Gcn::ales re 
Fulfe1), 159 B.R. 921,923 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); Bov,'en C01p. v. Security 
Pacific Bank Idaho, FS.B., (In re Bowen Corp.), 150 B.R. 777, 781-82 (BaIL'kr. D. 
Idaho 1993). The required factors are not present. 
The Stay Relief Motion, to the extent it embodies a request for abstention, 
was not "timely filed." If sincerely premised, rather than an eleventh-hour 
strategy, the question of abstention could and should have been raised 
months-indeed, years-2go. 
Also, the dispute betv,'een IIB and Debtors is not a "purely" state law issue, 
II ;:10r are the matters non-core. The fundamental issue in the adversary proceeding is 
the extent and dischargeability IIB 's claim against Debtors. The complaint 
seeks a dete1111ination of the amount of the debt and a determination that such 
claim should be found nondischargeable under§ 523(a). This is a matter of core 
jmisdiction. 28 US.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).47 Indeed, this Comi not just core but 
exclusive jurisdiction over IIB's § 523(a)(2) and§ 523(a)(6) claims. See 
Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, if 
Debtors' Stay Relief l\fotion \Vere granted and their the01y follmved, paiiies 
47 IIB's 
Doc. No. 1 2.t 2, ';;12, 5. 
Doc. )Jo. 16 at 1-2. 
th2.t the m2.tter was core u:1cer 28 U.S.C. § l 57(b)(2)(I). Adv. 
2.ns\Yer admitted both those of the · Adv. 
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\vou1d be required to litigate on t\vo fronts, a situation that does not promote 
judicial economy. See also Deitz, supra. 
i 0 < unaer 9 1 lS 
similar factors. Jones v. State Fann l11ut. Auto Ins. Co., (In re Jones), 410 B.R. 
632, 640--41 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (citing Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In 
re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990)). The decision 
·whether to per:.11issively abstain is committed to the Court's discretion.48 fa 
this Comi declined to so abstain, noting that "On balance, the Court concludes the 
factors ,veigh in favor of retaining the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, 
and not abstaining." Id. at 641. The Court, having evaluated all arguments, 
required factors, reaches the same conclusion in the instant case.~9 
The Court concludes that abstention under either 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(l) or 
(c)(2) is not persuasively advanced or appropriate, and the Stay Relief Motion, to 
the extent it seeks such relief, will also be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
On the foregoing findings, conclusions and analysis, Debtors' 








935 F.2d 1071, 
Cir. BAP 
49 
A.nother comment in Jones is apropos here: "The Court is ... concerned that. 
Defendant's for abstention may be rrntiva:ed by a desire for 1vhat Defendant a 
more favorable or resolution on the merits. 
of 1he 2.ction only serves to both ,nore time and more money 
costs." Id at 641. 
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MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING WA TVER OF DISCHARGE & NOTICE 
Notice of l\fotion for Order Approving Waiver of Discharge 
and Opportunity to Object and for a Rearing 
No Obiection. The Court may consider this request for an order \Vi th out further , 
notice or hearing unless a paity in interest files an objection within seventeen (17) 
days of the date ofthis notice. 
If an objection is not filed within the time pennitted, the Court may consider that 
there is no opposition to the granting of the requested reliefand may grant the relief 
without fmther notice or heari..11g. 
Obiection. Any objection shall set out the legal and/or factual basis for the 
objection. A copy of the objection shall be served on the movant. 
Hearin2 on Obiection. The objecting party shaU also contact the court's calendar 
clerk to schedule a hearing on the objection and file a separate notice of hearing. 
:,10Tl0l, FOR ORDER APPROVL'\G WAIVER OF DISCHARGE & l<OTJCE: PAGE! 
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STEPHEN B. McCREA, attorney for the above named debtors, moves this Court for rn order 
approving debtors, Frantz' \Vaiver of Discharge as to all creditors which is being filed ·11,1ith the 
Court contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion for Order Appro,ing WRiver of 
Discharge ("l\1otion"). The Court's approval of this waiver of discharge is required by §727(a)(l 0) 
of the BawJUptcy Code. This Motion is based on the debtors' ki1owing decision to waive discharge 
- -enterecfinto wffliadvice ofcounsel. The purpose of this Waiver of Discharge to clarify that the 
debtors' previous motion to dismiss was intended to waive discharge to all creditors. 
Vlherefore, debtors respectfully request the Court for entry of an order approvbg the debtors' 
V{ aiver of Discharge. 
Dated this f ,'.L day ofl,fay, 2015. 
,~g~ 
Isl STEPHEN B. McCREA 
Attorney for Debtors 
MOTION FOR ORDER APPR0\'11,G WAMR OF D:SCHARGE & NOTlCE: PAGE 2 
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) _____________ ) 
Case No. 11-21337-TL~I 
Chapter 7 
ORDER APPROVING \VAIVER OF DISCHARGE 
On May 13, 2015, chapter 7 debtors, Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia J\1. 
Frantz ("Debtors"), executed and filed a voluntary waiver of discharge under 
§ 727(a)(l0). See Doc. No. 508 ("Waiver"), and Doc. No. 509, a motion 
requesting approval of the Waiver ("Motion"). 
Section 727(a)(l 0) states: "The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, 
unless ... the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor 
after the order for relief under this chapter." This provision imposes several 
requirements. The waiver must be i11 v,rriting, and executed by the debtor(s) post-
petition. In addition, the \Vaiver must be filed with the Comi in order for the 
Cami to evaluate and "approve" the same. Generally speaking, approval follows 
the Comi' s finding that the debtor ·waives dischc.rge knO\vingly, voluntarily, and 
v.:ith an aYvareness of the consequences of that act See, e.g., In re , 505 
B.R. 326,328-29(Ban..1a. D. 2014). The Federal Rules of B 
do not require to a s est of 
\VAIVER OF DISCHARGE - 1 
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I such a -Yvaiver nor for a hearing. The rules do, hmvever, require a notice to be 
given all creditors 2nd in interest after a ,vai-ver discharge is approved. 
Fed. R. B 2.11 __ lcr. P. 
On~fay _30, 20}_?J?eb~ors 2nd Debtors' counsel 2ppeared before the Comi 
to address the Waiver. Debtors' counsel conveyed his clients' decision to \Vaive 
discharge under§ 727(a)(l 0), and represented that they did so after consulting 
,vith and upon the advice of counsel, and that the decision was made knmvingly 
and voluntarily, and -s;vith a\vareness of the consequences. Identical affiGnations 
are made the \Vaiver itself that was executed by Debtors and filed ,vith the 
Comi. 
The Comi concludes, upon this record, that the ·waiver meets the 
requirements of the Code. The Motion shall therefore be granted and the \Vaiver 
shall be, and hereby is, approved. },11 appropriate notice under Rule 2002(£)(6) 
\vill be prepared by the Comi and served by the Clerk. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: 11ay 20, 2015 
~~-
TERRY lvfYERS 
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
DIS - 2 
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Case No. 11-21337-TUvl 
Chapter 7 
Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024-TLM 
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MOTION FOR SA.i".CTIONS 
Idaho Independent Bank (''IIB"), by and thrnugh its attorneys of record, Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby moves for sanctions against the Debtors' Martin D. Frnntz 
and Cynthia M. Frantz ("Debtors" or "Defendants") and against the Defendants' attorney of 
record, Jonathon Frantz, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), based upon the grounds set forth below. 
This Court has the Inherent Authoritv to Issue Sanctions in this Case. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), a b2nk111ptcy court has the inherent authority to sanction 
pmiies and attorneys for their conduct in bankruptcy cases. Cald11·ell v. Unified Capital Corp. 
(In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278,284 (9th Cir. 1996); In re ~McGuire, Case No. 12-
41681-JDP, 2014 Wl 4418549, *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho, Sept. 8, 2014)(unpublished). These 
powers are not governed by mle or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Hale v. 
United States Tr., 509 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). This inherent sanction authority allows a 
bankruptcy court to deter and provide compensation for a broad range of improper litigation 
tactics. Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehti11e11), 564 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009). 
In order to impose sanction under its inherent sanctioning authority, the bankruptcy court 
must make an explicit finding of bad faith or willful misconduct Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re 
Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). For a finding of bad the bankruptcy court can 
find either bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Lehti11e11, 564 F.3d 1061. A finding of 
bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for an action prove totally frivolous-
there is a colorable claim for the assessment "] iti gant is 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
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or fides." V. 230 F.3d 9 
WI1en issuing sanctions under its iJ:1herent authority, bad faith or willful misconduct 
consists of something more egregious than mere negligence or recklessness. Dyer, 322 F.3d at 
1196. However, sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including 
recklessness \vhen combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or 
improper purpose. Fink, 230 F.3d at 994; In re A. von Townhomes Venture, 1012 \VL 1068770, 
(9th Cir. BAP, March 12, 2012)(unpublished). Thus, even if a party only acts recklessly 
rather than in bad fait11, the acts are still sanctionable if the reckless conduct is coupled with "an 
improper purpose, such as an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings to gain an 
Sanctionable conduct includes improper litigation tactics (such as delaying or disrnpting 
litigation), vexatious conduct, bad fait11, wanton conduct, willful abuses of judicial process, and 
action in the litigation for an improper purpose or acting for oppressive reasons. Lehtinen, 564 
F.3d at 1058; Hale, 509 F.3d at 1148; Fink, 230 F.3d at 992-93; Dhaliwczl v. Singh (In re 
2014 \VL 842102, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP, March 4, 2014). Fm1her, sanctions have been deemed 
approprL::ite against an attorney based on a determination that an attorney's assertions in a filing 
are frivolous. In re Brooks-Hamilton, 400 B.R. 238, 253 (9th Cir. BAP 2009). Sanctions are 
also appropriate when conduct is tantamount to bad faith and wastes judicial time and resources 
and defiles the integrity of the banJ.r.,..ruptcy system. Avon, at *7. 
A filing to delay legal proceedings warrants re 
& LLC, 435 590,591 (9th Cir. 2011 In 
:\10TI0N FOR C, - .) 
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the banl:.ruptcy court issued sanctions based on a party's imprnper of a 
court action. Id. The court deten11ined that the timing of the removal was highly suspect 
because it was filed days before a hearing on a sanctions motion for v,rhich the removing party 
had filed no opposition papers. Id. There was also no basis for the removal. Id. Thus, Lhe 
banicrnptcy comt detennined that the notice of removal was frivolous and filed in bad faith to 
delay the state court proceedings, thereby warranting imposition of sanctions. Id.; See 
re .Media Group, Inc., 2006 WL 6810963, *7-8 (9th Cir. 2006)(unpublished) (affinning 
In 
bankrnptcy comt' s finding that use of deposition in state comt action to investigate the trnstee' s 
administration of the bankruptcy estate was an improper litigation tactic and therefore 
sanctionable ). 
Underlying Facts \Varranting Sanctions in this Case: 
1. On August 23, 2013, IIB filed the above captioned Adversary Action against the 
Debtors, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) for fraud and §523(a)(6) for conversion, in which IIB 
sought a determination that the loans owed to it via lhe Debtors' guaranties and line of credit, 
were non-dischargable ("Fraud Trial"). Docket No. 1. 
2. Instead of filing an answer to the Adversary Proceeding, the Debtors thrnugh 
Jonathon Frantz filed a Motion to Strike. Docket No. 6. Upon briefing and oral argument, this 
Court rnled from the Bench on October 29, 2013, that the :tvfotion to Strike was denied in 
entirety. Docket No. 13. An Order Denying the Motion to Strike was entered on October 31, 
2013. Docket No. 14. 
3. On December 23, 2013, an Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for 
·vu.s entered in which the Fraud Trial was set for the week December 1, 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 4 
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conference held on December 18, 2013. The pre-trial conference was attended 
counsel for IIB and counsel for the Def endanLs, and all counsel agreed upon the trial dates and 
deadlines set forth in the Pre-trial Order. Docket No. 21. 
4. Thereafter it was necessary for IIB to file a Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents, \vhich was granted by this Court. Docket No. 43, 52. The mandatory fees and costs 
were preserved to be awarded upon the conclusion of the case. Docket No. 52. 
5. On October 3, 2014, the eve of the discovery deadline and shortly before the 
Fraud Trial was to first commence, the Defendants, through Jonathon Frantz, filed a Motion to 
Amend the Pre-trial Order and Continue the Trial ("Motion to Continue Trial"). Docket No. 
38. In tl1e Motion to Continue Trial, the Defendants sought to continue their expert disclosure 
deadlines, the discovery deadline, and the trial date. Id. In violation of Local B 211.kruptcy Rule 
9011.l(c), Frantz, as counsel for the Defendants, made unfounded accusation that 
Plaintiffs counsel had made "misrepresentations and intimations that they would only call 
experts to challenge the expe1ts put f01th by the Frnntzes." Docket No. 38. Based upon those 
false accusations, they contended they were "surprised" that IIB disclosed expert witnesses and 
argued that they were entitled to contiriue the deadlines set fo1th in the Pretrial Order, so that 
they could now disclose expe1ts. Id., p.5. 
6. The unfounded arguments as to Plaintiff's counsel were made by the Defendants 
and Defer:dants' counsel, despite the fact that the Defendants' counsel had signed multiple 
stipulations, unequivocally and expressly agreeing to the deadlines at issue, all of which were 
subject to Court Orders. See Docket 47, 47-1. Those in no mmmer 
!\10TI0N FOR SANCTIONS S 
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that IIB v11ould disclose expert 1vitnesses if the Defenda~1ts to 
disclose expert witcesses, and in fact were to the contrary. Id. 
7. Fu1~J1er, in tl1e Motion to Continue Trial, the Defendants attempted to use a 
similar delay litigation tactic that they had attempted before in the underlying ban.Jcruptcy 
proceeding, in which they contended the case should be continued so that they could have more 
time to determine if Hawley Troxell should be disqualified in representing IIB in the pending 
Fraud Trial. Docket No. 38, 38-5. Omitted from the Defendants' contentions 1vas a copy of the 
Stipulated Order Granting Motions for 2004 Examination Debtors, entered in their underlying 
bankrnptcy case on January 13, 2012, in which they had acknowledged there was no conflict of 
interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the Debtors in the bankruptcy 
case or any other dispute against the Debtors. Case No. ll-21337-TUv1, Docket No. 54. 
8. Due to the tenure of the arguments raised by the Defendants in the Motion to 
Continue, it appeared that the motion had been filed as merely a delay tactic in proceeding to 
trial that had been set ten months prior to the motion being filed. 
9. After briefing and oral argument, this Cou11 denied the Defendants' Motion to 
Continue the Trial, and held on October 20, 2014, that the Fraud Trial remained scheduled to 
commence on December 1, 2014. Docket No. 51, No. 53. 
10. Then, eleven days later, on October 31, 2014, just one month shy of the pending 
Fraud Trial, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell ("DQ Motion"). Docket 
No. 55. The Debtors set the DQ \fotion for hearing for November 17, 2014. 
\10TI0N FOR SANCTIONS - 6 
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11. November 3, 2014, a minute entry was set P21-ties 
to submit pre-trial briefs, exhibits and disclosure of witnesses for the Fraud Trial, on November 
17, 2014. Docket No. 56. 
12. On November 6, 14, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Expert Witness 
Rand Wichmm1. Docket No. 59. 
13. On November 7, 2014, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Expe1t \Vitness 
Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan, and Tes M. Strunk ("Resol're Experts"). Docket No. 64. 
14. Wl1ile still preparing to proceed with the Fraud Trial, on November 13, 2014 and 
November 14, 2014, IIB filed oppositions to all of the tfotions to Disqualify. Docket Nos. 66, 
67, and 69. 
15. In compliance with the tenns of the Pre-trial Order and the minute entry, IIB' s 
counsel prepared and federal expressed the binders of Fraud Trial exhibits to the Court and to the 
Debtors' counsel so that they would be received by November 17, 2014. 
16. Nevertheless, on November 17, 2014, and after oral argument, this Court vacated 
the trial dates and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motions to Disqualify for December 
1, 2014 and December 2, 2014. At the oral ruling on November 17, 2014, this Comt held "that 
the showing by Defendants in their submissions was less than compelling or even preponderating 
and ,vere not then adequate to justify granting tl1e motions." Docket No. 84, Ex. A attached 
hereto, 5:20-23. HO\vever, this Court stated that the Defendants would be provided an 
opportunity to present evidence to attempt to "prove them up". This Court explained, "this 
;:ipproach w;:is taken not because of the handic2p I to 
factual allegations on ; it was also because denying 011 of 
'.vIOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 7 
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case 
and hanging over the plaintiff's law firm \Yhich would prevail, but under a rnling based more on 
defective, an eleventh hour approach to the issue than on the merits rnling. So the motions were 
set down December 1 and I reluctantly vacated the trial setting." Id., 5:20-6:9. 
17. It was noted at the conclusion of the Court's November rnling by IIB's counsel 
that contrary to the Pre-trial Order the Defendants' trial exhibits had not yet been delivered to 
IIB 's counsel. Jonathon Frantz was ordered to inm:ediately deliver the trial exhibits. 
18. At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing for the Disqualification Motions, the 
Comt rnled from the bench that the I\fotion to Disqualify the Resolve Expe1ts would denied. 
Then, after the two day evidentiary hearing in which seven different witnesses testified, 
Comt entered an oral ruling on December 10, 2014, denying each of the Debtors' Motions to 
Disqualify. Docket No. 84, Ex. A attached hereto. In the Oral Ruling, this Court stated in part: 
a. "On September 17, I entered an oral ruling noting t.i11at the 111otions could 
well be viewed as strntegic rather than meritorious and designed solely to 
gain the relief that the failed motion to continue the trial didn't achieve." 
Ex. A, 4:18-21 
b. "The parties were required to disclose evidence by November 25, at 5:00 
p.m. Mountain time. The plaintiff complied with that deadline, the 
defendants did not." Id., 6:1-12. 
The Comt then set forth its findings on the Evidence and concluded as to the DQ Motion 
that: 
In 
c. "[P]laintiff s analysis of the facts and the law is supported by the 
Mr. Clark was acting as a testifying expert witness only. As such, an 
attorney-client relationship was not created. There's no basis to dis 
Hmvley Troxell under IRPC 1.9 and defendants' motion, 
will, therefore be " Id, 12:10-15. 
1v1otion to Disqualify the Ex.pert Rand Wichman, this Court commented: 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 8 
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d. on th:s ti'Liin read \Vas emblematic of of 
Defendants to create an alleged role for Mr. Wichr:1an a suggestion of 
delivery or disclosure of so-called confidential information which simply 
wasn't there." Id., 19: 10-14. 
19. Further, in denying the Debtors' attempt to dismiss their barL'kruptcy in H1e 
underlying banl{rnptcy case in March 20151 (which appears to have been another attempt to 
aYoid tl1e Fraud Trial) and deny their relief motion to have the debt determined in state court, this 
Com1 stated: 
GiYen this jurisdictional and substantive law underpinning, the 
alleged "cause" advanced by Debtors for stay relief is 
unpersuasive. Lifting the stay to allow state court litigation on 
IIB 's claim, and Debtors' def ens es to such claim, is not necessary. 
I'v1oreover, that it is urged at this late date, and when trial will 
commence now in five weeks on the same issue this Court, 
soeaks to strate1:dc desires rather than urincioled ones. 
Case 11-21337-TLM, Doc. 484, p. 29 (emphasis supplied). 
This Court also noted in that memorandum decision: 
As noted earlier, this is not the first attempt to avoid the 
conunencement of the trial in the adversary proceeding. At a 
pretrial conference in December 2013 with Debtors' and IIB 's 
respective counsel, the Court set a trial for a year later, to 
conunence on December 1, 2014. In October 2014, Debtors 
sought to vacate and continue the trial. Their motion, following 
hearing and argument was denied. Debtors then filed motions to 
disqualify IIB' s expert witnesses and IIB 's counsel. Those 
motions required a hearing, and Debtors were thus successful in 
obtaining a continuance of the trial that was to start December 1. 
But these motions themselves were found after n two-dav 
1 The Debtors nlso atlempted to obtain n Section 727(n)(l0), as to all creditors except IIB, 
to attempt to obtain a their 
to obtain select wniver discharges under 727(a)(l0) was by 
3, 2015. Case No. 11-21337, 438. 
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was reset 
will start May 26, 2015. 
Id., p. 29,fn. 44 (emphasis supplied). 
In a concluding footnote, this Comi stated: 
AI1other comment in Jones is fully apropos here: "The Comi is ... 
concerned that ... Defendant's request for abstention may be 
motivated by a desire for what Defend2.nt considers a more 
favorable forum, or perhaps simply as means to delay resolution on 
the merits. Prolongation of the 2ction only serves to cause both 
parties to expend more time and more money in litigation costs." 
Id. , p. 33, fn. 49. 
20. Upon the ruling on the Disqualification Motions, this Court then entered an Order 
Rescheduling Trial to commence May 26, 2015. Docket No. 88. Further, this Coilli ordered that 
all exl1ibits be delivered to the Court by January 30, 2015. In addition, Exhibit lists and Witness 
lists were to be filed by January 30, 2015, and pre-trial briefs no later than April 30, 2015. A 
status conference \Vas also set for March 16, 2015. 
21. On January 30, 2015, pursuant to the Court's Order, IIB' s counsel filed it's 
Exhibit List and Witness List. Docket No. 89, 90. Contrary to the Court's Order, the Defendants 
did not file a witness or exhibit list until Febmary 4, 2015. Docket No. 91, 92. In the witness list 
the Defendants identified witnesses that had not been disclosed in discovery. Docket No. 93. 
IIB' s counsel requested that the Defendants amend their list to remove the witnesses, which 
2 Despite the lack of merit and a elem: determination by this Court after a two day trial on 
issues that no attorney client relationship existed between the Defendants and Hawley 
the Frantz, through attorney Jonathon Frantz, has filed a 
lawsuit state comi against Hawley for malpractice on the very some alleged 
!\10TION FOR - 10 
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to Id. The Defendants, Jonathon Frantz, further conceded that 
undisclosed \Vitnesses "had no knowledge of any facts in this case are not called to express 
opinions." Docket No. 93, Ex. B. Nevenheless, they continued to contend they would call the 
witnesses at the Fraud Trial. Thus, a hearing was necessary, and on March 16, 2015, this Court 
ruled from the Bench granting IIB's Motion to Strike the W1disclosed witnesses. Docket No. 99, 
102. 
22. At the hearing on March 16, 2015, this Court asked Defendants' counsel, 
Jonathon Frantz why he had not yet delivered the Defendants' exhibits to the Court as set forth in 
the Comt's Order Rescheduling the Trial. Those exhibits had been due to the Court on January 
2015. Defendants' counsel responded that he "was a one man shop" and that "his client 
[Mmtin Frantz] had prioritized other matters3 ahead of this task." In response, this Court 
ordered that the exhibits be delivered to t11e Coeur d'Alene courthouse no later than March 20, 
2015 ("Exhibit Order"). Docket No. 99. 
23. Notably, IIB's counsel had spent hours reviewing the Defendants' tlu·ee (3) 
binders of 175 exhibits and furt11er time in negotiating a stipulation as to what would be 
stipulated to for foundation and admissibility purposes, which was filed with this Court on 
1\farch 13, 2015. See Docket No. 97. 
3 These otl1er priorities apparently included a Motion to Dismiss, in which the Debtors were 
desperately attempting to convince this Court that they could and \Vould provide for more 
recovery to their creditors, lhan the Chapter 7 Trustee. Of course the Motion to Dismiss was 
also ::mother effort to attempt to avoid the Fraud Trial. See Case 11-21337, Dockets 
458, 466, a two day evidentio.ry hearing on the l\fotion to Dismiss, this 
'1\1otion. Case 11- , Docket No. 
'.'v10TION FOR S,'\i"\CTIONS - 11 
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In response to this Court's Exhibit Order, the through their attorney 
Jonathon Frantz, filed an "Amended Exhibit List" on March 16, 2015, in which he withdrevv all 
of the Defendants' exhibits and stated he would simply utilize the exhibits submitted by IIB. 
Docket No. 100. This of course made the lime 011 Defendants' exhibits and stipulations 
thereof, meaningless. 
25. On April 30, 2015, IIB duly filed its 40 page pre-trial brief, which set ford1 the 
legal authority providing the basis for the non-dischargable judgment under §523, as well as the 
evidence that \Vould be submitted to this Court clearly establishing the systematic and detailed 
fraud that the Defendants had engaged in against IIB, apparently from the inception of the first 
purchase loan in October 2005. Docket No. 113. 
26. On April 30, 2015, the Defendants, through their counsel, Jonathon Frantz filed a 
single sentence pre-trial brief stating they were waiving their right to file a pre-trial brief. 
Docket No. 114. 
27. On the very next day, May 1, 2015, the Defendants apparently signed a Waiver of 
Discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), as to all of their creditors ("Waiver"). Case 11-
21337, Docket No. 508. Notably, this \Vaiver of Discharge was not filed until May 13, 2015, 
and counsel for the Debtors had no explanation for this late filing. Further, the Defendants did 
not set the Motion for Waiver of Discharge for hearing. Notably, the Debtors chose to wait 
May 13, 15, to file the Waiver, despite obtaining a ruling from this Court on March 3, 2015, 
tlrnt a Section 727(a)(10) could only be considered if it included all debts and creditors. Case 
11-21337, Docket No. 438. Instead of filing that \Vaiver shortly after Cou1t's ruling on 
lvfarcb 3, 15, had i;1cuned another tvv"o months of 
FOR 12 
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28. On 14, 20 this Court set \Vaiver of Discharge for hearing to be 
on May 20, 2105, and also set a status conference for the Fraud Trial. 
29. On May 20, 2015, this Court approved the Waiver of Discharge as to all creditors, 
and as a result, vacated the Fraud Trial, due to the mootness of the non-discharge issues. Docket 
No. 116. 
30. As of May 20, 2015, v,.·hich was one week prior to the date the Fraud Trial was to 
commence, IIB had of course expended substantial time, fees, and expenses in preparation for 
the Fraud Trial. This was a trial that the neither the Defendants nor their counsel, Jonathon 
Frantz, apparently ever intended to actually litigate. Yet, they did not \Vant to advise IIB until 
the last minute, so as to cnuse IIB to incur wmecessary fees nnd costs. Such conduct is 
s anctionable. 
SAi"',TCTIONS SOUGHT BY IIB. 
As set forth in the record in this case, the Defendants and their attorney, J omthon Frantz, 
clearly engaged ir1 improper litigation tactics such as delaying and disrupting litigation, vexatious 
conduct, bad faith, wanton conduct, willful abuses of judicial process, a waste of judicial time 
and resources, and engaging in litigation tactics for an improper purpose. Although sanctions are 
nothing to be summarily granted nor sought, IIB respectfully submits that the methodical and 
intentional conduct of lhe Defendants and their attorney is tantamount to bad faith, of which they 
should not benefited by, nor should they obtain the rewilrd of intentionally causing IIB to 
incur unnecessary attorney fees o.nd costs. 
MOTION FOR CTIONS 13 
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A. Attorney Fees for I'\fotion to Compel. 
As set f01th in this Court's Order Granting Motion to Compel Production of Documents, 
IIB is entitled to sanctions pursuant to the Federal Rule of B ank.ruptcy Procedure, Rule 7037, as 
against the parties andlor attorney whose conduct necessitated the compel motion. Docket No. 
52. As set forth and itemized in Ex. A to tl1e Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager, filed concurrently 
herewith ("Schwager Aff."), the total fees and costs incurred by IIB as a result of the compel 
motion totaled $2,534.50. 
B. The Conduct in Filing the :Motion to Continue Trial Filed on October 3, 2014, 
\Varrants Sanctions. 
As set forth above, the Defendants waited ten (10) months from the date the trial was set, 
the eve of the discovery deadline, and shortly before the Fraud Trial was to commence, to file a 
Motion to Amend the Pre-Trial Order and Continue the Trial. In making the motion to amend 
the pre- trial order, the Defendants through their attorney made false and unfounded accusations 
against IIB 's counsel, violating Local Ban..1<:ruptcy Rule 9011.1 (c). The very stipulations signed 
by the Defendants' counsel countered the contentions that IIB's counsel had misled the 
Defendants into believing that IIB was only going to disclose expert witnesses, if they chose to 
disclose expert witnesses. 
Further, Defendants, through their attorney, contended that the trial should be 
continued so that they could determine whether they should attempt to disqualify IIB' s counsel, 
despite fact the Defendants had expressly aclo10\vledged in a signed stipulated order, 
by , that was no in the 
FOR - 14 
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IIB against the in case or in 
Debtors. 
There was no merit to the Defendants' Motion to Continue Trial and it was summarily 
denied after oral argument on October 20, 2014. This Court at the hearing that the Fraud 
Trial would go forward on December 1st as scheduled. Then eleven days later, the Defendants 
attempted to take another run at continuiilg the trial, by filing an actual motion to disqualify the 
law firm of Hawley Troxell. It is evident due to the tenure of the arguments set f mth in the 
motion and the subsequent delayed filing of the Motions to Disqualify, that the :t\fotion to 
Continue the Trial filed on October 3, 2014, was filed for the sole purpose of delaying and 
disrupting the litigation, on the eve of trial no less. IIB incuned unnecessary fees and costs 
defending the frivolous motion in the total sum of $3,014.504, as set forth in Ex. B to the 
Schwager Aff. 
C. The Disqualification I\fotions filed against Hawley Troxell and the IIB Experts 
\Vere Filed in Bad Faith for Improper Purposes of Delaying Litigation. 
The Disqualification Motions filed against Hawley Troxell and the IIB experts were 
in bad faith for the improper purposes of delaying litigation. The lvfotions themselves consisted 
of conduct tantamount to bad faith and certainly a waste of judicial time and resources. Hawley 
Troxell had represented IIB in regard to obligations owed by the Debtors since 2010 
4 This total includes 1.4 hours there were also included in the Sanctions request in regard to 
Motion to Compel, as the hearing on 10.20.14 and the orders that were drafted on 10.22. 
Thus, if Sanctions are awarded the Motion to 
to Continue Trial, then totai should sum of 
sum of 1.50. 
\10TI0N FOR - 15 
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at on August 23, 13, on behalf of IIB. Yet, Defendants, 
attorney Jonathon Frantz, caused the DQ Motion to not be filed until October 31, 2014, just one 
montl1 short of the Fraud Trial. They did not even file it on October 3, 2014, when they filed the 
I\1oticn to Continue. Instead, they waited until the very last thereby benefiting from 
their improper litigation tactic of getting the Fraud Trial moved from the pending December 151 
date. 
The bad faith is further evidenced by reviewing the submissions of the Defendants. As 
this Court noted, the pleadings filed by the Defendants were not sufficient to justify the motions 
being granted. Neve1theless, the Defendants were making serious ethical allegations against 
IIB' s counsel. As a result, and to ensure there was no "cloud hanging over the entire case," this 
Court vacated the trial date and set the Disqualification Motions for evidentiary hearing, so they 
could be decided on the merits, rather than via default. 
After engaging in a two day evidentiary hearing with seven (7) wilnesses and volumes of 
exhibits, this Court ultimately denied each and every one of the Disqualification Motions and in 
a subsequent decision noted that the motions were found to "l.::ck any merit." 
IIB incurred unnecessary fees and costs in defending the frivolous Disqualification 
lviotions in the total sum of $49,477.62, as set forth in Ex. C to the Schwager Aff. The fees and 
costs incurred by IIB for the three disqualification motions were substantial for several reasons. 
First, each of the three motions filed a month before trial was to commence were significant to 
IIB 's success at trial. Not only did the false allegations as to IIB' s counsel raise ethical issues 
and concerns, as well as provide a "cloud" over the if no evidentiary v,:as 
IIB had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation and case, 
J\10TION FOR SANCTIONS - 16 
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of if their who had case since at 
least 2010 \Vere disqualified. Further, based upon the allegations it was necessary for IIB to 
subpoena records from a third party law firm, all on an expedited basis due to the timing issues 
the evidentiary hearing. In obtaining those subpoena consisted of at least two 
banker boxes, documents were discovered that expressly contradicted the allegations being made 
by l\.1r. Frantz against IIB' s counsel. Further, the Defendants rrt the minute disclosed an 
expert witness they intended to present at the evidentiary hearings. Thus, it was necessary for 
IIB' s counsel to research, file and argue a motion in limine to exclude the improper witnesses. 
After oral argument, this Court did in fact exclude the witness, as the intended testimony was not 
proper expe1t witness testimony. 
Further, the attempt to disqualify the expe11 v;itness testimony of Rand Wichman was 
similarly significant to the success at trial. Mr. Wichman had conducted substantial work in 
evaluating the draw requests, tracing of construction funds, and the project, and in that work had 
determined that nearly a Million Dollars of the loan proceeds bad been converted. If Mr. 
Wichman would have been disqualified, then IIB would have had a serious proof issue in 
to the conversion cause of action. 
Accordingly, due to the seriousness of the allegations and the matters, the fees and costs 
incuned were necessary, due to the litigation tactics pursued by the Defendants and their 
attorney. 
IvlOTION FOR - 17 
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D. The Litigation Tactic of Submitting Exhibits Of \Vhich There Was No 
Submit at Trial, Is Sanctionable. 
to 
The Defendants and their attorney, Jonathon Frantz, \Vasted substantial time and mo;1ey 
in submitting one seventy-fo•e (175) exhibits to IIB' s counsel, causing additional time 
and expense in working on the exhibit stipulations, and then thereafter simply ar;1ending the list 
to have no exhibits, because they refused to provide a copy of the exhibits to the Court, pursuant 
to the Court Order. This improper litigation tactic caused IIB to incur unnecessary fees and costs 
in the total sum of $6,171, as set forth in Ex. D to the Schwager Aff. 
E. Neither the Defendants, nor the Defendants' Counsel Had Any Intent of 
Proceeding with the Fraud Trial. 
From J\.farch 3, 2015, the date that the Defendants obtained a niling that a Section 72 7 
(a)(lO) required a as to all creditors, to May 20, 2015, Lhe date that this Court approved 
such a Vlaiver, the Defendants and their counsel, Jonathon Frantz, intentionally caused IIB to 
incur unnecessary attorney fees and costs in trial preparation, when they knew they did not 
intend to proceed wiLh the Fraud Trial. On March 3, 2015, the Defendants were informed by 
Court that they ca1mot waive their discharge unless they waive their discharge as to all creditors. 
On March 16, 2015, the Defendants, through their attorney Jonathon Frantz, filed an amended 
Exhibit List in this oction, stoting "None." On April 16, 2015, m1 order is entered denying tl1e 
Def end ants' Motion to Dismiss their bankruptcy. Then on April 30, 3015, after receiving the IIB 
Pre-trial brief, the Defendants, through their attorney, Jonathon Frantz, filed a single sentence 
right to file a Brief. The next , the si 
as to all creditors under Section 0). 
FOR - 18 
)\ 
case 13-07024-TLM Doc 117 Filed 06/02/15 Entered 06/02/15 14:41:05 Desc Main 
Document Page 19 of 44 
filing of Waiver of Discharge to be 13, 2015, 
even when they filed it, they did not notice it for hearing. It is not until the Court sua sponte sets 
the Waiver for hearing for 1\fay 20, 2015 and the Waiver is tl1en approved, that the necessity for 
the Fraud Trial on non-discharge issues is mooted. 
In reviewing the entirety of tl1e litigation tactics in both the Adversary Proceeding and the 
Bankruptcy Case, it is now evident that neither the Defendants, nor their attorney, intended to 
proceed with the Fraud Trial. Instead of filing an enforceable Section 727(a)(l0) waiver of 
discharge early on in the case, they first tried several other litigation tactics to attempt to avoid 
that drastic measure. They first attempted to delay by mak:ing false statements in regard to 
discovery issues making vague threats as to IIB' s counsel's ability to represent IIB; then on 
the eve trial they file an actual DQ 1\fotion; then when that fails and the trial gets rescheduled, 
tl1ey file a motion to attempt to dismiss the bankruptcy case. W1ien that does not work, they wait 
until the very last minute and file a Section 727(a)(10) waiver of discharge as to all of their 
creditors, mooting the non-discharge 523 issues. \Vhile engaging in these litigation tactics, they 
know that IIB and its counsel are preparing for the scheduled 2 week Fraud Trial, in which it is 
clearly incuning substantial fees and costs. IIB' s fees and costs are evident by the multiple trial 
filings many of which the Defendants simply declined to do, and those that they did do, were not 
in compliance with this Court's orders. 
In engaging in the litigation tactics that took place in this case, the Defendants and their 
counsel willfully disrupted the litigation process \Vith delay rnctics and abuses of the judicial 
willful misconduct ences bad faith a for the the 
sanctions. 
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IIB fees and costs as to this litigation tactic from March 3, 2015, to 
May 20, 2015, in the total sum of $43,960.15, as set forth in Ex. E to the Schwager Aff.5 
F. Attorney Fees and Costs are Warranted For the Sanctions :\fotion 
IIB has incuned additional fees and costs in addressing the sanctionable conduct under 
this Motion. As of May 31, 2015, those fees and costs totaled $3,396.50, as set forth in Ex. F to 
the Schwager Aff. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record in this case, IIB respectfully requests that a judgment be awarded 
in its favor and against :tvlartin D. Frantz, Cynthia lvf. Frantz, and their counsel, Jonathon D. 
Frantz, jointly and severally, for sanctions in the total sum of $102,040.27 .6 
DATED THIS,11,Ja.ay of June, 2015. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA VlLEY LLP 
By-+-+'-"-"-~----'~~__,.""---__;._.:_-'--"'~"f,1--~+-~ 
Sheila R. Schwager. ISB No. 5059 / 
Attorneys for Pl;intiff Idaho Indepeb 
5 This amount includes those fees and costs incurred in regard to the submission of the 
Defendants' exhibits. If fees and costs \Vere awarded as requested, this amount would 
to be reduced by $6,171 to avoid duplication. The attorney fees and costs incurred from 
1, 2015, the date the Waiver of Discharged was signed to lvfay 20, 2015, total $26,667.17. 
6 amount not include the sanctions request of Subpart D, as those fees 
a::e also included in the request set in Subpart Further, the total i.s reduced by 
S343.00 of in the requests set forth in Subp::u1 A and B. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tl1is'Jj1.{?ay of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SANCTIONS by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of Lhe following: 
Jonathon Frantz 
FRANTZ LA \V, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln Ste., St. A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Stephen B. :McCrea 
608 N011hwest Blvd, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 1501 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1501 
lvIOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 21 
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0 U.S. J\fail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight :!\fail 
DE-mail 
D Telecopy 
Sh2ila R. Schwager 
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INRE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 








Case No. 11-21337-TLl\1 
l\1AR TIN D. FRAi'\fTZ AND 
CYNTHL-\ l\1. FRAi"\'TZ, 
Debtors. 
-------------) 
IDAHO L'\TDEPE:NDENT BANK, 











l\1ARTIN D. FRAi'\fTZ, an individual, ) 






Adv. No. 13-07024-TLl\1 
ORDER GRAi'\fTING IN PART AND DEN\'l:NG IN PART 
:MOTION FOR SA.1"\'CTIONS 
Based on the rnling entered orally this date and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Idaho Independent Bank's Motion for 
Sanctions, Doc. No. 117, is GRAL"\JTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 
Sanctions of $49,477.46 are a\varded to Idaho Independent Bank against 1\1a1iin 
and Cynthia Frantz and their Jonathon Frantz, jointly and 
ORDER- l 
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TERRY L. :tvfYERS 
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY J1JDGE 
AP 136 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 








Case No. 11-21337-TL'.\f 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ AND 
CYNTHIA l\ L FR_,\i~TZ, 
Debtors. _____________ ) 
IDAHO INDEPEN1)ENT BA.i"\:l{, 










l\1ARTIN D. FRA.1"\TTZ, an individual, ) 






Adv. No. 13-07024-TLl\f 
ORDER DISl\ITSSING AffVERSARY PROCEEDING 
Based on the ruling entered orally this date and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above captioned adversary proceeding 
is DISI\1ISSED as MOOT. 
DATED: September 14, 2015 
TERRY L. lvf':{ERS · 
CHIEF U. S. BAi"-JKRUPTCY JUDGE 
ORDER- l 
AP 142, 142-1 
I D S 
1v1}0..RTIN D. FB .. A.~\iTZ and 
CYNTHI.:\ M. FBJcJ\iTZ, 
Debtors a 
BOI 
Docket No. 3K- 1-21337-TLM 
Case No. ADV-13-07024-TLM 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
10..Z".RTIN D. FBP .. NTZ and 
CYNTHIA M. FR.Il,.NTZ, 
Boise, Idaho 
Defendants. er:cber 14, 2015 
11:01:37 a.m. 
TELEPHONIC JUDGE'S ORAL RULING 
CH...Zi.PTER 7 
HELD BEFORE THE HONOBP.BLE TERRY L. MYERS 
PRESIDING CHIEF JUDGE OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Proceedings recorded 
produced transcr 
electronic sound recording, ~ransc 
io:1 service. 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
n 
( '.JB) 989 :? 55 -
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: 
FOR THE DEBTORS 
SHEILA RAE SCHWAGER, Esq. 
Troxe 1 Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
(208) 344-6000 
JONATHON FRANTZ, Esq. 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln Street, Suite A 




* * j; * T 
3 PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 11:01:37 A.M. 
4 * * * * 'r( 
5 THE CLERK: Mr. Francz, are you on che line? 
6 MR. JONATHAN F~.NTZ: Yes. 
7 THE CLERK: Oh, great. Then I think we'll be 
8 Give me j st one moment. 
9 Ms . S do we have you on the line? 
10 MS. SCE\'il.AGER: Yes. Thanks. 
THE CL2RK: , great. Thank 
12 you. 





to take up Idaho I Bank versus Martin and 
ia Frantz, Adversary 13-7024. 
This matter is before me on cwo motions filed 
17 the plaintiff, Idaho Independent Bank, which I'll referred to 
18 as IIB. Both of those motions deal with questions of the 
19 award of attorneys fees and costs which were incurred in this 
20 adversary proceeding. 
21 The first of those motions is a motion for 
22 sanctions, Docket 117, I'll call that the sanctions motion, 
23 it was filed on June 2 and argued on e 5. 
24 The second is IIB's motion for attorneys fees and 
25 cost, Docket Number 121, which I'll call the fees moti 
:,) .0. 
1 was filed on June 3 and on Julv 28. 30th were taken 
2 under adv sement at the respeccive nearings, after oral 
3 as counsel fer IIB; and Mr. Franz 
4 as counsel for the debcor/defendants, Martin and Cynthia 
5 Fr2.ntz. I've consider those s. I've considered the 
6 written submissions that have been made ies and 
7 I've 2.lso considered extensive other independently 
8 researched authorities. I also take judicial not_ce of the 
9 files and records in the adversary proceeding, as well as in 
10 the related r 7 bankruptcy case, pursuant to FRE 201. 
" -1. J. The background for these motions is rtant. The 
12 debtors filed ~heir Ch r 11 case in October of 2011. The 
13 fil st significant ongo litigation in state court 
between debtors and IIB. 
15 In l of 2013, this Court converted the r 
16 11 case to a iquidation under Chapter 7 based upon a motion 
1 ', 
-'- I filed IIB that was st ated to debtors. 
18 In st of 2013, IIB file a int to con1Inence 
19 this adversary pro in which the bank all that 
20 debtors were principles in various entities which had entered 
21 into agreements with and became obligated to IIB and that the 
22 debtors' personally guaranteed those obligations. According 
to the c aint, the e Ri oan ob igation 
was represented to be $6.135 million as of the r j_ 
25 cetiticn date. IB also concended that debtors were 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
(2 
obl ed on a iine of credit in an amount cf $283,000 as of 
2 tf1a t ci.a te ~ aint for a j t against 
3 debtors in the amount of all s that debtors caused IIB 
4 to suffer, not to exceed the full amount due and ow under 
5 the Eagle Ri loan and line of credit as defined in the 
6 complaiGt such s to include all accru ir1t.erest, 
7 costs and attornevs fees under those obligacions. And Ii3 
a determination and j that such s\ also s 
9 obl ions, when liquidated, would be nondis able under 
10 523 (a) (2) or 523 (a) (6) of the Ban cy Code. 
11 EB also in the a;nt sought recovery and award 
12 of costs and attorneys fees incurred in the adversary 
13 proce . .,_ 1 -F i LSe.J....,_, all a ri t to the same under the 
14 loan documents and guaranties and Idaho Code sions, 
15 Sections 12-120 and 12-121. 
I 
16 Much of the history o_ this adversary ng is 
17 set out in detail in my oral decision of March 3 of this year 
18 in the Chapter 7 case and in my written decision of il 16 
19 of this year in the same case, Docket 484 in the Chapter 7 
20 case. That latter written decision of April 6, 16 [sic is 
21 also reported at 2015 Westlaw 17 8068. Those decisions are 
22 fu ly ncorporated reference, as are the Court's or 
23 decisions written or oral in either the main case or the 
24 instant adversary procee Those decision de 
25 context, as well as support for the findings and conclusions 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
?.O. 
that I enter L 
S ODe .c ~' OJ.. LDe relevan~ ascects of that s 
3 a~d the events and the liL on are the follow \•vith 
l the partic ion of all - of all counsel at a Deceffiber 2013 
5 pretrial conference, trial was set for DecerCoer l 
6 2Ql4. ricte pretrial terus, conditions and deadlines 
8 disclosure of trial evidence, and for sion cf DrcDosed 
9 exhibits to the Court were entered. The rial order ,,_,as 
10 modified in February, June, and st of 2014 to adjust 




In October 2014 the debtors o t to con~inue the 
4 trial which IIB opposed. IIB also fi ed a motion to compel 
discovery responses. 
6 a hearing on October 20, the debtors' motion to 
continue was denied and IIB's motion to compel was granted. 
Then on October 31 the debtors moved to disqual 
19 IIB's counsel, Hawley Troxell. 
20 On November 6 and 7, the debtors noved to 
21 disquali several of IIB's trial witnesses. This generated 
22 as ificant amount of activity. And at a hearing on 
23 November 17 the Court concluded at the disqua if cation 
24 motions could not be resolved without a devel evidentiary 
25 record. It, therefore, vacated the December tria and 
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1- used sedate.sin DecercLber for bearings on the 
2 discrualificat on Docions. After a two- hear , on 
0, I entered an oral ruling ng the deb-:or s' 
4 motions in all regards. A transc of that r:.11 is filed 
5 in the adversary docket as Docket 105. 
6 Later that month che trial was re-scheduled, this 
7 time for May 26 29, and June 1th 5 o::: 2015 and 
8 additional pretrial deadlines were set. 
9 In March of this year the Court granted II3's 
10 request to strike debtors' rly disclosed defense 
11 witnesses. 
The Court also reminded debtors' counsel of his 
13 ob' i ions under the pretrial orders ng the de ivery 
14 o del)tors' ously identified exhibits to the clerk o 
15 tte cm:rt. It had been represented that disclosure of the 
16 exhibits to the plaintiff had occurred and been timely made, 
1 but the delive~y of the disclosed exhibits to the court's 
18 clerk had not. Instead of complying with the orders 
19 regarding the lodg of the exhibits and even this 
20 Court, sua sponte, granted a brief extension of the deadline, 
21 which then had been missed, the debtors elected not to 
22 and expressly waived use at trial of all exhibits that 
23 they had ously disclosed. 
24 While che adversary process was continuing, debtors 
12s filed in their r 7 case a Februarv 12, 2015, mot_o 
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waive their discharge under Section 727(a) (10), a waver 
"'- I wh er: was to be effective a.cco::cdi:"!. to ::ht submission as ::o 
I 
3 all creditors excepc IIB. This was~ llowed later chat month 
4 by a motion of the debtors to dismiss their er 7 case 
5 or co reconverted to ll and also a motion to lift 
6 the 362 stay in order o renew lit tion with IIB in state 
cou::ct~ 
8 At a hearing on March 3, the Court denied the 
9 att partial waiver of discharge and set the mocions to 
10 convert or dismiss and for stay relief for a hearing on March 
11 30. After that March 30 hearing, which actually occurred on 
12 both the 3 and the 3 •:, I entered the written decision of 
13 ri 16 that I referred to earlier ng those motions. 
14 On 1 30, IB ti~e filed a crial brief for the 
15 ding two week trial that was go to start on 26. 
6 Debtors on that due date filed a document purporting to waive 
1 7 sub:Ttission of their required trial brief. That was an 
18 :-iot authorized the Court's pretrial order or 
19 otherwise. 
20 Then less than cwo weeks before the trial would 
21 co;r.rnence, debtors filed in the Chapter 7 case a 13 - on 
22 13, a waiver of discharge under Section 7 2 7 (a) (10) , that 
23 now encompassed all creditors, including I B. This Sect on 
24 72 (a) (10) waiver was actually executed almost 2 wee~s 
25 earlier, on 1, wjich was the after debtors' counsel 
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1 declined cc f ~e the trial brief; and ic was cwo wee~s before 
the discharge waiver made it to the Ccurt docket. 
3 The debtors s t DI this new waiver on 
4 a 17 day negative notice under the local rules. This, of 
5 course, wculd not have resolved the matter before the trial 
6 vias sched,Jled -co cor,:-nence, so on 14 the Court, sua 
7 sponte, set a 20 hearing in the Chapter 7 case on the 
The Ccurc, foll that hearing, entered an order 
9 approving the waiver of discharge and caused the required 
10 notice of no discharge to be issued the clerk and served 
~I 1 on all creditors. 
12 I had also set a concurrent 20 hearing in the 
13 adversary to address the ications of the 
14 potential waiver of discharge on the 
15 Follm<J discussion a-c that hea with counsel, I orally 
16 found and concluded that the waiver of discharge rendered 
17 moot the question of nondischargeabili of specific debts 
18 under 523(a) and I, therefore, vacated the pending trial. 
19 But I did not then, and have not since entered any other or 
20 further order regarding the adversary proceeding. 
21 IIB seeks to recover under it sanctions mot on 
22 approximately $102,000 of attorney's fees and costs that were 
23 incurred in the adversary proceeding and it asked that such 
24 award be imposed jointly and severally on the debtors don 
25 their at-orney, the debtor's son, Jonathan Frantz. 
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1 II3 sees to recover from debtors under i::.s 
2 ic10t tely $406,000 in attorneys fees and costs, a 
3 f re which is inclusive of those fees and costs ~hich are 
4 also so, under the sanction motion. 
In addition to the aLtornevs fees and tne 
6 nontaxable costs that are set out in the fees motion, I3 
7 also has filed a bill of costs, Adversary Docket 120, that 
8 request $8233.39 of taxable costs under ~ule 054 ) and cur 
9 local rule 7054.1. I'll separately address that cost claim 
10 later~ 
11 In order to resolve the cost motion -- the fees 
12 motion and the sanct ons sction, the first aspect that needs 
13! to be addressed is jurisdict.ion. IB's c aint asserted 
14 nondis abili claiss under Section 523 (a) (2) and (3) 
15 and unde 523(a) (6) The Court has jurisdiction over such 
16 claims under 28, U.S.C., Section 1133 and 157 (a) excuse 
17 me, 1334 and 157 (a), and they were core proceedings under 
18 157 (b) (2) (I), the debtors' answer expressly admitted that. 
1 a - .., As I noted a minute ago, IIB s t a judicia 
20 determination of all damages under those causes of action, 
21 an entry of a nondischargeable money j in such an 
22 amount. This Court clearly has the jurisdiction and 
23 authori t.o enter a j t determining the amount of a 
24 nondischargeable debt as pare and Darcel of its deterDinaticn 
2S of nondischa~geability icself. 
?.O. ::?,ox 
!2C 5) n 
1 The cases of 24 ?.3d 864. 
F.3d 1015. Both the inch C rcuit Court cf als. 
3 the case of 469 B .. 11, the inth Circuit 
4 Appellate Panel, al establish that preposition. 
The debtors' counsel has edly and incorrectly 
6 argued that there was no aspect of the adversary g 
7 that would establish the amount of any debt, but IIB 
8 expressl had asKeo for a money ju t for sin the 
9 amount of the total debt this Court:. would determine en the 
10 evidence to be nondis e. II3's estimate of that 
11 amount was near as 11i as the total proof of claim filed. 
12 The au_horities were and are clear that this Court can 
13 establish the amount of a nondischa e debt and enter a 
1 ;-noney t as part of the Section 523(a) udicat:.ory 
5 process. I've ained chis before, including in a orior 
6 written decision, nonetheless debtors continually make the 
1 '"7 
- I flawed assertion that there was no request for damage relief 
18 or liquidation of debt. In fact that same argument was 
19 raised again at the July 28 hearing. 
20 When debtors waived their discharge under 
21 727(a) (10) of the code and that waiver was approved, the 
22 question of nondischar lity of any debt, inc the 
23 debt owed II3 became moot. That's because all obliga ens 
24 owed debto s were rendered nondischargeable in this o 
25 any other ban cy case virtue of the section 27 (a) ( 0) 
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Co lier on Ban oy at 7 2 . 12 indicaces 
2 that it's a iver of any dis , et a~, thus ~one of the 
3 debtors debts are discharged and tl'..e d.ebtor' s nor:e:{eIT:Dt 
4 property is ad1ninistered by the '.:rustee, but ac1y debts unpaid 
5 the trustee in his adDinistrat~on survi~ve. 
6 Those ever nondischargeable debts wil~ include 
here, and do include here all obligations under t~e 
8 guarantees and the Eagle loan, _hp linP of credit and 
9 any other amount that could be established as o~ed by debtors 
10 to IIB, whether or not such amounts were fraudulently 
11 obtained or resulced from conversion. 
IIB had not concluded ics state court action when 
13 che debtors filed their initial Chapter 11 ition in 2011 
4 and its c aim was not conclusive liquidated co an amount 
15 certain a state court J nt. Since the waiver of 
16 discharge was filed on the eve of this Court's 2015 
17 trial, the obl tions were not adjudicated in this adversary 
18 proceeding. The debtors waiver caused a vacation of that 
19 ending trial, so, since the amount of the debt has not yet 
20 been liquidated, if necessary it appears that it will need to 
21 be liquidated in state court. 
22 The question turns jurisdictionally as to whe~her 
23 or not the fee issues may be de ermined this Court r 
24 the present motion? In regard to the fees motion and to a 
25 lesser under the sanctions motion, the parties have 
2 
1 l debated issues whether or not IIB should be 
2 considered the crevail pa fer tne purposes of fee 
3 1 allowance. 
4 In the case of 2011 Westlaw 1060991, 
5 a decision from the Bc.::1 Court, the ainti£f 
6 s t denial of discharge under Section 72 and the 
7 debtor/defendant filed a Section 727 (a) (10) waiver before the 
8 matter could cone to trial. After fi ::hat the 
9 plaintiffs' aint was rendered moot and questioning 
10 whether resolution of dis issues deprived the Court of 
11 jurisdiction to liq"L1idate the underly claim outside of a 
12 contested claim proceeding, the Court stated as 






"Defendancs' election to waive or disc~arge came in 
the middle of a hotly contested matter invol 
extensive discovery. It would be disingenuous tc 
suggest that the waiver is not related to the 
aintiffs' action." Close 
It therefore found olaintiff to be the prevail 
20 party for purposes of allowance of costs. 
21 This Court would reach the same general conclusion 
22 as to prevailing as did the Court in 
23 If state aw ' ' .c ~vJere LO ini.o::cm the issue of prevail 
24 party, the Court notes the case of 
25 20 5 West aw 3858528, a decision in June of this year, whi 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
I 
l I found a t.o have led in the absence of a j 
2 citing the 8rovisions of Idaho Civ~l ?rocedure Rule 
3 54 (d) (1) (B), and concluding that -c:he Court can con.sider in 
4 its discretion the, quote, \\final j 1 dgrr·.ent or resr1lt ot the 
5 2ctioT1 11 , close , when making its determination. 
6 While the parties have focused on il 
7 their arguments have not, however, focused on the under 
8 and fundamental jurisdictional aspects presented by the 
9 I current situation. In my view this is a threshold issue and 
10 as such I need to briefly ain and how the adversary 
11 proce has been rendered moot, and from that foundation 
2 ,;"hat occurs on consideration of the fees motion and 
13 the sanctions motion. 
14 The Ninth Circuit Court of ls has explained in 
15 c ca e called 
16 398 F.3d l 25, and en bane decision in 2005 as follows. 
17 And I will only certain portions of the text and omit 







"For a case to fall within the parameters of our 
limited judicial power, it is not enough that there may 
have been a live case or controversy when the case was 
decided by the Court whose j we are review ng, 
rather Art le III requires hat a live con rovers 
persist th tall stages of the lit 0:1. ":There 
this conditio:1 is not met, the case has become 2oot a:1d 
?.8. 
1 its resolution is no longer within our constitutional 
2 
3 ?he Ninth Circuit in another case called 
4 or 415 F.3d 994 in 2005 also 
5 considered simi~ar issues. There, the plaintiff was a ~usic 
6 cer who had filed an adversary proceeding against the 
debtor, Stanley 30rrell, also known as MC Hawe.er. The 
8 aintiff s nondischargeabili under 523 (a) (4) c.nd 
9 (a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Code. After Pilate obtained a 
10 SUITcillary j ton the 523(a) causes in 2000, and while that 
11 j t 1,,.1as 0::1 to the District Court, the Ban cy 
12 Court denied the entire discharge of Burrell and his wife 
13 under Sec on 727 based on their failure to comply with 
14 cond tions o~ a settlement with the trustee. The 
15 District Court thereafter affirmed the Court's 
16 sumP.ary j to Pilate. The Ninth Circuit on from 
17 that District Court decision held, quote: 





debt were rendered moot when the cy Court 
denied discharge on other grounds while Pilate's appeal 
before the District Court." C se 
It explained that desnite neither party argu the 
23 case was moot, that the Court of als had an i 
24 obli ion to consider mootness sua and it reasoned as 
25 ~allows, quote: 












"The district court_ did not properly have 
' ' d' '' ' . '. ' JUrlS lCt:lOn 'CO ,,ear L:llS case because the case became 
moot while it was penning before the Dist:rict Court. On 
ril 24, 2002, less than a month before -cne District_ 
Court ente~ed its o~der of j , the Ban 
C8~rt entered an order ng the discharge of debtors 
on other grounds. If the controversy is moot, both the 
trial and appellate court:s lack ect E'Latter 
jurisdiction and the concomitant power to declare the 
deciding the cla on the merits." 
SiDilarly iTI the case of 
12 276, a decision of the y Court from the Eastern 
13 District of Virginia earlier this year. The Bankruptcy Court 
l addressed the question of its own continuing jurisdiction 
15 over a Section 523(a) adversary proceeding after the Court 
16 had denied debtors' discharge in a separate 727 adversary 
17 proce prosecuted by the United States Trustee. In that 
8 case a trial in the 523(a) action had started but was not 
19 completed before the Court heard and ruled on t:he U.S. 
20 Trustee's co~plaint and denied discharge. The Court started 
21 there with the proposition that Bankruptcy Courts are courts 
22 of limited jurisdiction. It stated, quote: 
23 
24 
"Further it is almost universally agreed that when 
a debtor is denied a discharge, any action to dete ne 
the dischargeability of individual debts becomes moot." 
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l Close 
2 The citations c~n be f a page 280 of that 
3 decision. 
4 Similar authorities can be found in the case of 
5 2010 Westlaw 4622451, a decision of the 
6 Ban cy Court in the Northern District of Alabama in 2010. 
7 In following an explication of bankruptcy 
8 court jurisdict on and authori , the Court found that the 
9 action before it was no longer a core proceeding and given 
10 the test for a related to procee , under the 
11 jurisdictional statutes, which is that the outcome would have 
12 an effect on the estate be administered, it also found 
13 that the case could not be a non-core related proce 
14 There is a ~ecent case ar at a sl ly 
15 different conclusion, that's 2015 Westlaw 
16 1093105 from the stern District of Missouri. There the 
17 debtor waived his dis and that mooted a ng Section 
18 523(a) for adjudication. The Court concluded that it 
19 had the abili to 1 idate the amount of the debt, 
20 notwithstanding the waiver of discharge, because it had 
21 alre heard all the evidence and the waiver occurred onl 
22 after the filing of post trial briefs and the submission of 
23 the matter for a decision. It elected to proceed, quote 1 
24 "because it had alre fully liti d the issue regarding 
25 dis ability of claim and s,n close f 
?.O. C2 
that it was, quote, r for it to deter~ine the amount of 
2 the deb;: owed." Close 
l 3 Rowever given tne focus on urisdiction and 
4 mootness by the Ninth Circuit in 
5 and given the decisions tha;:_ -
6 referenced tie the Court's abili to liquidate the clain to 
7 its jurisdiction and i;:s core j risdiction under 157 (b) (2) (I) 
8 of Title 28; and since this c2se is ~ot like the case, 
9 I conclude that I could not and should not retain and try the 
10 ma;:ter solely to liquidate the c aim of IIB. 
11 So with that and in elaboration of ny 
12 prior oral decision that the adversary proceeding was 
13 rendered moot by the waiver a dis conclude that this 
14 proceeding will need to be dismissed and the dismissal wil 
15 be without prejudice. 
16 That leaves of course the question of the effect of 
17 mootness and dismissal on the fees motion. IIB hasn't 
18 challenged my prior observation at the time of hearing that 
19 this adversary proce has been rendered moot. But as 
20 aintiff it does argue, at least icitly, that this Court 
21 can and should address the supplemental issue of the 
22 allowance of attorneys fees and costs before enter its 
23 order of dismissal. There are cases that suggest that 
24 Bankruptcy Court has discretion to retain jurisdiction when 
25 judicial economy, fairness, convenience and comity favor that 
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1 retentiona ~ conc1uae that those factors do not 
2 I requested 
3 
::etention a:1.d udication of the fees r:totio::1.. 
The factor cf judicial economy doesn't we 
4 
5 
strcng.:..y in favor reter:tior1 of the 
cc.se, c..his case was not. al 
fees motion, unlike the 
fu2.ly tried 2nd 
6 submitted to the Court prior to the moot. event. And even 
8 
9 
a vast amount of pretrial activi occurred, the trial 
't even corr . :11enced ~/et. 
Furthermore, absent some sort of non-litigation 
10 resolution with the Frantz's, IIB wil be required to 
11 liquidate its claims nst debtors in st.ate court. Thus, 
12 my udication of the fee mot on here would address one 
13 limited component, that is to say the adversary proceeding 
4 of fees and cost, when the underlying claim it.self in 
5 princ le, the entitlement to any other fees and cost 
116 ilicurred LIB, those or to ban cy, during the 
17 11, during the Chapter 7 and in the ultimate state 
18 court trial would all need to be resolved by a state court. 
19 Parsing the fee issue between two courts in this way does no 
20 e judicial economy. Further, if such a state court 
21 trial were to occur, IIB's preparation for the trial of at 
22 case is not totally lost and much of its effort will not be 
23 wasted and that would ameliorate the judicial economy factor 
24 as well. 
25 The issues in the adversary proce 
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1 Section 523(a) questions are our moot would be oure 
2 c SLat law, the amount of the debt. There's one notable 
3 ion thaL I'll tal ~o later in this decision. 
4 As the Ninth Circuit BAP said in Casamont 
5 196 B.~. 517 at 524, needless decisions of state 
6 ..LC.VJ Federal Court should be avoided as a matter of comi 
7 For this Court to address only one segment of fee allowance 
8 under state law doesn't respect or advance comi 
9 In reaching these conclusions I don't gainsay Lhat 
10 the fees IIB incurred n this ing are significant. 
11 The nature o the case, which sounded in fraud and 
12 conversion, the amount in controversy, the long history of 
13 transactions, the of the underl ng loans, the 
14 exi and duration of events that gave rise to the 
15 claims and prec ated the aint, the need for 
116 preparation for a trial of a suit of this type, and the 
17 specific troublesome aspects cf the litigation that occurred 
18 in this Court, some of which I will address further in a 
19 moment, have all conLributed to the anount of fees 
2 0 incurred. 
21 One concern underlying presentation of the 
22 fees motion to this Court, under the circumstances of 
23 mcotness of the underlying case, be that when IIB 
24 pursues li dation ar:d collection of its l • C..Lal;-;.S st 
25 debtors it will be in a state court action where that courL 
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will have less familiarity with che details of cne lit ton 
2 i this Court and thus with the reasonableness of the fee 
3 I and costs incurred in IIB's prepar the case fo::- trial and 
4 in its responding to the various motions and ec'cions and 
:i ot:ler fil s made by the debtor. The decision as to the 
6 allowance and amount of fees and noncaxable costs will 
7 likely be a stace court's to make on whatever submissions 
8 and arguments as may be presented, both IIB and the 
9 debtors. 
10 Io the extent that this Court's view of the 
11 reasonableness of IIB's cy fees and expenses in the 
12 adversary proce is material, I'll make it here. 
I am te familiar with the nature, magnitude and 
exity of the under ying transactions and events, I have 




I for several years, I am familiar with the 
17 liti ion that has occurred and the positions taken the 
18 parties, I have heard and ruled on numerous matters, with 
19 that perspective I can confidently state that the amount 
20 by IIB, which are fully and adequate doc:.unented 
21 the submissions made in support of the fees motion are 
22 reasonable in nature and anount and were appropriate y 
23 incurred the matters at issue and the liti i 
24 conduct of the debtors. The debtors 
25 motion are not persuasive. 
?. 
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ections to the fee 
02 
l But nocwichs those observations, which I 
2 clearly make for the record, for the reasons thac I've 
3 ousl stated, the Courc can't enter a decision or order 
4 address the allowance of such fees. That would be a 
5 piec~meal approach co Just one a of fees and costs that 
6 may ultimately come before a state courc and it would invade 
7 the of the state court to decide all issues and it 
8 would be inimical with a decision that moocness of this 
9 proceeding requires dismissal of the orocee So for 
10 those reasons I will the j~risdictio~al 
11 
12 I view the bill of costs that I nentioned, 
13 Adver a Docket 120 different As I've noted the Courc 
14 would find IIB be the prevail , achieving 
15 is litigation the ultimate relief sought of 
I 6 nondischargeabilicy. Unlike fees, which in this context are 
17 a state law issue, taxation of cost is a matter of federal 
18 rule. Under Rule 7054(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules and our 
19 Local Rule 7054.l, IIB is entitled to costs. The bil of 
20 cost request $8233.39 of taxable costs. I have reviewed the 
21 items claimed and find them to be in accord wich the rules, 
22 they will be allowed and will be taxed against the 
23 debtors. 
24 I'm going to turn now to the sanctions motion, 
which seeks a lowance of a subset of ~he fees and cost, 
2 
ly l/4th, as sanctions to be osed against debtors and 
2 their counsel ointly and severally. in the 
3 starti2g po~~ is jurisdictional foundation and context. The 
4 basis or1 v.1hich this Court can entertain the sanctions .... ' ITlOLlOil 
S is not identical to that which I've just discussed re 
6 Even if an underlying adversary proceeding 
7 is dismissed, the Court has jurisdiction to consider and 
8 se sanctions for conduct in that proceeding. The cases 
9 of in re: 409 Federal 
10 dix 07, a Ninth Circuit decision of December 2010, 
11 established that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to 
2 se sanctio:1s sua e, after formal dismissal of the 
13 ban case itself, citing the U.S. Supreme Court 
14 de ision of 496 U.S. 384 at 
15 39 
16 Additionally the Ninth Circuit in the case of 
17 
18 of October 8, 2010, held that the 3ankruptcy Court had 
19 jurisdiction to se sanctions, notwith the 
20 appellant's request to voluntarily withdraw complaints. It 
21 found that sanctions are a collateral issue that the Court 
22 may consider, quote: 
23 "After an action is no longer pending because 
24 aim to deter abuse of the judicial orocess and have no 
25 bear and thus, no res judicata effect on the ca es 
0. 
underl ng merits." Close 
2 Once agai the Ninth Circuit cited the 
3 decision. 
4 The 3AP had determined in an intermediate appeal in 
5 the case, that the dismissal of the 
6 adversary did not ive the cy Cou:-t of 
jur sdiction to near the sanctions request, also rel ng on 
8 and ether authorities. The BA? dee sion is 
9 found at 2009 Westlaw 7809930. 
10 There's also a Ninth Circuit case called 
11 762 F.3d 963, a decision in 
12 2014, in which the Ninth Circuit announced that Federal 
13 Courts have anci lary jurisdiction, among other things, 
4 quote: 
5 "To enable it to function successful , that is to 
116 manage its proceedings, vindicate its authori and 
17 effectuate its decrees." Close 
18 I conclude that I have jurisdiction over the 
19 sanction's motion, notwithstanding the mootness and the soon 
20 to be entered dismissal of the Section 523(a) proceeding. 
21 The gravamen of the sanctions motion is that the 
22 conduct of the debtors and their attorney, Mr. Frantz, ~as 
23 roper, in bad faith and rious to IIB. 
24 I have previously and sively - excuse me, 






1 s1.:r:m1arized t:he author ty addressing its inherent a1.;.t:lori ty 
2 to sanction parcies. That's the case of 
3 2014, Wesclaw, 4418549, a decision of S e1cber 8 1 2014. 
4 As before I will relate che holdings without case 
5 ciI-ation. The Court said under SecL-icn 105(a) 1 a Ban cy 
6 Court has ~ne inherent authori to sanction parties and 
7 attorneys for their conduct in ban cases. The 
8 inherent sanctio2 au~hori allows a Ban Court to 
9 deter and provide comoensation for a broad range of r 
10 1 t ation tactics. Sefore sing sanctions under its 
11 inherent sanctioning authori a Court must make an explicit 
12 finding of bad faith or willful misconduct. With regard to 
13 the inherenc sanction authority, bad faith or willful 
misconduct cons st of someth more egregious than mere 
ne igence or recklessness. Moreover the Court's inherent 
16 powers under Section 105(a) must be exercised with restraint 
17 and discretion. Sanctionable conduct includes r 
18 lit on tactics, for example, del ng or dis ing 
19 litigation, bad faith, wanton conduct, willful abuses of 
20 judicial process and acting in the litigation for an improper 
21 purpose or acting for oppressive reasons. This is found at 
22 2014 Westlaw 4418549 at pages 3 and 4 and it cites among 
23 other things the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
25 and t also cites the 
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l Ninth Cir it 3AP decision in S-I-N-G-H, 2014 
2 Westlaw 842102. 
The BAP had also issued and other dee sior in 2012 
4 called 2012 Westlaw 10687 0. 
5 It too finds that sanctions are available for a varie of 
6 types of wilful actions, incl recklessness when 
combined with an additional factor, such as frivolousness, 
8 harassment, or an imorooer purpose, therefore, even if a 
9 party does not act in bad faith but only recklessly, when 
10 that reckless conduct is c d with an improper purpose 
11 such as an att to influence or man late proce to 
12 an c , it is sanctionable under a Court's 
13 inherent r. That's at page 5 of the BAP decision citing 
14 and l the case. As the 3AP there 
5 noted, the inherent power to sanction covers a broad range of 
6 misconduct, including wilfully abusing the judicial 
17 processes. 
18 In regard to the general inherent power, Attorney 
19 Frantz has that Rule 9011 should be used by the 
20 plaintiff rather than invok that Court -- the Court's 
21 inherent power. However in 509 
22 F.3d 1139, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the inherent 
23 power to sanction is a valid alternative basis for si g 
24 sanctions there where the Court had mis ied Rule 9011. 
25 The Court noted that under its or decision of 
2 
1 llate Court would not overturn a Bankruptcy Court's 
2 decision merely because that Court ied the wrong label to 
31 the ri 
4 
ous use of its inherent power to sanction. 
The fees and nontaxable cost soughc by IIB under 
5 the sanctions motion relate only to certain specific conduct 
6 the debtors and their counsel, Mr. Frantz, during the 
7 course of this , even though the entirety of the 
8 history of the case and the overall conduct of the case would 
9 inform that question. IIB seeks fees and cost as sanctions 
0 in the following categories. 
11 
12 
First, regarding the motion of IIB to compel 
ion of documents, which was granted Adversary 
3 Docket 52, fees are claimed in the amount of $2534.50 as 
14 shown at Docket 118, pages 12 and 13. 
15 Second, in regard to the October 2014 motions of 
16 debtors to amend the pretrial order and continue the December 
7 2014 trial, motions which were denied the Court in October 
18 of 2014, IIB claims fees in the amount of S3014.50 as found 
19 at Docket 118, pages 14 and 15. 
20 Third, relating to the debtors' motions to 
21 dis i IIB's counsel, Hawley Troxell, and to disquali 
22 IIB's witnesses, all of which motions were denied the 
23 Court in Decer:ber of last year. Fees totaling $47,650.50, 
24 and travel costs totaling $1826.96 are claimed, this is a 
25 total amount of 549,477.46 in this category and is itemized 
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l at Docket 118 a~ pages 16 
2 Fourth, in connection with debtors' s losure o::: 
3 the exhibits to IIB which was later followed s so-
4 called waiver of submiss on of the actual exhibits to the 
~ Court, these are claimed in the amount of $6171, itemization 
6 is at: Docket 1 1 Q --V at pages 26 31. 
7 Fifth, in connection with the del submission of 
8 the full section 27(a) (10) waiver, which occurred on the eve 
9 of trial, IIB seeks fees of $42,829 and costs of $1131.15 for 
10 a period of March 3 through 20 of this year. This 
11 category totals $43,960.15 and is itemized at Docket 118, 
12 pages 32 
13 Sixth, and finally, for the work on the sanctions 
14 mot on itself, I B claims fees of $3396.50, Docket 118 at 43 
5 2nd 44. 
16 ==rm first to take up the motion to compe . 
17 Recall, this Court ed IIB's discovery motion and entered 
18 Docket Nur:-tber 52. In that order the Court indicated fees 
19 would be allowed pursuant to Civil Rule 37 (a) (5) (A), as 
20 incorporated Bankruptcy Rule 7037. I conclude that the 
21 requested fees of $2534.50 are reasonable and appropriate and 
22 the same will be awarded under the Civil Rule and cy 
23 Rule. 
24 I would note this is not a sanctioned ruling and it 
25 requires no special findings under the authorities that 've 
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1 just sur;:-unarized. The rule here is a fee shifti 
2 Cnder i, fees and costs are allowed a successful lit ant in 
3 a discovery dispute unless one cf the three conditions of 
5 they are net. The portion of the rule that addresses award 
6 of fees for sanctionable conduct, which would be rule 37(b) 
7 and (d) is not at issue. So I will enter an order fol 
8 this decision all the fees of $2534.50 under the Civil 
9 Rule and 3ankruptcy Rule, consistent with my order r 
10 Docket 52. As authorized the Civil Rule, the same will be 
11 assessed against and payable 
12 Frantz jointly and several 
debtors and Attorney Jonathan 
13 The second that I'll address is the motion 
14 to ameno the pretrial order and to continue the trial back in 
15 October 20 4. I denied those motions then because ~'Vere 
16 not well taken, nor persuasive But I do not find, 
17 on the whole of the record, that they were advanced with the 
18 purpose and intent required under the case law for exercise 
19 of my nherent sanctioning authori The sanctions motion 
20 seeking fees related to that aspect of the case will be 
21 denied. 
22 Next I'll address the motion to disquali IIB's 
23 counsel and the bank's witnesses. Recall that soon afte 
24 October motions were udicated there were additional 
25 motions c aiming that IIB's counsel must be disqualified for 
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1 ethical reasons and that there were compelling reasons to 
2 disquali several witnesses identified I:3 for 
3 their use at trial. ~ne u cirnate resolution of these ma~ters 
4 required vacation of the trial and it reouired the hol of 
5 a multiple evidentiary hear ng. The decisio~ to defe~d 
6 the bank's claims attacking the bank's counsel and do 
so with all ions of unethical conduct and conflict was 
8 calculated and strategic. It had the des red effect of 
9 vacat and pos ing the trial. It had tne additional, 
10 and the Court finds the desired effect of outt counsel and 
1 IIB to extraordinary expense and at bottom, the allegations 





In ementat en of the sanctions motion v1ay 
15 of Adversary Dockets 125 and 126, IIB has provided additiona 
16 previously undisclosed information about the disqualification 
17 I motion. A June 4, 2015, email from Marty Frantz to Jack 
18 Gustave!, the CEO of the bank, suggested that the bank join 
19 with debtors in a ice case against the Hawley Troxell 
20 firm, obtain a big settlement from the firm's insurers and 
21 leverage that into a resolution of IIB's claims against the 
22 debtors. This rather breathta overture followed the two 
23 day hearing and the December 2014 ruling of this Court that 
24 there was no nerit on the evidence to the conflict of 
25 interest alle ions against ' ~ ,- ' t2e rirr. 
?.0. 
0 
The email further disclosed that the idea behind 
2 the ettlement proposal was jo ntly devel debtors and 
3 a Chicago attor~ey ~aued K2tz~ The e~ail stated in this 
4 regard that the earlier disqualification motion pressed 
5 against the law firm was a, quote, "probe," close quote, so 
6 that Katz could, e, "see ho1.tv Havl Troxell would defend 
themselves." Close And quote, "to evaluate the 
8 merits of ah st:.akes future ice case." Close 
9 
10 It further stated, quote, "Mr. Katz's firm needed 
11 to decide if the case was strong t:.o compel then 
12 to pursue the future high-stakes civil itigation on a 
13 cont nt fee bass." Close quote. 
4 That email also disclosed that a ma actice case 
15 nst Hawley Troxell was recently filed in civil court. It 
l 6 now appears that this case was 
17 case CV-2015 1406 in the First 
18 Judicial District Court, Kootenai County, what I'll call the 
-9 malpractice case. 
20 The presiding judge in that case, the Honorable 
21 John T. Mitchell issued a July 29, 2015, menorandun decision 
22 in that case and caused its decision to be served direct yon 
23 this Court. Not only was it served on this Court, tis of 
24 course a matter of record in the state court of which I may 
25 take judicial notice under Rule 201 of the FRE. 
1 The dee sion in the malpractice case reflects that 
2 the su twas filed on February 20, 2015, a e of months 
3 after I had ruled in December the disqualification 
4 I':',ot ion. Mitchell made several insi ful ar:d telling 



















"Frantz's position taken in this case demonstrate 
his misunderstanding of state and federa bankruptcy 
laws and their interaction. The :celief F~antz 
and the le unde ~ng that requested relief 
demonstrate the absurdi of this litiqation." Close 
quote. 
At page 2, 
"The fatal factual problem with Frantz's lS 
that Hawley Troxell did not represent Frantz as an 
attorney in that prior litigation, thus no conflict and 
no r:,a ice in the cy proceeding. The fatal 
legal problem with Frantz's theory is that the Honorable 
Terry 1. Myers, presiding Chief Judge of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court, already decided that precise 
issue on December 10, 2014, after a two day evident ary 
hear Frantz breathed not a word about that prior 
decision in his complaint and jury demand filed before 
this Court, filed two months after Judge rs' 
Close quote. 
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"Frantz was ccmpletely silent in his 2int 
about what u rs did with Frantz's effort to 
disqualify. As mentioned above, Frantz conven 
ou~tted any reference i~ his aint and jury demand 
filed before this Court, che fact that two months 
earlier Judge s decided Frantz had absolutel no 
basis upon -,1hich to disqualify Hawley Troxell." Close 
That's at page 3 of the ice decision. 
The state court ultimately granted Hawley roxell's 
14 ) r:i_otion to dismiss or abate the case. 
1s J The Ninth Circuit authorities, which I outlined 
6 earlier 1 make clear that the Court may enter sanctions, 
l 7 l 
18 ,- l or J_ 
19 liti 
20 liti 
, '\to deter and provide compensation for a broad range 
ti on tactics." Close Those in proper 
ion tactics can include del or dis 
ion and acting in the lit ion for an improper 
21 purpose or for oppressive reasons. 
22 This Court has earlier and repeatedly expressed 
23 concern that the motions, objections and a s advanced 
24 debtors and their counsel could well be viewed as 
25 strategic rather than ~eritorious and to strategic 
9- ss 3 
1 desires rather than or c ed ones. This would be in the 
2 DeceF;ber O oral r 1 l referencing the October 17 oral 
3 rul ~g and agai in tne ri, decision~ 
4 Given their very nature and timing, the 
5 disqualificat on motions before this Court were gua_ to 
6 cause IIB and its counsel to s ificant resources. 
7 This Court found the motions lacked any merit. It also new 
8 appears that another st ·was at ay, the use of the 
9 i"'tOtion to dis ify counsel was a test of the law firm in 
10 order to evaluate an anticipated collateral malpractice suit 
11 and rematic [sic] of the behavior in this Court on the 
12 disoualificat on sotion, when the ma ctice suit was 
13 actual 01.:: , the debtors and their counsel disclosed to 
14 the state rt the existence of the ban 
15 disqualification motion bu not its unst:ccessful outcome. 
16 I can leave to Mitchell the questions 
17 concern the lack of candor and the related issues under 
18 the daho Rules of Professional Conduct. The salient point 
19 here is that all this conduct points to t.he i:r,proper 1Jse 1 
20 indeed the misuse of litigation tactics to cause economic 
21 injury to an opponent and its counsel in the form of 
22 increas l '~ _lL ion costs. That manifested intent was to 
23 increase the bu~den of liti ion and concomitantly inc~ease 
24 the potential of settlement. And even f not settled, 
25 goa o delay of the ng trial was achieved using 





of the case the conduct debto::-s 
sel, Jonathan Frantz, was f an se 
:or oppressive reasons and its and consequence was 
or dis ng litigation. As that case law otes, 
5 willful actions and even reckless conduct, when combined th 
6 r purpose or harassment, will adequately s the 
7 required fi of bad faith and willful misconduct. 
8 This Court, therefore, on the ent 
9 record and with sis on the facts set forth today, as 
10 well as in its orior decisions, finds that the motions to 
l disqualify IIB's counsel and witnesses were made in bad 
12 faith, r r purpose and manifest willful misconduct. 
3 S ctions are appropriate. 11 be assessed. 
14 s ions are compensatory in nature. IIB reauest fees and 
J1s nontaxable costs of $49,4 7.46 ace to my review of the 
16 itemization at Exhibit C, Docket 118, pages 6 23. 
17 I find and conclude that the same or other appropriate 
18 claimed and sanctions in such amount will be assessed aga ns 
19 debtors and their counsel, Jonathan Frantz, jointly and 
20 severally. 
21 The next category sought the bank is the refusa 
22 to provide, or the so-called waiver of use of the prev s 
disclosed exhibits. The debtors disclosed 175 proposed 
24 exhibits, indicating an iGtention to use them at crial. This 
25 disclosure was tisely made and the plaintiff rationall d 
?.J. 3oz 3, Is 
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1 reasonably devoted s ficant time to analyzing and 
2 evaluating those proposed exhibi s, and conside 
3 the ccntext of its own exhibits and the other discovery in 
4 the case. When the Court was address matters before it in 
5 March 2015, inc the stri of the defendants' 
6 rcpe-ly disclosed defense witnesses, it reminded counsel 
7 that debtors' exhibits not only had to be disclosed to the 
8 bank, but the order of the Court requ red that the or l 
9 exhibits and their coo es be delivered to the clerk and that 
10 the deadline for do so had passed. The Court instructed 
11 Mr. Frantz to c y with the order and finish his task and 
12 allowed him another week to do so, though by all rights the 
13 document should have been alre and ready to be 
4 when the in tial deadline Mr. Frantz filed, at 
15 the end of the grace period allowed the Court, a waiver of 
16 use of any exhibi s. IIB's request in this regard seeks 
17 $6171 in fees. It argues that it incurred time and expense 
18 in evaluat exhibits, which in the bank's view debtors 
19 never really intended to use. IIB sees the identification 
20 and disclosure of the exhibits, coupled with a later waiver, 
21 as evidencing a design, which from the outset was to the 
22 bank to unnecessary work and expense. While the 
23 taken the debtors' and counsel to with the 
24 pretrial orders is, frankly, unfathomable, and the Court is 
25 not ssed with the post facto rationalizations, it c 
0 .v 
6 
1 reach tne conclusion that the identification CI the exhibits 
2 and orov sion of the same to the bank at the init a deadl e 
3 we~ done with a then oresent ana existing intent to never use 
4 any exhibits all. For that reason this aspect 
5 ~~n°~ion~ motion will be denied. 
6 The next aspect is the del2y or the debtors in 
7 filicg r coIT<plete section 720 (a) (10) ·v1aiver. vvhen 
8 executed that waiver, correct the .:::atally falled -- flawed 
9 al waiver approach that had earlier attempted, they 
10 did so on l. The waiver wasn't actually filed until 
11 13, the trial was scheduled to start on 26. IIB request 
sanctions in the amount of $43,960.15, which encompass fees 
13 and costs incurred from March 3, when debtors becane aware 
14 th::-cu ny rul that a partial waiver of discharge would 
15 not .::: - y I to 20, the date that the waiver in proper form 
16 was approved. 
17 Initially the Court would conclude and find that 
8 the proper t spa::1 for the of sanctions on 
19 this behavior would be from May 1, when a proper and 
20 27 (a) (10) iant V}ai ver was executed to May 13, the 
21 it was filed before the Court. In revi Exhibit E to the 
22 sanctions motion, I believe the fees in the shorter period of 
23 time would be $16,044. The question is whether this amcun 
24 should be addressed as a sanction? 
25 From the prior ~ul on the cartial iver, 
?. 
debtors and counsel knew that only a waiver of 
discharge as to all claims would be consis ent ith the cede 
and with case authorities. It clear was one avenue 
4 available for debtors to resolve matters and of course it 
5 would have tne consequence of moot the trial. The focus 
6 therefore, has to be on the reason for the de from l 
7 to May 13. IIB asserts that debtors and their attorney knew 
8 that IIB was ng dil tly for trial and that the 
9 delay was simply for the purpose and the intent to increase 
0 the cost incurred the bank. In submissions made in 
11 opposition to the motion, debtors assert that the reason for 
12 sitting on the l executed waiver for two weeks was so 
that could ore one last a at settlement. 
There are attachments, C emails between the ies 
attorneys that indicate sett ement discussions did in fact 
16 occur. Even debtors were obvious y aware that the 
17 bank and its diligent counsel would be finalizing 
18 preparations for the trial, even debtors were 
19 aware that, if necessary they could file waiver and moot the 
20 trial. 
21 I can't find on this record that the two wee delay 
22 in filing the waiver was done with the purpose and intent to 
23 oppress and cause expense, that is to say delay for the sake 
2L of delay and to increase the injury, knowing that the ver 
25 would inevitably be filed. Had the settlement been reached, 
38 
1 the trial preparation expense would still have been incurred 
2 the bank, but che waiver of course, in the context of a 
3 settle~ent, would not need to be sed and the waiver of 
4 course, deals with not just the bank's debt. For those 
5 reasons I find that the record is insufficient to s 
6 the sanctions motion and chis aspect of che motion will 
7 denied. 
8 IIB also, as I noced, requested fees and costs for 
9 bri t~e s2nctions notio~, that's under Exhibit~ to the 
10 motion. While a portion -- whiled ion of the sanctions 
11 motion is go to be granted, as I've indicated, a 
12 si ficant ion will not, and I have concluded that I 
,13 will not award fees incurred in brief and argu the 
anctions ~,otion. 
15 So Lhe motion ill be granted in part, the amount 
16 of $49,477.46 will be assessed against the debtors and their 
17 attorney, Jonathan Frantz, jointly and severally and I will 
18 otherwise the sanctions motion. In reaching this 
19 conclusion, I think there's one other issue that should be 
20 briefly addressed. 
2l Attorney Frantz has argued that IIB, in see 
22 sanctions against him but not against the debtors' other 
23 attorney, Mr. McCrea, is evidence of personal enmi r 
24 otherwise shows that the motion is urged improper 
25 I've noted, I've determined that a portion of the mot en w 1 
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1 be granted, an assessment nade ointlv and several 
21 not also against McCrea? The first ands 
5 -:hat 3 did not reouest sanctions against Mr. McCrea and, 
4 thus, I'm not real oresented with that auestion. But a 
5 second and more telling answer has to do with the conduct of 
6 the adversary proceeding. Attorney Frantz at the 
7 outset of the adversary proceeding, moved unsuccessfully to 
8 strik.e the int and subsequently answered i . Mr. 
9 McCrea later appeared as co-counsel Docket 17. In 
10 S r of last year Mr. McCrea fiied a motion to withdraw, 
11 Docket 32. Then in the October motions filed in the 
12 adversary proceeding Attorney Frantz, he represented that 
13 the deb~ors had asked Mr. McCrea to cease representation in 
14 the adversary proceeding in order to reduce legal costs. I 
15 did not allow Mr. McCrea's total withdrawal. Instead I 
16 indicated that he would be responsible for one discrete 
17 aspect of the adversary proceeding and that would be, should 
18 trial occur and should Jonathan Frantz be called to testi 
19 Mr. McCrea would have to act as debtors' counsel during the 
20 examination and cross examination of Mr. Frantz. The two 
21 hearing on the disqualification of IIB's counsel, the mat-:er 
22 which supports the award of sanctions was conducted 
23 Attorney Frantz. It is that aspect of the case and only that 
24 aspect for which I have today, found sanctions to be 
25 appropriately imposed. Mr. McCrea was not involved there, 
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l nor does it appear e was involved in the related state court 
2 case that 've discussed earlier. I perceive no reason for 
3 ~ of the sanctions related to the 
4 disqualification motion on Mr. McCrea and cannot, as to him, 
5 Tt1ake tf':e finC.ings 2nd conclusions that are :::-equired of rrte 
6 under the case law. 
7 Additional , I c·oselv observed the conduct of all 
8 counsel in this case and in the underlying ban cy case 
9 and in connection with the various ead~ngs and matters. In 
10 reflect upon the conduct of both of debtors' counsel, I 
1 can sirr;ply say the nature of their respective conduct and 
their respective credibili is in a word, different. 
3 So in conclusion, the fee motion is denied on 
4 jurisdictional The sanctions motion is n 
15 part and denied in Under the discovery rules the fees 
16 I and costs on the motion to compel will be allowed, taxable 
17 costs will be allowed under Rule 7054. 
18 ocriate orders have been prepared and will be 
19 l shortly after the conclusion of this case, which is 
20 now. 
21 We're adjourned. 
22 PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:01:06 P.M. 
23 * * * * ·k 
24 
25 
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l\iA.R TIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
CYNTHIA M. fRA_r'.)TZ, an individual, 
IS ON APPEAL- 1 
Case 
Chapter 7 
Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024 
Case 13-07024-TLM Doc 150 Filed 10/09/15 Entered 10/09/15 17:16:37 Desc n 
Document Page 2 of 2 
STATEJ\'IENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The are the Issues on Appeal: 
1. Did the Bankruptcy Court eIT in granting sanctions against the Frantzes' attorney, 
Jonathon Frantz? 
2. Did the Bankrnptcy Court e1T in granting sanctions against the Frantzes? 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2015. FRA'\'TZ LAW, PLLC 
Certificate of Electronic Sen ice 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attorney for Defendants. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2015, I caused that ECF sent trne 
and conect copies of the foregoing to the following: 
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John F Kurtz, Jr.- jku11z@hawleytroxell.com 
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@hawleytroxell.com 
ON 2 
